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Abstract
This dissertation examines the shared struggles and political horizons of citizens and non-citizens
living together in squatted buildings in central São Paulo, Brazil. Building on six months of
ethnographic fieldwork, it focuses on the coalition forged between the MSTC (Movimento Sem
Teto do Centro, i.e. Central São Paulo Roofless Movement) and international migrants and
asylum-seekers who have taken up residence in the movement’s squats. This dissertation argues
that the problem of political subjectivity and belonging at the urban margins is deeply shaped by
the struggles for adequate housing. Further, that looking at the divergent aspirations and claimsmaking of citizens and international migrants reveals how the ideal of full citizenship can inspire
progressive change, but at the same time can reinscribe discourses that promote inequality, and
also fail to fully capture people’s political imaginations. The dissertation highlights how squatters,
and those inhabiting precarious forms of housing more generally, are constructed as the immanent
others of the city’s “good” or “full” citizens; portrayed as burdens and threats to society, they are
perceived as undeserving of rights and political participation, regardless of their formal citizenship
status. The constitution of the virtuous identity of the citizen in cities is thus intimately tied to
processes of residential segregation. In analysing the aspirations and claims-making of those
pushed to the margins of both cities and of citizenship, the dissertation illustrates that when they
articulate a discourse that positions them as valuable city dwellers deserving of rights, they can
contest ingrained prejudices and access rights and political recognition, but that they risk
reinforcing the notion that not all city dwellers should expect to be treated as “full citizens.” The
dissertation also shows that international migrants, with horizons informed by transnational ties,
can evade the local discourse of deservingness, and thus reveal the limitations of fighting for full
citizenship in highly unequal cities—and also critique the legitimacy of international borders
guarding national citizenship regimes. These arguments have implications for how we
conceptualize the relationship between cities and citizenship, for how we analyse the political
horizons of international migrants, and for how we interpret coalitions forged between citizens and
non-citizens.
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Introduction

Cities, as opposed to rural areas, became the living spaces for the majority of humanity in the
twenty first century. 1 Cities have historically grown by attracting migrants—rich and poor,
domestic and international—and they continue to work as the core magnets for human mobility.
But cities have also historically socio-spatially segregated their newcomers. The disenfranchised
ones are often pushed to brave the wilds of the urban fringes, or to carve out an informal space to
improvise their dwellings around the urban infrastructure (along train tracks or on steep hills, for
example, occupying the precarious available space). Cities have also historically been central
spaces for the development of citizenship. Western genealogies of citizenship commonly establish
its “birth” in the Ancient Greek polis. The word citizen itself derives its origin from 1300’s AngloFrench citisein (feminine citeseine), meaning “inhabitant of a city or town.”2 But again historically,
not all city dwellers have been equal citizens, both formally (in terms of legal status) and
practically (in terms of being recognizes as rights bearers and political subjects).
This dissertation proposes a way to think about cities, migration, segregation, and
citizenship in tandem. It discusses how, especially in highly unequal cities, those pushed to live at
the urban margins (which are traditionally spaces of arrival for disenfranchised newcomers) are
often also pushed to the margins of citizenship, or of cities’ “community of value” (Anderson
2013). The community of value is a moral and normative community composed of the “good
citizens”—that is, those who demonstrate a certain set of values and exemplary behaviours and

1

It is estimated that at some point in between 2007 and 2008, for the first time in human history, more than half of
the world’s population lived in cities rather than in urban areas (UNFPA 2007).
2
For a full explanation of the etymology of the word citizen, see https://www.etymonline.com/search?q=citizen.
Accessed 20 August 2020.
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whose rights and belonging are self-evident. The dissertation highlights that, whether they are
citizens or non-citizens, those inhabiting precarious neighbourhoods and forms of housing are
often constructed as the immanent others of the city’s “good” or “full citizens”: they tend to be
portrayed as burdens and threats to society, and, as such, they are not generally perceived as
deserving of rights or political participation. I call these spaces at the margins of cities and of
citizenship “eviction rooms,” a term borrowed from the late writer and former São Paulo favela
dweller Carolina Maria de Jesus (2017 [1960]).
This dissertation also explores the “politics of the evicted,” or the sort of citizenship politics
that might emerge from those living at the urban margins. In their claims-making and aspirations,
do eviction room dwellers seek to prove their worth and deservingness and to integrate the city’s
community of value? What are the promises and limitations of engaging in this sort of citizenship
politics? Or do they evade this deserving/undeserving dynamic and carve out different ways of
being political in cities?
This research explores these questions by analysing the encounter between disenfranchised
citizens and recently-arrived international migrants living together in squatted buildings in central
São Paulo, Brazil. It focuses primarily on the fragile coalition forged between the housing
movement MSTC (Movimento Sem Teto do Centro, i.e. City Centre’s Roofless Movement), which
organizes different squats in central São Paulo, and international migrants and asylum-seekers
coming mostly from Haiti, Angola, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). It shows that
these Brazilians and international migrants 3 face a common struggle for dignified living standards

3

In this dissertation, I refer to the Haitian, Angolan, and Congolese people living in squats in central São Paulo as
international migrants rather than as refugees or asylum-seekers. In technical terms, many of them were asylumseekers (people who had applied for legal protection as a refugee and were awaiting a decision from the Brazilian
government), or had obtained permanent residence (most commonly by having a child who was born in Brazil), while
some had been granted a humanitarian visa (the case for most of the Haitian migrants), and hardly any had been
granted refugee status. It was more common for the Congolese to self-identify as refugees, but such an identification
was rare among the Angolans and Haitians. I opted to refer to them all as international migrants because this is a more
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in the city and, that, as squatters, they are similarly situated at the margins of São Paulo’s
community of value, being generally perceived as both “bums” (vagabundos) and criminal
invaders. But in exploring their aspirations and visions of transformation, it shows that the
Brazilians leading the MSTC actively engage in a citizenship agenda aimed at inserting squatters
into the city’s community of value as “full citizens” deserving of social rights (most notably, the
right to adequate housing). The movement does so by exhorting all squatters, through the
disciplinary codes of squat life, to behave as honest hardworking people who are also politically
mobilized to claim their rights. This agenda, while often allowing for concrete “victories” (as in
securing publicly-funded housing solutions to its members), and for an expansion of the city’s
community of value, also ends up inadvertently reproducing the deserving/undeserving dynamic
undergirding the city’s community of value. In contrast, the international migrants living alongside
Brazilians in squats tend to show scepticism towards the ideal of full citizenship in a city like São
Paulo, and they evade the discourse of deservingness that sustains the boundaries of the city’s
community of value. With horizons stretching beyond São Paulo and Brazil, they often harbour
hopes or concrete plans to migrate to a country in the global North, and they articulate a
cosmopolitan discourse, inspired by religious beliefs and anti-colonial sentiments, that challenges
the legitimacy of international borders obstructing their mobility.

Local context and global challenges

general term that can encompass different legal statuses and motivations for migration and that simply conveys the
idea that these people had come from other countries (as opposed to domestic migrants) and had not obtained Brazilian
citizenship.
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Especially since the early 2010s, Brazil has become a more prominent destination for migrants and
asylum-seekers from the global South, receiving growing numbers of newcomers from beyond
South America (Silva et al. 2018; Magalhães et al. 2018). Some of these newcomers were attracted
by the image of Brazil as an emerging country where they could obtain protection and better living
standards, while others saw it as a temporary stop or a way station en route to the global North.
Most of them converged in São Paulo, the country’s economic powerhouse. As the Brazilian
economy became engulfed in an economic crisis from the middle of 2014 onward, and the
unemployment rate soared, a growing number of these international migrants have resorted to the
city’s downtown squats as a housing solution. The main factors pushing them to the squats are not
fundamentally different from the ones pushing their Brazilian neighbours to these buildings: the
city’s exorbitant rents, low-paying or precarious informal jobs, unemployment, and racism.
São Paulo is at once the national hub for international migrants and a city with an acute
housing crisis and highly influential housing movements. As in Johannesburg, Los Angeles, and
many other metropolises, its traditional central districts have been relatively abandoned by public
and private investments and by the upper-classes, who migrated to new centralities with luxurious
condos and high-rise glass office buildings. The urban poor have been politically and physically
reclaiming these central districts of São Paulo since the late 1990s, squatting abandoned buildings
in organized housing movements that criticize the existence of so many “homes without people”
while there are so many “people without a home.” The discourse of these housing movements is
often couched in the language of citizenship: housing is a citizenship right, and they work to
“rescue” the citizenship of the urban poor by providing them with political education in their
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socialization in squats.4 International migrants, non-citizens by definition, have increasingly joined
these movements out of necessity. They were found living in 58% of the estimated 51 squatted
buildings in central São Paulo in 2018, according to a survey conducted by the municipal
government (Prefeitura de São Paulo 2018).
The travails of the international migrants and Brazilians living in São Paulo’s central squats
illustrate some key contemporary urban and migration challenges. On the migration side, this
dissertation offers an account of the strategies undertaken by “undesirable” international migrants
in the face of restrictive immigration and asylum policies in more desirable destination countries
and severe marginalization in the more accessible ones. Critical scholarship on international
migration has highlighted how, alongside global governance agendas for greater “migration
management” (Pécoud 2009), there has been an increasing trend towards restrictive immigration
and asylum policies and militarized border security, especially but not only among countries of
the global North. There is now a vast literature analysing the state discourses and practices that
seek to prevent, criminalize, and contain non-authorized movements, be they forced or voluntary
(Andersson 2014; Mountz 2015; De Genova 2016). These policies have been shown not to work
in containing undesired flows but rather to exacerbate the “problem” they intend to target (Massey
et al. 2016). They have also led to a rerouting of migrants’ journeys, both around border regions
but also across larger geographical areas. Increasingly restrictive immigration and asylum policies
in the North have been partly responsible for diversifying destinations across the relatively more
porous global South (Castles 2014; IOM 2017). As the literature on South-South migration has
shown, while disenfranchised migrants might find easier access to the territories of many

4

As I explain in Chapter Two, especially since the late 1970s, social movements in Brazil have largely framed their
claims to the state in terms of a citizenship agenda. For an overview of the prominence of the notion of citizenship
among many Brazilian social movements, see Dagnino (2007).
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developing countries, they generally struggle alongside locals to access rights, protection, and
benefits (Hujo and Piper 2007; Bakewell et al. 2009). While living in squats in São Paulo, the
international migrants considered in this dissertation were exposed to the same sort of local, urban
governance that their Brazilian neighbours knew too well: a governance based on neglect, eviction
threats, and criminalization.
On the urban side, this dissertation is an account of an on-the-ground housing struggle of
marginalized urban dwellers in a city that, like many others across the global South and North, has
become increasingly unaffordable. The majority of the world’s population currently lives in cities
of the global South, which have been known for their rapid and often unplanned growth, for their
stark inequalities that make them divided cities, and for the proliferation of informal precarious
settlements where the urban majority lives (Samara et al. 2013). 5 But the “housing crisis” is
currently a global one that is not restricted to the global South. Cities of the global North are also
increasingly segregated and polarized thanks to a neoliberal urban governance model (Smith 1996;
Keil 2020). In 2014, it was estimated that at least one billion people were not adequately housed
in the world (UN-Habitat 2014). The commodification and, especially since the 1980s, the
financialization of housing have contributed to this figure—housing as a lived space is increasingly
turned into an asset whose price is ever-increasing to guarantee investment returns (Sassen 2017;
Rolnik 2019).6 Still, to talk about a contemporary housing “crisis” makes this problem seem
exceptional, rather than an inherent feature of capitalism. As David Madden and Peter Marcuse
(2016, 10) stress, “housing is not produced and distributed for the purpose of dwelling for all; it is

5

These processes have been thoroughly analysed by Southern urbanism, a research agenda that has challenged
catastrophic and abject portrayals of urbanization in the global South and produced a robust body of urban theory that
does not assume North-Atlantic urbanization as the norm or a standard to be achieved (Nuttall and Mbembe 2005;
McFarlane 2008; Roy 2009; Caldeira 2017).
6
The intricacies and unsustainability of the financialization of housing came to light dramatically in 2007, when
subprime lending and housing speculation in American markets brought the global economy to a halt.
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produced and distributed as a commodity to enrich a few. Housing crisis is not a result of the
system breaking down but of the system working as intended.”

Personal motivations

I have focused on the issue of housing because, having grown up in the divided city of Rio de
Janeiro, I have always seen it as a key factor determining not only people’s living standards, their
opportunities for social mobility, and their access to public services, but also their political
standing in the city. Adequate housing is a recognized right under international human rights law 7
and in many countries’ legislation—in Brazil, it is enshrined in the Constitution. The United
Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner (OHCHR n.d.) recognizes housing as
“the basis of stability and security for an individual or family” and the “centre of our social,
emotional and sometimes economic lives.” It is a particularly important social right because
without a home and documentation proving residence, people are often unable to access other
social services and support (such as education and benefits), to obtain formal jobs or open bank
accounts, to vote or make formal claims on the state. But as I argue in this dissertation, people’s
housing also impacts their ability to be seen as “full” or “good” citizens, understood as valid and
valued members of the public, as political subjects, and as rights-bearers. Those inhabiting
precarious forms of housing and neighbourhoods are often treated by the police, government
authorities, real estate developers, the mainstream media, and parts of the middle- and upper-

7

For example, adequate housing is recognized as part of the right to an adequate standard of living in the 1948
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights.
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classes as people whose entitlement to rights is not self-evident and whose belonging to the city is
under suspicion.
Also because of my experiences in Rio, I knew that housing was a key source of distress
and struggle not only for Brazilians but also for disenfranchised international newcomers. I began
reflecting on this while I was a master’s student in the city and worked as a volunteer at Cáritas, a
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) implementing partner in Rio. On my
bus commute, I saw each day how the asylum-seekers and refugees assisted by Cáritas had been
pushed to the most peripheral and under-serviced favelas of Rio and its metropolitan region, their
stops much further down the line from my own. In the absence of shelters or housing-related
services for newcomers in the city, they gradually built their own communities in neighbourhoods
underserved and often controlled by criminal organizations, while some ended up living on the
streets. This informed my understanding that especially in highly unequal host societies, we cannot
understand migrants’ struggles in isolation or only in terms of their “migrant-ness.”

Research questions and main arguments

The aim of this work is to answer two main questions:

1) How can we conceptualize the intersecting struggles of citizens and non-citizens living
together at the urban margins?
2) What sort of visions of transformation do they articulate? In exploring this latter question,
the dissertation focuses on how those at the urban margins engage with the horizon of
citizenship.

8

In answering these questions, the dissertation highlights how squatters, and those inhabiting
precarious forms of housing more generally, are generally constructed as the immanent others of
the city’s good or full citizens. They are at the margins of what Bridget Anderson (2013) has called
the “community of value,” which encompasses those who are valued members of the public, and
whose rights and belonging are self-evident. The urban margins are traditionally spaces of arrival,
where disenfranchised domestic and international migrants tend to settle. I call these spaces at the
margins of cities and of citizenship “eviction rooms” (De Jesus 2017 [1960]). Eviction room
dwellers, whether formal citizens or not, are often constructed as burdensome or threatening
elements to the city (for example, as vagrants, criminals, diseased, etc.); hence, their deservingness
of rights and entitlement to political participation is generally under question. This, in turn, impacts
their political strategies whenever they make claims to rights and justice. In order to have their
claims be seen as legitimate, eviction room dwellers are often pressed to counteract prejudices
attached to their neighbourhoods and communities and prove that they are valuable members of
the city (for example, they might stress they are hardworking people who are not involved with
criminal activities). Bu while this sort of discourse is often necessary and can help advance their
causes, it also reproduces the deserving/undeserving, valued/unvalued dynamics of the community
of value, and the unequal realization of citizenship. The dissertation thus argues that the question
of political subjectivity and belonging at the urban margins is deeply shaped by the struggles for
adequate housing.
Further, this research argues that looking at the divergent aspirations and claims-making of
citizens and international migrants reveals how the ideal of full citizenship can inspire progressive
change, but at the same time can reinforce discourses that promote inequality, and also fail to fully
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capture people’s political imaginations. As I show, the Brazilian squatters leading the MSTC
invested in a discourse aimed at inserting squatters into the city’s community of value, by insisting
they were not “bums” or criminals, but “full citizens,” understood as hardworking and politically
engaged people. This approach has allowed for important achievements, such as squatters’ access
to dignified and well-located housing, and a change in their own self-perception as valuable
members of the city. At the same time, this approach reinforces the exclusionary dynamics of the
city’s community of value, as it does not question the premise that some urban dwellers are
deserving of rights (because they adopt certain exemplary behaviours) while others are not. I also
show that the international migrants living in squats tended to evade the discourse of deservingness
that sustains the boundaries of the city’s community of value. In showing reluctance to engaging
in this citizenship politics, these migrants raise questions about the value of struggling for inclusion
in a highly exclusionary city. Finally, I highlight how disenfranchised international migrants,
inspired by transnational family responsibilities and connections, can not only bypass local
discourses of citizenship based on deservingness, but also articulate a discourse that rejects the
legitimacy of citizenship as a regime of control over mobility, even if they do not articulate the
clear contours of an alternative political community (beyond citizenship).

Theoretical interventions

The main theoretical contributions of this dissertation can be discussed in relation to two main
lines of investigation that do not constitute clearly bounded literatures in themselves. The first one
is the line of investigation around the connection between cities and citizenship, and in particular
the question of how housing and residential segregation impact the politics of citizenship in cities.

10

The second one analyses the promise and limitation of the political horizon of citizenship, and
specifically the extent to which this horizon might be liberating for both marginalized citizens and
non-citizens. In the next subsections, I discuss each of these lines of investigation in turn.

Cities, citizenship, and housing

The city is not an obvious site through which to analyse citizenship. This is because since the
eighteenth century, citizenship has rather been conceived as being coterminous with the state.
However, as I outline in the next chapter, citizenship and cities have been intimately linked, from
the “birth” of Western notions of citizenship until today. In recent decades, there has been a
resurgence of scholarly interest in the role of cities in shaping citizenship (Holston and Appadurai
1999; Isin 1999; Smith and McQuarrie 2012). This interest has been partly animated by
assessments that, in a globalizing reality, the state can no longer be taken as the sole or even main
container of political community (Linklater 1996; Magnusson 1996). In this context, some authors
have considered the possibility of repositioning the city as the key political unit determining the
boundaries of membership, belonging, and rights amid transnational flows (Brodie 2000; Bauböck
2003; Purcell 2003). Other authors refer to urban citizenship as a dimension of political belonging
and claims-making that already exists in constant tension with the national one, and that is also
interspersed by transnational or global allegiances and claims (Holston and Appadurai 1999;
Sassen 2002).
The approach adopted to the city-citizenship link in this dissertation is in tune with works
that underscore how the city is a key site through which the meaning and practice of citizenship is
constituted (Isin 2000, 2002; Staeheli 2003). This entails seeing citizenship less as a formal legal
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status within a nation-state comprising certain rights and duties (as in T. H. Marshall’s [1992]
classic formulation), but more as a relational process that defines individuals’ and groups’
membership in a political community. This sort of approach to citizenship underscores how “the
processes and practices that make someone into a full member of a given political community are
at least as important as the end result itself (status)” (Lazar and Nuijten 2013, 3). 8 Lynn Staeheli
(2003) emphasizes that the questions that undergird such a relational approach to citizenship
“concern the ways in which individuals and social groups identify themselves in relation to a
broader community and the political strategies of incorporation that are developed.” She adds that,
“In these strategies and in the routinized interactions that shape social relations and feelings of
belonging, the spaces of the city are centrally important” (99). Hence, the city is not simply a place
where people meet and interact, but it is taken as a central locus for claims-making and identity
formation, where people engage most palpably with the substantive aspects of citizenship (that is,
questions of belonging, rights, justice, etc.).
In my analysis of how the politics of citizenship plays out in cities, I build largely on
Bridget Anderson’s (2013) concept of the “community of value.” This concept underscores how
citizenship, despite being based on claims of universalism and inclusion, always presupposes
social hierarchies and moral judgements distinguishing those who are valued members of the
national or local community and those who are not, or not-quite so. The “community of value” is
inhabited by the “good citizens,” who are commonly associated with the “liberal sovereign self:
rational, self-owning, and independent” and who also consider the interests of others (3). The good
citizens embody not only the cultural traits associated with the local and national community but,
mostly importantly, they perform exemplary behaviours and share certain values which attest their

This is in line with what Engin Isin (2000, 5) calls the “sociological definition of citizenship” which underscores the
“social process through which individuals and social groups engage in claiming, expanding or losing rights.”
8
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virtues and belonging. The good citizens have values and are valued, and therefore their
entitlement to rights is self-evident. But their identity depends on the constitution of its others: the
failed citizen (who does not live up to the liberal ideals), and the non-citizen. The rights and
belonging of the latter two are not self-evident, regardless of formal entitlements. But the failed
and the non-citizen can move up this social hierarchy and become “tolerated citizens,” if they
manage to prove they are not a social disappointment or a threat, but people with values and value
(as in “worth”)—examples can be found in the legitimate welfare claimant and in the hardworking
immigrant. Tolerated citizens are only contingently accepted within the community of value. As
such, they tend to be “the guardians of good citizenship”: they “must endlessly prove themselves,
marking the borders, particularly of course by decrying each other to prove that they have the right
values” (6).
My dissertation contributes to a literature on the constitution of citizenship in cities by
highlighting the relevance of housing and residential segregation for the constitution of the city’s
community of value. Engin Isin (2002), whose work is discussed in the next chapter, contends that
the constitution of the virtuous identity of citizenship through cities cannot be disassociated from
the production of forms of alterity, by constituting immanent groups as the “others” of this virtuous
identity. He argues that, historically, the citizens are “those who were able to constitute themselves
as a group, confer rights on and impose obligations on each other, institute rituals of belonging
and rites of passage, and above all, differentiate themselves from others, constructing an identity
and an alterity simultaneously” (2). Building on this, I highlight that the constitution of the
meaningful identity of the citizen in cities is often built on the constitution of those inhabiting the
urban margins as its immanent others.

13

It needs to be stressed that the question of housing and residential segregation has been
analysed in relation to citizenship by many authors and in different ways. Scholars such as Iris
Marion Young (1999) have shown how segregation is anathema to the inclusive and democratic
aspects of citizenship. Young argues that the residential racial segregation found in American cities
goes against the values of citizenship: it disrespects the principle of equal opportunity, it further
entrenches inequality, and it harms communication across segregated groups. 9 Other scholars have
shown how conditions of segregation and precarious housing can ignite grassroots mobilizations
that press for a more democratic urban politics and for new conceptions of (urban) citizenship
(Appadurai 2002; Holston 2008; Caldeira 2017; Earle 2017). The urban margins are thus regarded
as “spaces of invention of new democratic practices” (Caldeira 2017, 9), of a deepening of
democracy (Appadurai 2002), as spaces of “insurgent” (Holston 2008) or “transgressive” (Earle
2017) citizenship. Finally, many analyses, which are associated with the latter, have adopted the
notion of “the right to the city” to analyse the connection between housing struggles and citizenship
(Fawaz 2013; Huchzermeyer 2014; Rolnik 2014). These analyses emphasize how struggles for
housing, especially those that involve the urban poor’s appropriation of public or private property,
are ultimately struggles for the right to the city, understood as an agenda that entails an alternative
urban future and alternative relations of citizenship (Harvey 2008; Marcuse 2010). These analyses
are inspired by Henri Lefebvre’s (1996) original notion of the right to the city, which is about a
radical urban agenda that positions all those who inhabit the city (those who contribute to the
everyday experience and space of the city) as citadins (a fusion of the citizen with the
denizen/inhabitant). In Lefebvre’s formulation, citadins are entitled to the right to both appropriate

Along similar lines, Teresa Caldeira (1999, 136) claims that highly segregated “cities of walls” contribute to the
“corrosion” of citizenship. She analyses how spatial segregation created by the proliferation of gated communities in
cities such as São Paulo and Los Angeles diminishes interactions across social groups and fosters an urban
environment in which “different groups belong to separate universes and have irreconcilable claims” (136).
9
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the urban space (leading to an abolition of private property) and to participate in all decisions that
impact the production of urban space (leading to an eventual withering away of the state) (Purcell
2002, 2013).
All these works have contributed to an understanding of how citizenship is impacted by
the question of housing and residential segregation in cities, and of how the issue of housing can
lead to progressive and radical notions of (urban) citizenship. However, the question of how
housing and segregation impact urban dwellers’ effective ability to be seen as equal and valued
members of the public and deserving of rights and protection has not received much theoretical
attention. As Rolnik (2014, 295) stresses, “It is no overstatement to say that to be deprived of
adequate housing is to be deprived of the very possibility to be part of and enjoy the city life.” But
how does the deprivation of adequate housing impact urban dwellers’ political belonging to the
city? I propose the notion of the eviction room as a way to conceptualize this question. Inadequate
housing does not only impact urban dwellers’ general wellbeing and health and their access to the
opportunities and social rights that city life can afford. It also impacts their ability to be recognized
as full or good citizens, as those deserving of rights and protection and who can have a say in the
political decisions that affect their lives. Eviction room dwellers are thus often pressed to show
their deservingness when making claims to rights and fair treatment. This leads to my second main
question: What sort of visions of transformation can be found among citizens and non-citizens
living together at the urban margins? How do these visions engage with the question of citizenship?

The horizon of citizenship: promise, limitations, and the struggles of non-citizens
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The term horizon has pervaded Western philosophy, and it features prominently in the work of
phenomenologists, most notably in the work of Edmund Husserl. In Husserl’s work a “horizon is
always situated, historical, and subjective” and it “structures thought and limits imagination”
(Hansen 2015, 229). In simple terms, we can see people’s horizons as informing what they
conceive as possible; that is, they inform what people can see ahead of them. This understanding
of the term is rooted in our experience of the geographical horizon itself, the line where the ocean
meets the sky, and which limits our field of vision. The horizon therefore imposes a limit on (or
delimits) what we can see, and, in principle, this limit is unsurpassable: “the more I approach it,
the more it recedes; the more I advance toward it, the more it distances itself from me” (Geniusas
2012, 2). But the horizon does not always present itself the same way, and it can change and expand
as we change our positions, as we move closer to it or further away from it. The horizon is thus
relative to our whereabouts or situatedness, and the “question of how we came to inhabit our
present standpoint thereby proves to be inseparable from the generation of the horizon itself”
(Geniusas 2012, 2). In other words, how we have arrived at where we are (our past experiences or
background) and where we are (our situatedness) inform what we can see and imagine ahead of
us, our horizons.
Thomas Blom Hansen (2015, 229) argues that citizenship has become “a meaningful and
effective horizon for political imagination across the globe.” As such, citizenship often informs
our thought and imagination, and it shows us what we could potentially achieve politically. We
can thus conceive of citizenship more as a promise than an institution or a formal legal status. As
Hansen highlights, we tend to measure different problematic social circumstances (deprivation,
exploitation, and injustice, for example) against the vaguely-conceived standard of “full
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citizenship.” But, as a horizon, citizenship is a “never fully realized ideal” (231) and it is precisely
its unachievable character that guides and feeds so many people’s pursuits.
Anne McNevin (2019, 2020) and Peter Nyers (2017) engage critically with this notion of
political horizons and the horizon of citizenship in particular. McNevin (2019) takes issue with
how our political imagination has been constrained by assumptions around “international space”
and “progressive time,” both of which can be seen as coordinates of the horizon of citizenship.
International space refers to the geopolitical organization of space along the borders of sovereign
states, an organization that grants (at least in theory) political recognition and rights to citizens and
denies those to non-citizens. Progressive time refers to the notion that time unfolds in a linear way
and that the passage of time entails a forward movement, an advancement or betterment. As
McNevin (2019, 4) put it, “Progressive time suggests that citizenship, in its nation-state form, is
an obvious end-goal” (4) for all those who lack it partially or completely. T. H. Marshall’s (1992)
influential account of national citizenship is a key example of these assumptions. For Marshall,
societies “create an image of an ideal citizenship against which achievement can be measured and
towards which aspiration can be directed. The urge forward along the path thus plotted is an urge
towards a fuller measure of equality, an enrichment of the stuff of which the status is made and an
increase in the number of those on whom the status is bestowed” (18).10
Disputing these common assumptions around the necessary progress of citizenship,
McNevin (2020) underscores the “false promise of citizenship.” She stresses how citizenship has
failed to progress linearly and apply universally, how it has been “realized in vastly unequal
terms.” This criticism has been thoroughly developed by feminist, postcolonial, decolonial, and

Marshall identifies this “progress of citizenship” as taking place in England between the eighteenth and twentieth
centuries, as the scope of citizenship rights (civil, political, and social) gradually expanded in a logical succession and
as those rights came to apply to a growing proportion of the citizenry.
10
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migration scholarship.11 These works underscore how citizenship, despite being promoted as
universally inclusive, was founded on the exclusion of marginalized social groups; is still enjoyed
unequally among citizens due to prejudices and hierarchies of power; and denies rights, protection,
and political participation to all those who, most commonly due to the accident of birth, lack formal
citizenship status. McNevin thus maintains that many migrants and citizens do not experience the
progressive expansion of citizenship in practice, but rather find themselves protractedly waiting
for citizenship’s fulfilment. In the case of many citizens, this might occur as they struggle to enjoy
substantive rights and protections despite being formally entitled to those—a formal citizenship
that does not translate into an effective citizenship. In the case of many migrants, this might occur
as they find themselves in legal limbo, as they are unable to obtain permanent status for decades
or generations, and as they remain closely surveilled and at risk of deportation. Moreover,
McNevin argues that the assumption that citizenship progresses linearly works to rationalize and
legitimize the fact that many people are currently denied citizenship’s protection. The assumption
is that those people are not yet able to enjoy such protection (perhaps for lack of competence,
loyalty, or due to deviant behaviour), but that they should be incorporated, eventually. McNevin
is interested in historical and contemporary examples of struggles that are not clearly informed by
the horizon of citizenship and that somehow refuse to wait for the progress of citizenship. She sees
such struggles as creating a “moment of pause, between denial and fulfilment, endurance and
refusal, the not-yet and the yet-to-come” (emphasis in the original).
Peter Nyers (2017) interprets the metaphor of the political horizon as not just limiting our
conception of what is possible. For him, “the horizon can be both limiting and liberating” (285)
While the horizon recedes as we approach it, it can also be seen as “precisely the impossible that

11

See, for example, Lister (1997), Werbner and Yuval-Davis (1999), Mignolo (2006), and Shachar (2009).
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is enacted presently through social struggles” (285, emphasis in the original). Nyers sees different
social movements that reject the limits imposed on people’s political subjectivity and imagination,
but which have not yet found a language beyond the vocabulary of citizenship, as precisely these
liberating horizons. He frames these struggles as “incipient cosmopolitanisms,” struggles that
inhabit the terrain between the “no longer” and the “not yet”; that is, struggles that, as in
McNevin’s perspective, are not fully informed by the horizon of citizenship while neither
articulating a clear or fully-fledged alternative to it. Along the same lines, Isin and Nyers (2014,
9) call “incipient citizenship(s)” the “struggles all around the world that no longer recognize the
limits imposed on people and their political subjectivity but that have not yet articulated terms
appropriate beyond these limits.”
There is no consensus, within critical migration studies, on whether the horizon of
citizenship is an adequate lens through which to consider the struggles of disenfranchised
international migrants, especially those who are irregularized. Authors associated with the
Autonomy of Migration approach tend to see the horizon of citizenship as limiting in relation to
migrants’ struggles, while the authors associated with the Critical Citizenship Studies literature
tend to see it as potentially liberating. 12
Scholars advancing the Autonomy of Migration approach generally emphasize how
undocumented migrants are able to create an “excess” to the order of sovereignty and citizenship
(Papadopoulos, Stephenson, and Tsianos 2008; Papadopoulos and Tsianos 2013). This excess is
found both when migrants circumvent states’ borders, by making them porous, and when migrants,
once in another state, create a world of sociability and solidarity which is “below the radar” of the
state. These authors focus on how migrants build communities that neither concern the institutions

12

It is not my aim to fully describe this debate here, but simply to highlight its aspects that better illuminate my
discussion. For a summary of this debate, see Nyers (2015) and Stierl (2019, Chapter One).
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of the state nor seek the state’s recognition; how they produce “alternative ontologies, that is
alternative everyday forms of existence and alternative forms of life” (Martignoni and
Papadopoulos 2014, 40; emphasis in the original). These alternative ontologies—also referred to
as the “mobile commons”—are manifest whenever and wherever migrants share their knowledge,
establish networks of affective cooperation and support, and construct paths to cross borders and
stay in foreign countries without the state’s acquiescence. This underground world of solidarities
is where autonomists identify a “chink in the wall” of citizenship, that is, a form of political
community and identity that transcends the order of the state (Papadopoulos and Tsianos 2013,
179). Scholars associated with the Autonomy of Migration approach tend to see citizenship as
mostly an exclusionary institution dedicated to the containment and management of populations.
As Dimitris Papadopoulos and Vassilis Tsianos (2013, 179) put it, when citizenship “represents
the ultimate horizon of political practice and social analysis,” it “operates as a wall.” It is in that
sense that Ilker Ataç, Kim Rygiel, and Maurice Stierl (2016, 533) stress that from the perspective
of the Autonomy of Migration, “citizenship is regularly perceived as a sovereign and exclusionary
state instrument regulating belonging and as such unsuitable for imagining communal possibilities
beyond the script of the nation-state.”
In contrast, scholars associated with Critical Citizenship Studies stress that citizenship is
better conceptualized as a Janus-faced institution that can be deployed for control and governance
as well as for progressive change.13 As Nyers (2015, 32) put it, the Autonomy of Migration’s

In Catherine Neveu’s (2014, 87) words, citizenship can “discipline or emancipate, enforce norms or open up new
possibilities for their questioning and transformation.” Rygiel (2010) studies citizenship both as a “set of governing
practices” that enact exclusion and regulate human mobility and as a field of struggles. Nyers (2015, 34) similarly
claims that “citizenship is simultaneously a means of governance and exclusionary rule, and also an important identity
through which progressive struggles get enacted and performed.” Some Autonomy of Migration authors concede to
that interpretation. Martignoni and Papadopoulos (2014, 43), for example, recognize that citizenship “thought as a
process and not only from a juridical perspective—is still a space of conflict which can be opened up by ‘acts of
citizenship’ ...or by ‘insurgent citizenship.’”
13
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conception of citizenship as being a tool for control and exclusion misses the point that “As a
concept and practice, it [citizenship] has not been completely captured by the state or state
philosophy.” Critical Citizenship Studies authors stress that cutting loose from citizenship
analytically and politically might neither be possible (for the moment) nor necessary. In more
pragmatic terms, countless migrants cannot afford to reject states’ recognition, and campaigning
for regularization is an important political strategy through which undocumented migrants strive
for dignity and rights (McNevin 2011). But more fundamentally, these authors also stress that
“there is no outside from which one can be political,” but only “immanent relations and struggles”
(Isin and Nyers 2014, 6). They also point out that, when Autonomy of Migration authors affirm
the possibility of migrants’ transcendence of citizenship and the creation of new ontologies, they
do so without mobilizing “a genuinely alternative political topography,” as McNevin (2013, 194)
put it. Indeed, their envisioning of the mobile commons is defined by a rejection of the state order
but not by a new imaginary of who we can be as political subjects or of new forms of political
association and belonging. Authors associated with Critical Citizenship Studies tend to see the
struggles of migrants as inhabiting the space of the “no-longer” (being fully captured by the
horizon of citizenship) and the “not-yet” (articulating an alternative beyond it), as mentioned
above. McNevin (2013, 198) refers to the intangible aspect of migrants’ struggles over political
recognition as “ambivalence,” so as to stress the “dissonance between what may be emerging as
thinkable and possible on the one hand and the limits of existing analytics (including citizenship)
on the other.”
My dissertation contributes to these studies by showing some of the promises and
limitations of engagements with citizenship for citizens and non-citizens living at the urban
margins. First, it argues that agendas that invest in the “promise of citizenship” and take the ideal
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of “full citizenship” as the horizon for political struggle can bring about important and concrete
improvements for those at the urban margins, but that these agendas can be limited by their
engagement with the exclusionary dynamics of the community of value. “Full citizenship” is both
an elusive ideal or standard against which we measure social problems (as explained by Hansen),
and a value-laden identity. To be a full citizen is not only to enjoy rights, protection, and political
participation; it also requires self-creation and distinguishing oneself from those who do not show
the same values and exemplary behaviours (those who are not or not-quite full citizens). If we
analyse citizenship by paying attention to the dynamics of the community of value, we can see that
agendas that engage with the existing premises of deserving/undeserving, valued/unvalued are
bound to reproduce inequalities and legitimize citizenship’s unequal realization. Such agendas
might succeed in expanding the boundaries of the community of value (so that it includes
hardworking and politically engaged squatters, for example), but they also reinforce these
boundaries. I believe we should not underestimate the importance of this expansion and that we
cannot foresee their ultimate political implications. For those who are at the margins of the
community of value, claiming their full citizenship is often an invaluable step, and it might be a
first step in the direction of more systemic change.
Second, in analysing the aspirations and strategies of international migrants living in São
Paulo’s squats, my dissertation agrees with the point made by authors advancing the Critical
Citizenship Studies literature that disenfranchised international migrants might not generate a new
ontology or alternative to citizenship, but that they can pose a challenge to citizenship’s
exclusionary dimensions. And by these exclusionary dimensions I mean both how citizenship
operates as a regime of control over mobility and how citizenship is shaped by differentiations
between the full citizens and their immanent others.
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In relation to the latter exclusionary dimension, I show how migrants can bypass and create
a degree of “excess” (as stressed by the Autonomy of Migration approach) to the exclusionary
dynamics of the community of value, in the sense that they can evade co-optation by it. The
international migrants living in São Paulo’s squats, once invited to struggle alongside
disenfranchised Brazilians, generally show reluctance to fighting and waiting for recognition as
full citizens in a highly unequal city. Despite their marginal positioning vis-à-vis the city’s
community of value, they do not actively strive to prove their values and value in the city. They
show that those at the urban margins do not necessarily have to wait for citizenship’s presumed
progressive unfolding or to be co-opted by the deserving/undeserving binary. But I do not assume
that this sort of reluctance to engaging with the dynamics of the community of value is a necessary
stance taken by disenfranchised migrants. I believe it is a stance that is probably more common
when migrants feel disillusioned with their experiences and prospects in the host society. In
contrast, in contexts where they might have a greater sense of attachment and hope, they might
strive to become what Anderson (2013) calls “tolerated citizens” (for example, by insisting they
are hardworking individuals taking up the jobs that citizens do not want to perform), and, hence,
help reproduce the exclusionary dynamics of the community of value.
In relation to the former exclusionary dimension of citizenship, I show how, instead of
articulating a discourse about their rights or belonging to the city, some international migrants
living in São Paulo’s squats often articulated a “tactical” cosmopolitan discourse (Landau and
Freementle 2010) that evaded local commitments and emphasized the legitimacy of their
aspirations to cross international borders, even if without authorization. This discourse was based
both on criticisms of colonial enterprises (as in “because country X has exploited the resources of
my country and sown armed conflicts, we now have a right to migrate to country X”) and on
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religious beliefs (as in “God created the world for all humanity and borders are arbitrary manmade creations”). Both rationales question the boundaries that sustain the institution of citizenship
and defy the legitimacy of international space. But while these migrants criticized the legitimacy
of international borders that impede their mobility, what they were aspiring to (access to rights and
a dignified life in a prosperous country) depended on these same borders. Hence, while not
articulating a clear alternative or ontology to the sovereign order and the horizon of citizenship,
disenfranchised migrants can nonetheless evade and question the more exclusionary aspects of
citizenship: both its internal boundaries around the community of value (especially in societies
that do not meet their needs and ambitions), and its external boundaries determining who is allowed
to belong/entrance and who is not.

Methodology

A failed attempt at a Participatory Action Research (PAR) and positionality

Initially, my goal was to develop a Participatory Action Research (PAR) during fieldwork in São
Paulo. PAR has been carried out and conceptualized since the 1970s within different academic
disciplines. At its root, PAR seeks to transform the hierarchical relationship between the “studied”
(research participants) and researchers by positioning participants as co-researchers, who
ultimately define research goals and methods according to their priorities and circumstances. This
approach to research is guided by principles that also undergird feminist and decolonial
perspectives, such “reciprocity, partiality and valuing the voices of ordinary people as expert and
authoritative on their own lives” (Pain et al., 2007, 26). The “activating principle” of PAR is to
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treat the voices of co-researchers as knowledge (Krumer-Nevo 2009, 290). PAR is based on an
ethical and dialogic engagement with co-researchers and it is committed to research-informed
action. The purpose of developing a collaborative research is to devise “action(s)” that might be
valuable for the communities involved. As Sara Kindon and colleagues (2007, 14) stress, PAR has
different (not exclusively academic) standards for evaluating the quality of research: it measures
“the credibility/validity of knowledge derived from the process according to whether the resulting
action solves problems for the people involved and increases community self-determination.” I
was attracted to this sort of research because I thought it would allow me to overcome the
“extractive” mode of research production (Smith 2012), and to produce knowledge alongside
squatters who could also benefit from it.
However, my attempts to develop a PAR with the MSTC and migrants living in squats in
central São Paulo ultimately failed. I came to understand that PAR, in order to be feasible and
decrease the power inequality between researcher and research participants, requires a pre-existing
degree of equality between both sides, in the sense that both have to have the time, conditions, and
interest in developing a joint research project. PAR thus requires that the researcher identifies a
particular group that (1) is able to dedicate the time and effort to a joint research project, and (2)
believes that a joint research project can directly advance their goals. In relation to the MSTC, I
realized that I could not propose that the movement’s leadership dedicate time and effort in a joint
research project, because these were extremely busy people who had more urgent issues to attend
to (such as their own jobs, eviction threats, constant political organizing, etc.). Still, I explained to
Carmen Silva, the movement’s leader, that I was interested in learning about the participation of
international migrants in the MSTC, and that I also wanted to be able to contribute to the activities
of the movement in whatever ways she found helpful.
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The MSTC, as other housing movements in São Paulo, is used to being approached by
sympathetic researchers interested in analysing their politics and tactics. Urban scholars in São
Paulo have been key allies of the city’s housing movements over the past decades, helping to
inform their agenda and also granting their actions intellectual legitimacy and authority—for
example, if these movements get into trouble with the police or are disparaged by the media, they
often call on these researchers to make public statements defending their actions. Carmen referred
to me as an extra partner in their struggle, and I was happy to act as such. She welcomed me to
participate and help organize the movement’s activities as a “collaborator” (someone who does
not live in a squat but contributes to the movement), especially in the activities of GRIST (Grupo
de Refugiados e Imigrantes Sem Teto, i.e. Group of Roofless International Migrants and Refugees).
GRIST was then a sub-group within the MSTC responsible for better “integrating”
international migrants into the movement. At the time of my fieldwork, it was organized by four
middle-aged and middle-class Brazilian women who were also “collaborators.” I joined them in
organizing cultural events, in trying to mediate conflicts among neighbours, and in organizing
weekly “base meetings” (reuniões de base)—base meetings are mandatory meetings where wouldbe squatters are introduced to the movement’s political agenda and the rules governing daily life
in the squat. I became good friends with these other collaborators throughout the time of my
fieldwork, and we shared a sympathetic approach both to the movement and to the international
migrants living in the MSTC’s squats. As the months passed, I could see that I had become
increasingly immersed in the movement’s agenda, being able to explain its strategies and modus
operandi using its own terms. I further explain GRIST and my participation in it in Chapter Four.
In relation to the international migrants living in squats in downtown São Paulo, they did
not constitute a coherent group that I could approach with my PAR proposal in the first place.
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Also, they were struggling to make ends meet and sometimes to save some money (for remittances
or a further migration) while living in squats, pressed by the urge to provide for their family
members both near and far. Hence, I was also not in a position to try to form a group of migrant
squatters, and to expect them to dedicate their time and effort to a joint research project—an
endeavour which would not directly address their most immediate needs. Some of these
international migrants lived in the squats organized by the MSTC, while others lived in squats that
were run by shadowy groups that simply occupied empty buildings and charged a cheap “rent” per
unit. As I explain in Chapter Five, most recently-arrived international migrants live in these sorts
of squats, instead of those organized by housing movements.
The international migrants living in the MSTC squat where GRIST’s activities took place
tended to associate me with the movement. Therefore, when I interviewed them, they used to say
very little about their experience in the squat apart from expressing gratitude for having been
allowed to live there. Those living in other squats run by the MSTC did not associate me so closely
with the movement, and expressed their opinions more openly, especially in relation to the
movement’s constant demands for participation in the squat’s activities (such as in the collective
cleaning of the squat’s common areas). I was able to meet international migrants who lived in
squats not organized by housing movements through a GRIST collaborator who introduce me to a
Congolese man living in one of these squats—I have given him the pseudonym of Philippe and he
features prominently in Chapter Five. In order to protect the confidentiality of the international
migrants I interviewed, I have given them all pseudonyms.14 Philippe and I kept in touch
throughout my fieldwork and also some months afterward, and he introduced me to many of his
neighbours and fellow migrants living in other squats in downtown São Paulo. He seemed to value
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The only exception in this regard is Pitchou Luambo, a Congolese refugee who became a well-known activist for
migrants’ and refugee’s rights in São Paulo, and who is introduced in Chapter Four.
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the research I was doing. He talked about it being important for people to know the sort of struggles
international migrants were going through in São Paulo, but he also saw me as an important contact
for his future migration plans. As I explain in Chapter Five, he had plans to migrate to Canada,
which he eventually did.
The international migrants I interviewed were often curious to know why I wanted to learn
about their housing experiences in São Paulo, and some of them seemed initially suspicious of
why I took interest in this issue. As a white, middle-class, and young woman from Brazil, I was
clearly an outsider to their reality, and I got the sense that some were initially reluctant to share
their stories with me—I discuss ethical issues about the interviews below. But some migrants were
also eager to share their stories with me, which seemed to work as a cathartic experience for them.
The fact that I always presented myself as someone who was doing a Ph.D. in Canada made some
of the migrants, like Philippe, particularly eager to talk to me. If I were not a student in Canada, I
likely would not have known about how these migrants compared their experiences in Brazil to
what they assumed they would find in countries of the global North. Nor would I probably have
learned about the concrete plans some of them had to migrate to these countries. This was
something that often came up at the end of interviews, when some would ask “So how did you get
a visa to Canada?”
Despite my attempts at reflexively considering my positionality, I do not have a clear sense
of how the international migrants perceived me. And I do not think they all perceived me in the
same way, as I tried to explain above. Also, in relation to the MSTC’s leadership, the power
relation and my positionality were not straightforward. As Kirin Narayan (1993, 671-672) stresses,
positions can shift: “The loci along which we are aligned with or set apart from those whom we
study are multiple and in flux. Factors such as education, gender, sexual orientation, class, race, or
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sheer duration of contacts may at different times outweigh the cultural identity we associate with
insider or outsider status.” It was clear from the outset that the movement’s leadership saw me as
a partner or “collaborator,” and in occupying such a position I had privileged access to the
movement but also responsibilities towards it. As a Brazilian, I was an insider to the general culture
the movement was inserted in, but I was never a squatter, which made me also an outsider to their
particular struggles and perspectives. As time passed, my outsider status increasingly combined
with that of an insider, in the sense that I became more fully versed in the movement’s language
and workings.
Finally, I cannot claim to have eliminated the hierarchical relationship between researcher
and research participants, as I had control over questions asked, the interpretation of the interview
and observational material, and the way the research is disseminated. As Kim England (1994, 86)
highlights, reflexivity “can make us more aware of asymmetrical or exploitative relationships, but
it cannot remove them.” I tried to mitigate the exploitative aspects of my research by both
contributing to the activities of the MSTC during fieldwork and by trying to make the struggles of
Brazilian and migrant more visible in public discussions in São Paulo, as I explain below.

Collaboration, interviews, fieldnotes, and research dissemination

My fieldwork in São Paulo lasted six months, from early October of 2017 until late March of 2018,
and I returned for a weekend in late April, when I participated in my last meeting at an MSTC
squat. During those months I collaborated with the MSTC (as explained above), I conducted semistructured interviews, I kept a field journal, and I disseminated my research findings in the city by
presenting at events and publishing in publicly available magazines.
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In total, I interviewed 60 individuals, 32 of whom were international migrants, 14 were
activists from housing movements, ten were civil society members, and four were municipal public
officials—a list of the interviews can be found in the Appendices. These were semi-structured
interviews, with an average length of one hour. The interviews were carried out in a conversational
and informal tone, and while I generally managed to cover my main pre-determined questions,
participants also shaped the direction of the conversation, and often brought up issues I had not
anticipated discussing. The interviews were conducted in Portuguese, with the exception of one
interview that was carried out in French, with a Haitian migrant who had only been in São Paulo
for a few months. Most of the international migrants that I met living in squats had already been
in Brazil for at least a year, and they were able to communicate in Portuguese (the Angolans spoke
native Portuguese, while most of the Congolese migrants had lived in Angola before migrating to
Brazil). I first approached Missão Paz, a key civil society organization that assists international
migrants in São Paulo, and the MSTC. In both places I was able to obtain further contacts, and
through snowballing, I managed to meet more and more international migrants who lived not only
in squats run by the MSTC, but also in other squatted buildings that are not organized by a housing
movement. I did not conduct a survey of the squats and their dwellers for both logistical and ethical
reasons. Logistically, it would not be feasible for a single researcher, as there were over 50 squats
in central São Paulo during the time of my fieldwork, and many of these squats were not organized
by housing movements, but by shadowy groups (sometimes assumed to be involved with drug
dealing gangs) that were weary of the presence of researchers or journalists. Ethically, I did not
think gathering this sort of information would be in the interest of either the housing movements
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or the international migrants living in the squats. The numbers could be used by particularly hostile
public officials to support eviction orders. 15
When I interviewed a civil society member, a government official, or a publicly known housing
activist, I presented them with my letter of informed consent for signature, but when I was
interviewing squatters, I asked for their verbal consent. Considering their vulnerable position, I
believed they would not feel comfortable signing a written letter, but I still provided them with the
information contained in it, emphasized that their participation was voluntary, that they could
withdraw their participation at any point during or after the interview, and offered them my contact
information in case they would like to get in touch with me at any point. I have kept the names of
the international migrants living in squats anonymous by using pseudonyms, and I also do not
disclose the names of the Brazilians living in the MSTC’s squats that are quoted in this dissertation.
Even though some of these participants explicitly told me I could include their names in my
research, I opted to maintain their anonymity because of the risks they face in terms of
criminalization. I have kept the real names of research participants who are publicly known in São
Paulo—most notably, those of key figures of housing movements (such as the MSTC’s leader,
Carmen Silva)—since their identity and perspectives are not secret but openly voiced in, for
example, the demonstrations they organize, in their social media presence, and in the interviews
they regularly give to the media and other researchers. In the case of all interviewees, I always
asked them if they felt comfortable with my recording the interview, and in the cases when they
did not, I only took notes (no interviewee objected to note-taking). I also asked all interviewees if
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On 1 May 2018, after I had concluded my fieldwork, a squat in central São Paulo that was organized by a shadowy
group caught fire and collapsed, and this tragic incident spurred the municipal government to conduct a survey of the
squats in central São Paulo (Prefeitura de São Paulo 2018). The survey and the general response to the collapse have
led to a further criminalization of housing movements in the city.
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they would be interested in receiving a written form of my research findings. I shared the magazine
articles I wrote in Portuguese (explained below) with all those who had expressed such interest.
I transcribed the interviews in Portuguese, and I only translated into English the parts that were
quoted in the dissertation. By taking notes on the transcriptions, I identified recurring and relevant
themes. These interviews, alongside the fieldnotes, were key building blocks of the dissertation,
in the sense that they not only substantiated the findings but also informed the way these findings
were presented and the concepts and theories that the dissertation engages with.
I kept a field journal in which I wrote down my impressions after interviews, visits to squats,
and my participation in activities in the MSTC’s squats. These notes helped me to interpret
interviews later, after I had concluded fieldwork, reminding me of the circumstances of the
interview (the place where we met, how the meeting was arranged, for example), the general mood
and emotions that were conveyed, as well as of the new insights that the interaction had brought
up. But these notes were also helpful during fieldwork, supporting my preparation for future
interviews and interactions (for example, highlighting the sorts of aspects I should pay attention to
and new questions I should consider). These fieldnotes were also later used to build the vignettes
that open Chapters Three to Five. These vignettes are meant both to give the reader a more concrete
sense of the people, places, and social dynamics that inform the dissertation and to encapsulate the
main elements of the argument I develop in each chapter. 16
In addition to the interviews, the collaboration with the MSTC, and the writing of
fieldnotes, I also collaborated with the activist group Warmis during my time in São Paulo. Warmis

16

In writing these vignettes I was inspired by the work of anthropologists who incorporate lively scenes and
interactions experienced during fieldwork in their books, such as Ruben Andersson’s Illegality Inc. (2014). In writing
the fieldnotes I mostly followed the guidance of the book Writing Ethnographic Fieldnotes by Robert Emerson and
colleagues (2011), while Kirin Narayan’s (2012) Alive in the Writing guided my translation of the notes into more
polished vignettes.
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is organized by migrant women coming mostly from Latin American countries, and it seeks to
foster intercultural dialogue and promote a culture of non-violence and respect for human rights. I
participated in their weekly meetings from the end of November onwards. Their activism was not
part of my research, and I initially approached them to gauge their interest in organizing some
intervention about the obstacles that disenfranchised migrant women faced in securing housing in
São Paulo. We ended up organizing a panel discussion about this topic, which took place at Centro
Cultural São Paulo on 1 March 2018. 17 In this event, five migrant women (one from Bolivia, one
from the DRC, and two from Angola) talked about their own experiences with housing in the city
and I made a brief presentation about my findings on the experiences of migrants living in squats,
focusing on the situation of women. Our presentations were followed by a Q&A session. The
presentation was attended by migrant women but also people (mostly women) from São Paulo
(students, researchers, civil society members, and members of the general public) interested in the
topic. The migrant women at the event emphasized how their experiences in São Paulo were
marked by disillusionment, and how necessity drove them to precarious forms of housing such as
squats. Their stories and perspectives helped rein in my impulse to romanticize migrants’
participation in squats.
I also disseminated my research findings by writing a short article in the March 2018
edition of Conexão Migrante (Thomaz 2018a), a magazine published by the local NGO CDHIC
(Centro de Cidadania e Direitos Humanos do Migrante, i.e. Centre for Migrants’ Human Rights
and Citizenship), which is distributed for free and available online, and has a broad migrant
readership. I also presented my findings at an event organized by the NGO Missão Paz on 28
March 2018, which was broadcast live on Facebook. At the event, architect Paula Souza and I
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Information about the event (in Portuguese), including audio files of the presentations and Q&A can be found at:
http://www.warmismulheresbolivianas.com.br/blog/mulheres-imigrantes-e-a-luta-por-moradia-em-sao-paulo/
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presented our research on housing challenges in São Paulo—hers focused on the history of
tenements, mine on squats and the presence of international migrants in them—and we answered
questions from the public. Finally, I wrote an article in Le Monde Diplomatique Brasil (Thomaz
2018b) about the participation of international migrants in squats in downtown São Paulo, focused
on their participation in the MSTC, and highlighting the circumstances that push both Brazilians
and these newcomers to live in squats. The article was published on 4 June 2018 and is available
online (free access). I shared this piece with all those who I had interviewed and expressed interest
in learning about my research findings (which included NGO workers, public officials, housing
activists, and international migrants).

Questions of activist research

Charles Hale (2006, 97) refers to “activist research” as “a method through which we affirm a
political alignment with an organized group of people in struggle and allow dialogue with them to
shape each phase of the process, from conception of the research topic to data collection to
verification and dissemination of the results.” As explained above, this dissertation was not built
on an activist participatory methodology per se, even though that was my original intention. But
there is an activist element to my dissertation, in the sense that I am politically aligned with the
struggles of both housing movements such as the MSTC and the international migrants living in
squats in São Paulo.
The activism of the MSTC and other housing movements that similarly organize squats in
central São Paulo is essential. In a city that has a towering and ever-increasing housing deficit,
where homeless rough sleepers can be found in every corner of even the richest business areas,
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and where the urban poor are generally blamed for their poverty and seen as potential criminals,
housing movements such as the MSTC play an invaluable role. Its activism politicizes the city’s
segregation pattern, presses for inclusive policies that would not have emerged otherwise (such as
social housing in the city centre), and it encourages squatters to see themselves as valuable
members of society, as rights bearing subjects who can and must have a say in urban policies.
In my research I try to highlight the concrete and potential transformations brought by its
activism, while also unpacking its contradictions, or how it is implicated in São Paulo’s and
Brazil’s political culture of citizenship. I do not frame these contradictions as constituting a flaw
or a lack in its strategies. I try to situate these contradictions within the context they come from, a
context where housing activists are confronted with both the possibility of criminalization and with
exclusionary assumptions about who is a “full citizen” in the city. In a context where both
citizenship and human rights are assumed to apply only to deserving people, and where squatters
are perceived as burdens and threats to the public order, they cannot simply claim that squatters
should enjoy rights—they need to justify why they deserve such rights in the first place. This is
why, in Chapter Three, I frame their discourse and disciplinary strategies around transforming
squatters into full citizens as “defensive.”
I believe that movements such as the MSTC are extremely apt politically in using the
“master’s tools” to try to, if not dismantle, at least shake the foundations of “the master’s house.”18
Given the urgent needs of the people they represent, I believe they often cannot afford to do
otherwise. In aligning myself with their struggle, I also could not responsibly frame their politics
as more radical than they actually were (as anti-state or anti-capitalist, for example). As I discuss
in further detail in Chapter Three, this sort of revolutionary portrayal of these movements can end

This is in contrast to Audre Lorde’s (1984) famous dictum: “The master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s
house.”
18
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up harming them, because they depend on the state to obtain a housing solution for the squatters
they represent. If they are portrayed as radical groups, their chances of being heard in policy
discussions decrease while their chances of being framed as terrorists and criminalized grow. At
the same time, and without discounting the achievements of the MSTC’s strategies, I explore an
important tension within them. This is the tension that comes from seeking to frame squatters as
“full citizens,” understood as hardworking and politically mobilized individuals deserving of their
right to housing. As explained above, by trying to insert squatters within São Paulo’s community
of value, the movement also ends up unintentionally reinforcing the exclusionary dynamics of this
community. However, I am not convinced that the movement should change its discourse so that
it focuses on dismantling the premisses of the community of value rather than expanding it by
inserting their members in it. As I further explain in Chapter Three, such a systemic-overhaul
approach might be less effective in advancing the movement’s urgent goals (of guaranteeing
adequate housing for its members), and it might be the privilege of groups whose lives and access
to rights are not so precarious.
Combining an alignment to both the MSTC and the international migrants living in its
squats was also challenging, because they did not share similar perspectives and goals. Their
perspectives and goals were not so much in conflict as they were divergent. I do not believe the
MSTC’s leadership would have wanted me to gloss over the everyday conflicts and difficulties
they had in “bringing the migrants to the struggle,” as they were open in discussing these with me,
even in formal interviews. To be clear, I do not see either the movement or the international
migrants as taking advantage of each other; rather, I believe their encounter was more one of ships
that pass in the night. They came from different backgrounds, had different itineraries in mind—
different horizons, as I argue—but shared, for a while, a similar condition as squatters. I tried to
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represent as best as I could both the perspective taken by the MSTC’s leadership and the one taken
by the international migrants, without assuming one was “more correct” than the other. Both made
sense within their worlds. As I mentioned, I shared my Le Monde Diplomatique article, which
explains these divergent horizons, both with international migrants I interviewed and with the
leadership of the MSTC and other key housing activists in São Paulo. The feedback I received was
succinct (sometimes just a thumbs up emoji) but positive; neither side raised questions or issues
with how I portrayed their circumstances.19

Précis of the dissertation

Chapter One lays out the conceptual framework of the dissertation, which builds on insights from
mainly urban, migration, and citizenship studies. It proposes a way of seeing the interplay among
cities, migration, and citizenship through the prism of urban segregation and housing. In a nutshell,
I argue that the politics of citizenship in cities is fundamentally shaped by the problem of
residential segregation. I develop the notion of the “eviction room,” understood as spaces of arrival
at the urban margins and at the margins of citizenship. I then discuss the “politics of the evicted,”
that is, the question of how eviction room dwellers respond to their marginalization, and the extent
to which the horizon of citizenship is able to capture their aspirations and visions of transformation.
Chapter Two explores a way to “see” the urban history of São Paulo “like a squat(ter).” It
discusses how the city’s successive migration cycles and patterns of segregation have produced
The article is available online, and a Brazilian woman who lived in one of the MSTC’s squats during my fieldwork
left a spontaneous comment on it. In the Le Monde Diplomatique Brasil website, comments are submitted through
readers’ Facebook accounts, and I could recognize the woman from her profile photo (I had seen her many times in
the squat she lived in), but I do not believe she would recognize my name. In her comment, she identifies herself as
someone who lives in a squat in downtown São Paulo, says the article is “very truthful,” and thanks “everyone” for
the “transparency” and “seriousness.”
19
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different renderings of the eviction room (in the form of tenements, peripheral neighbourhoods,
favelas, and squatted buildings). The chapter also introduces the reader to the politics of citizenship
in the city and in Brazil. It also explains how the central districts of contemporary São Paulo came
to have many abandoned buildings that have been reclaimed by the urban poor. I argue that the
current presence of disenfranchised international migrants, alongside disenfranchised Brazilians,
in squats in central São Paulo, rather than being an exceptional, curious, and circumstantial
phenomenon derived from the precarities of contemporary South-South migrations, is a recent
rendering of a centuries-old urban phenomenon. The struggles of disenfranchised international
migrants living in São Paulo’s central squats mirror not only those of their Brazilian neighbours
(many of whom of domestic migrant origins), but also those of their predecessors, disenfranchised
newcomers who had been similarly evicted from the infrastructure of the “city proper” and from
its community of value.
Chapter Three explores the trajectories, strategies, practices, and discourse of housing
movements organizing squats in central São Paulo, with a focus on the MSTC. I show how these
movements have developed a sophisticated discourse legitimizing the act of squatting abandoned
property and substantiating their members’ deservingness of rights, challenging the widespread
portrayal of squatters as “bums” (vagabundos) and criminals in the city. In order to position their
members as individuals deserving of rights, the MSTC exhorts squatters to behave as hardworking
and politically mobilized individuals, and it enforces a disciplined everyday life in its squats to
instil this virtuous ethos. I argue that their citizenship discourse is defensive, in that it is designed
to advance the rights of those perceived as undeserving of rights. In seeking to “return full citizens
to the state,” the movement expands and reinforces the boundaries of the community of value.
This does not cancel out the fact that movements such as the MSTC have managed to (1) challenge
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and make a dent in the city’s pattern of segregation, and (2) transform the way many squatters see
themselves. We cannot pre-empt the generative potential of the subjective changes in squatters
who become able to see themselves and speak as rights-bearing subjects, thereby challenging
ingrained patterns of submission that have been historically prevalent among Brazil’s popular
classes.
Chapter Four analyses the fragile coalition forged between the MSTC and recently-arrived
international migrants (mainly from Haiti, Angola, and the Democratic Republic of Congo). It
explores the promises and limitations of the MSTC’s approach to these migrants as “comrades in
struggle,” insisting on the shared oppressions among squatters across the citizenship divide. It
shows how international migrants, while generally appreciating the support received in these
squats, have tended to resist the movement’s disciplinary codes and exhortations to participate in
a common urban struggle. They have also generally evaded the citizenship discourse of
deservingness in São Paulo, thereby revealing the limitations of an agenda that pursues notions of
full citizenship in a highly exclusionary city. In dialogue with a recent literature on “migrant
squatting” in European cities, I make two arguments in relation to coalitions between international
migrants and citizens squatting together. First, I make the case that we should consider that these
coalitions carry within themselves an irony: the unity between citizens and non-citizens, which is
the politically promising and potentially generative aspect of these coalitions, can also be the main
factor undermining them, if practice and analysis rely too much on a presumption of unity. Second,
and building on the first argument, I contend that we should not assume that those who find
themselves in similar situations of marginalization, even sharing the same roof over their heads,
necessarily have the same horizons.
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Chapter Five analyses the particular horizons of international migrants living in central São
Paulo’s squats. While not assuming that all these migrants have concrete plans to migrate to the
global North, I argue that the possibility of moving to a country perceived as more prosperous is
part of the horizons of many of them, especially those who are connected to wide-ranging
migration networks. Such broad horizons impact their willingness to commit to a local and longterm struggle for durable housing in the city. Instead of insisting on their right to housing or to
other social rights in São Paulo, these international migrants often showed a sense of a right to
international mobility—as such, they articulated a tactic cosmopolitan outlook, based both on
theological and anti-colonial logics. I contend that these migrants can at once bypass the internal
boundaries of citizenship delimiting the community of value and critique the external boundaries
of citizenship governing human mobility, while not clearly articulating an alternative form of
political association and belonging.
The Conclusion provides an overview of the dissertation, its main arguments, and its
contributions. It also discusses the implications of this research for policy and analysis, the
limitations and scope of the dissertation, and it indicates avenues for further research.
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Chapter One: “Eviction rooms,” arrival at the margins of cities and citizenship

Introduction

How can we conceptually make sense of the encounter between citizens and non-citizens in squats
in downtown São Paulo, the sort of shared oppressions at stake in it, its promise and frictions? This
was admittedly the main challenge I have faced in conceiving this dissertation. There is no single
literature or field of studies to which the complexities of this encounter clearly belong. Is this a
study on urban social movements, on South-South migration, on the particular challenges and
resistances found in cities of the South, on citizenship agendas, on international migrants’ struggles
and strategies in cities, on the political alliances that transcend the citizen/non-citizen divide?
These are just some examples of possible ways to frame the dissertation. While these literatures
have all supported my interpretations, none proved sufficient. A reliance on migration-related
literatures sidelined the politics of the MSTC, while a reliance on urban-politics-related literatures
sidelined the international migrants’ side of the story. An emphasis on the coalition itself did not
make enough room for the particular trajectories and aspirations of either the housing movement
or of the international migrants. In sum, the material of this dissertation speaks to different
literatures, but it inhabits their interstices. In the following sub-section, I summarise the way I
came to conceptually frame this in-between terrain.

A view from these interstices

Much scholarship has reflected on the intimate connection between cities and migration, and on
the also intimate connection between cities and citizenship. In this chapter, I propose a way of
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seeing the interplay among cities, migration, and citizenship through the prism of urban
segregation and housing. In essence, what I propose is very simple, but it will take some pages to
fully elaborate. Here, I introduce its gist—the next sections of the chapter will develop the
connections to relevant scholarship.
Cities have historically attracted and often depended on the arrival of disenfranchised
newcomers to them. Whether of domestic or foreign origins, these newcomers have been generally
pushed to inhabit forms of housing and territories at the urban margins. These marginal spaces of
arrival proliferate during processes of urbanization (as in the slums in Paris and London in the
nineteenth century, or the ones found in contemporary Lagos), but they are also visible in more
consolidated cities today, where disenfranchised newcomers often neighbour disenfranchised
citizens (many of whom of domestic migrant origins)—such as in Buenos Aires’ villas,
Johannesburg’s inner city neighbourhoods, and in the squatted buildings of São Paulo and Rome.
Cities have also historically been key places shaping the content, contours, and
contestations of what we call citizenship. However, not all city dwellers have been equally
regarded as rights bearers and as valued members of the city, as the “good citizens” belonging to
its “community of value” (Anderson 2013). In its assumed birth in Ancient Greece, citizenship
only applied to the propertied, slave-owning, warrior men of the polis. In contemporary cities,
citizenship formally applies to all passport-carrying members of the country to which the city
belongs, but, as a meaningful and valued identity, it still only applies to a select group of city
dwellers.
Connecting these two dynamics, I highlight that the constitution of the virtuous identity of
the citizen in cities often hinges on the constitution of those inhabiting marginal spaces of arrival
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as its others.20 This means that those inhabiting slums, precarious peripheral neighbourhoods, and
squats, for example, are not only pushed to the margins of the “city proper” but also to the margins
of the city’s community of value. Regardless of formal citizenship status, they are commonly
constructed as the immanent others of the city’s good citizens: they are portrayed as vagrants,
criminals, diseased, depraved, burdens to society, the helpless poor in need of humanitarian
interventions, and so on. Even when they are formally citizens, these city dwellers are only
tenuously rights-bearing individuals with a political voice. When making claims to justice and to
rights, they often need to first shake off the stigma attached to their neighbourhoods and forms of
housing and show their deservingness—for example, they might insist they are honest and
hardworking people, taxpayers, responsible mothers, upstanding individuals not involved with
criminal activities, etc. While this move can allow these urban dwellers to climb the city’s social
hierarchies and access rights, protection, and political recognition, it might also reinscribe the
deserving/undeserving binary of the community of value. Considering these dynamics, I thus argue
that the urban politics of citizenship is shaped by processes of residential segregation.
I call these marginal spaces of arrival “eviction rooms,” a term borrowed from the work of
the late writer Carolina Maria de Jesus (2017 [1960]). As I will further elaborate, eviction rooms
are the spaces to which the urban poor are pushed to inhabit, spaces at the margins of the “city
proper” and whose inhabitants are positioned at the margins of the city’s community of value
(regardless of their formal citizenship status). I interpret the shared marginalization of Brazilian
and recently-arrived international migrants in São Paulo’s central squats as being part of this

As I will explain in the next sections, this is an elaboration based mostly on Engin Isin’s (2002) thought on the
relevance of alterity for the constitution of citizenship through the city, and on Bridget Anderson’s (2013) emphasis
on the moral assumptions that position only certain citizens as the “good” or “full” citizens belonging to the
“community of value.” I combine their insights while highlighting the importance of spatial segregation and housing
for the constitution of the virtuous identity of the citizen in cities.
20
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process of concrete and symbolic eviction of the urban poor. But how do these eviction room
dwellers respond to their marginalization? In other words, what does the politics of the evicted
look like? Do they strive to belong to the city’s community of value, to be regarded and treated as
good or full citizens? Or do they reject or raise objections to such an attempt? If citizenship status
does not significantly impact their marginalization in the city, do their different backgrounds
impact their aspirations and politics in the city? What can coalitions among eviction room dwellers
on different sides of the citizenship divided tell us about the meaning and value of urban
belonging?
Having caught a glimpse of this view from the interstices, we now turn to its fuller
elaboration.

Cities and migration: the production of marginal spaces of arrival

Migration and cities are umbilically linked. The process of urbanization itself is defined by the
mobility of people out of rural areas and into towns and cities. 21 Until the 19th century, immigration
was “the lifeblood of cities” (Clark 2013, 5, 12): the inflow of people was necessary to sustain
levels of urbanization in the face of extremely high mortality rates (Braudel 1981, 490). The
intimate connection between cities and migration is visible from the birth of ancient cities 22 to the

Urbanization can be defined as follows: “Urbanization is the general process by which essentially rural societies
and the regions they occupy transform into predominantly urban ones, usually occurring over long periods of time,
involving substantial redistributions of people in space, and concentrating proportionally more and more of them in
towns and cities. Urban places and their communities differ principally from rural ones by exceeding certain thresholds
of population size, physical density, territorial extent, administrative status, functional complexity, and morphological
diversity, beyond which they are considered unquestionably urban in character” (Conzen and Dahmann 2006, 531).
22
Cities are believed to have emerged around the 4 th millennium B.C. in Mesopotamia. For an overlook of ancient
urbanization in Asia, the Mediterranean, and Africa, see Chapters Two to Six in Clark (2013).
21
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pull of contemporary global cities 23 on domestic and transnational, low- and high-skilled labour.
Barring extreme situations of forced displacement to cities, we can see, in general terms, the
attractiveness of cities to both domestic and international migrants as connected to the ability of
cities to project themselves as dynamic spaces where people can obtain “existential mobility”
(Hage 2005, 2009).
“Existential mobility” or “symbolic mobility” is a concept developed by Ghassan Hage to
convey people’s desire for a sense that they are “going somewhere,” or “going places,” and doing
so at a satisfactory pace. For Hage (2009, 97), “a viable life presupposes a form of imaginary
mobility”; we all seek upward mobility and avoid a sense of existential immobility, or what he
calls “stuckedness.” In our current capitalist societies, existential mobility is associated with
upward social mobility and material comfort, but these are not necessary or perennial goals (Hage
and Papadopoulos 2004, 109). Existential mobility also does not necessarily require physical
mobility: people can feel like their lives are going places without changing jobs, cities, or
relationships. In fact, Hage (2005, 470) stresses that people generally “prefer to be ‘going places’
by staying where they are in environments with which they are familiar.” Plans for physical
mobility only kick in when we feel like we are not “going anywhere,” or that things are moving
“too slow” in our familiar environments. Thus, people migrate (or engage in physical mobility) in
search of an existential mobility that they believe they could not obtain where they originally were

Originally defined by Saskia Sassen (2001, 2012), global cities are conceived as core nodes in the world’s global
networked economy. They concentrate specialized services that support the increasing transnational financial flows
and the global dispersion of production. They specialize in what are called “producer services” (e.g. accounting,
marketing, legal services) that support the management and development of investment capital, corporations, and
NGOs that operate across the globe. They are also central for the creative and cultural industry and they tend to attract
newcomers (both domestic and international, both high and low-skilled). For works analysing the ability of global
cities to attract international migrants, see Lisa Benton-Short and Marie Price (2007) and Matthew Sanderson and
colleagues (2015).
23
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(where they were feeling stuck). People migrate “because they are looking for a space that
constitutes a suitable launching pad for their social and existential self” (Hage 2009, 98).
Cities have traditionally captured our imagination as places where existential mobility can
be achieved. A city’s “lights, its real or apparent freedom, and its higher wages” (Braudel 1981,
489) have historically attracted newcomers, and the networks that are built by migrant
communities only boosts the attractiveness of cities, mitigating the unfamiliarity and the
multidimensional hurdles in transitioning to a new place (Price and Benton-Short 2008; Schiller
and Çağlar 2011).
While cities have historically attracted newcomers, cities have also historically segregated
them. There is a common and repetitive irony in the experiences of disenfranchised and often
racialized migrants to cities: while their mobility is generally inspired by an evaluation that the
city will work as “launching pad for their social and existential self,” these newcomers are often
pushed to territories that in many ways are outside the “city proper” (where many might feel stuck,
yet again). Here I am mostly interested in forms of residential segregation that emerge not out of
cultural affinity but out of social exclusion from well-equipped urban areas—even though I
recognize these two forms cannot be completely isolated. I agree with Iris Marion Young’s (1999)
point that there is nothing necessarily wrong with “affinity group clustering by residence” (239),
but that segregation is a problem when it is a product of the exclusion of people from privileged
urban areas because of their racialization and class. As Young pointed out, this latter form of
segregation is particularly pernicious for it reproduces inequalities in life chances and stifles
political communication across segregated groups.
Marginal sites in modern cities, such as slums, unserved peripheral neighbourhoods, and
squats commonly emerge out of the survival needs of poor and racialized newcomers unable to
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secure adequate and formal housing. With the breakneck pace of urbanization in Latin America
since the mid-20th century and, four decades later, with the triggering of this process in many Asian
and African countries, 24 spectacularized images of a “planet of slums” (Davis 2006) have captured
perceptions of urban reality in the global South. But the creation of precarious neighbourhoods
inhabited by former peasants in growing cities has certainly not been an exclusive feature of
urbanization in the global South—one only needs to remember Friedrich Engel’s denunciations of
the unsanitary and crowded conditions of Manchester’s slums in the 19th century, where extreme
cases of death by starvation were met with the “barbarous indifference” (Engels 1993) of the city’s
elites. Still, since the late 20th century, the megacities (above ten million inhabitants) of the global
South have concentrated a great proportion of global urban growth, and the archetypal characters
of urban deprivation are currently found in Mumbai’s Dharavi, Lagos’ floating Makoko, and Rio
de Janeiro’s City of God, to name but a few famous cases—and the predominantly migrant origins
of all these communities should be noted.
With time, of course, these precarious communities pioneered by newcomers become more
settled, and their composition tends to become more local. This might be because the inflow of
migrants to the city diminishes, and/or because the neighbourhood becomes gradually betterequipped and therefore too expensive for disenfranchised newcomers, who then need to pioneer
another precarious area of the city.

24

Urbanization took hold in the global South in the mid-20th century during the great post-war rural-urban migration
in Latin America. The percentage of the region’s population living in cities rose from 33 percent in 1940 to 50 percent
in 1960 (Gilbert 1998, 26). Latin America became the first fully urbanized region in the global South, and it currently
has an urbanization rate of 81 percent, only marginally inferior to North America’s 82 percent rate and superior to
Europe’s rate of 74 percent (UNDESA 2018). Many African and Asian countries had their urban transition triggered
in full speed more recently, in the late 20th century—Africa’s current urbanization rate is of 43 percent and Asia’s is
approximating 50 percent. The booming growth of cities in the global South in the past decades was responsible for
the world’s population becoming more urban than rural for the first time in human history, a tipping point estimated
to have been reached in 2007. Likewise, 90 percent of the projected global urban growth for the next three decades is
expected to take place in Asia and Africa, leading to an expected 68 percent of humanity living in urban areas by 2050
(UNDESA 2018).
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If these marginalized urban communities generally emerge out of the segregation of
domestic newcomers, disenfranchised international migrants (regardless of legal status) to cities
of the South tend to be similarly segregated. Hence, many end up inhabiting the same marginal
spaces as disenfranchised citizens. The literature on South-South migration recognizes the shared
marginalization of citizens and non-citizens in host societies. It commonly emphasizes how
international migrants living in the global South (contrasted with those living in the North) tend to
struggle relatively less with issues related to their migration status and more with accessing
employment and housing, thus facing similar struggles to those of many of the host countries’ own
citizens (Balbo and Marconi 2006; Hujo and Piper 2010; Bakewell et al. 2009; Campillo-Carrete
2013; Bastia and Bressán 2018).
But it is important to highlight that the contrast between host societies of the global South
and North has limited purchase. First, while countries of the global South tend to have relatively
more liberal immigration policies and weaker border enforcement capacities—and this is the
predominant case in South America—exceptions to this pattern abound. 25 Second, a stark contrast
hides from view how disenfranchised international migrants, especially those who do not receive
refugee protection, often struggle to secure an income and adequate housing in cities of the global
North, too. Moreover, citizens of countries of the North have increasingly faced these struggles,

25

Asian countries dependent on immigrant labour and transit migration countries to the global North tend to govern
migration in more restrictive ways. Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand, for instance, have largely followed a Northern
model by creating guest worker programmes and offering legal migration paths for highly skilled workers, supporting
circular migration flows for low-skilled workers, and enforcing strict border controls to curb unauthorized migration
(Kaur 2010). Countries of the Maghreb, pressured by European countries to restrict the overestimated number of
mostly Sub-Saharan African migrants through their territories, have externalized EU border controls and adopted
stringent policies on irregular migration (De Haas 2008). These border control efforts sponsored by the European
Union have been prolonged further south of the African continent to countries of origin in the Sahel, such as Senegal,
and transit countries, such as Mauritania (Frowd 2015).
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especially with the reign of neoliberalism in the past four decades (Turner 2016) 26 and growing
class polarization in cities. Hence, we should acknowledge that also in the global North, and
increasingly so, disenfranchised citizens and non-citizens often face similar (but not identical)
struggles to obtain adequate standards of living. As I will later consider (in Chapter Four), there is
now a burgeoning literature on the politics of squats where migrants and citizens converge based
on the experiences of different European cities.
Inherently fragile comparisons between the global North and the global South (in
themselves extremely diverse containers) 27 aside, my point here is that one of the many ways to
see cities is to focus on how they have been constantly built and rebuilt through processes of both
attraction and segregation of people. Urbanization is generally marked by disenfranchised
newcomers of rural origins pioneering unequipped and undesirable (oftentimes environmentally
risky) territories. Similarly, disenfranchised international and domestic migrants currently
attracted to cities (of both the global South and North) tend to settle in marginal urban territories.
From an urban perspective, the arrival of disenfranchised domestic and international migrants can
be difficult to disentangle, given the forms of residential segregation they are often similarly

26

For Turner (2016), the regime of austerity in places like the USA and Britain has resulted in a weakening of
citizenship, to the point that “citizens come increasingly to resemble denizens albeit with less trauma and tragedy than
state-less exiles” (681).
27
In more mainstream terms, the arbitrary nature of the South/North divide is somewhat circumvented by
socioeconomic classifications of development set out by international organizations. The World Bank favours a
classification based on countries’ gross national income per capita, while the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP) gauges a country’s level of development by considering the human development index. Depending on which
of these institutions’ categorizations one follows, different maps of the South and the North are conjured up. However,
as postcolonial and decolonial authors stress, there is much to be criticized in these sorts of world mappings.
Boaventura de Souza Santos (2016, 18), for instance, defines the South as “a metaphor for the human suffering caused
by capitalism and colonialism on the global level, as well as for the resistance to overcoming or minimising such
suffering.” This definition complicates the tracing of clear lines on the world map, as it situates the South also in the
global North, wherever marginalized populations exist. (For example, following Santos, undocumented migrants,
ethnic minorities, and the unemployed living in Europe or North America dot the global North with patches of the
South.) A straightforward division between the South and the North is further complicated if we consider the diversity
in cultures, social contexts, ethnicities, etc. found on both sides: “To the same extent as the North, if not more so, the
South is made up of multiple worlds, a pluriverse” (Escobar 2017, 2).
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subject to. This perspective challenges the tendency scholars often have to separate these two
forms of migration as fundamentally distinct, and to therefore study them separately. 28
The journalist Doug Saunders’s (2010) concept of the “arrival city” stands out in this
regard, as it considers the impact of both domestic and international forms of migration on cities.
“Arrival cities” are not cities per se, but the poor neighbourhoods created by the relatively
disenfranchised newcomers to cities (be they domestic or international) both in the global South
and North.29 While mainstream analyses tend to portray these marginal places as fixed and
cancerous appendages to “cities proper,” places bound to poverty and criminality, Saunders insists
that arrival cities are supposed to be thriving communities that allow for upward social mobility
(places that allow for “existential mobility,” we could say). Arrival cities provide cheap housing,
social networks that facilitate access to entry-level jobs, entrepreneurial and higher-education
opportunities, in addition to producing schemes for further arrivals. According to Saunders, arrival
cities can create the new middle class and reduce inequality, but they often fail to do so, mostly
due to racism and governmental neglect (a bitter cocktail of unaffordable housing, unattainable
property ownership, and short-sighted urban planning).
The squats of downtown São Paulo studied in this dissertation can be seen as marginal
spaces of arrival, where disenfranchised international migrants live together with disenfranchised
Brazilian citizens, many of whom of domestic migrant origins. They can be seen as the product of
an old urban pattern of attraction and segregation of poor and often racialized groups. How can we

In migration studies, “migration” is generally assumed to refer to international forms of mobility involving relatively
long-term settlement. This is symptomatic of scholars’ inclination to privilege international border crossings, or our
often-denounced “methodological nationalism” (Wimmer and Schiller 2002). Focusing on the impact of physical
mobility on people’s lives, Hage (2005) directly questions why we tend to analytically privilege international
migration over internal forms of migration. As he highlights, rural-urban migration “can have a far more dislocating
and alienating effect on families and people” (469).
29
Saunders thus unites different global experiences of precarious newcomer urban settlement under this concept: the
favelas, shantytowns, barrios, and gecekondular of the global South, as well as the ethnic districts, banlieues difficiles,
and migrant suburbs of the global North.
28
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interpret the intersecting struggles of these groups at the margins of cities? As I will discuss in the
next sections, one way of answering this question is to consider the relationship between cities and
citizenship.

Cities and citizenship: the centrality of alterity

Cities and citizenship are also umbilically linked. This is sometimes easy to forget: since the
eighteenth century, citizenship has been mostly conceived as being about membership in a state.
T.H. Marshall’s famous formulation of citizenship “as a status bestowed on those who are full
members of a community” (1992, 18), where the community is understood as the nation-state, still
informs a common sense understanding of the term. Nonetheless, it is difficult to overestimate the
relevance of cities for citizenship. Not only is the city at the root of the word citizenship, it has
played a central role in shaping the content, contours, and contestations of what we call citizenship.
From the Greek city-states to contemporary mega- and global cities, there is something about
cities, their relative concentration of different people in a limited space and their relative economic
dynamism that speeds up felt time, that seems to make them a prime setting for political conflict
and engagement, for the positioning of social groups with and against each other, and for the
emergence of new claims and actors. Lewis Mumford (2011 [1937], 93) saw the city as generating
a “focusing and intensification of group activity” that makes it the “theater for social action” par
excellence. Along similar lines, James Holston and Arjun Appadurai (1999, 2) state that cities
“engage most palpably the tumult of citizenship” because of their “concentrations of the nonlocal,
the strange, the mixed, and the public.”
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The two main traditions or models of citizenship in the West have their origins commonly
traced back to cities (or city-like political communities): Athens (from the fifth to fourth century
B.C.) at the origins of a republican model, and Rome (from the third century B.C. to the first A.D.)
as the birthplace of a liberal model (Pocock 1995, 29). In the Greek polis (more commonly
interpreted as a city-state), the citizen was defined as a free and property-owning man who, in
Aristotle’s famous proposition, both ruled and was ruled. In this formulation, citizenship allows
for the fulfilment of man’s nature as a political animal. Citizens actively participate in politics by
gathering to discuss and deliberate democratically about public affairs. This approach to
citizenship is based on an ethical project: political participation means freedom, but it is also a
civic duty (Dagger 2002; Lazar 2008; Balot 2017). The core of this formulation, equating our
human condition with our ability to engage in public deliberation, has been highly influential, and
can be seen, for instance, in the works of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Alexis de Tocqueville, and
Hannah Arendt. As Pocock (1995, 34) stresses, “We do instinctively, or by some inherited
programming, believe that the individual denied decision in shaping her or his life is being denied
treatment as a human, and that citizenship—meaning membership in some public and political
frame of action—is necessary if we are to be granted decision and empowered to be human.”
In contrast, citizenship came to be conceived not as a necessary ethos derived from human
nature but as a status in Rome, capital city of the Roman empire. Citizens, in the Roman approach,
are more passive, less political but legal beings, equal and free before the law, entitled to a bundle
of rights, and tied by certain duties. This approach to citizenship was further elaborated in the
seventeenth century by liberal thinkers, most notably by John Locke (Lister 1998; Isin and Turner
2002; Schuck 2002). Liberal approaches to citizenship, as exemplified in Marshall’s definition
mentioned above, see it as mainly a formal and universal legal status protecting individuals.
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Emphasis is placed on different categories of rights (civil, political, social, and, more recently,
environmental, sexual, among other categories), while duties tend to be kept to a minimum,
including voting and paying taxes, for example.
Western lineages of the development of citizenship in cities traditionally move next to
Renaissance city republics and later to the urban revolutions that erupted in Europe between 1789
and 1848, through which modern and national understandings of citizenship emerged and
gradually became dominant (Bauböck 2003, 156). However, such lineages of citizenship tend to
be told from the standpoint of the city’s “victors”: “aristocrats, warriors, merchants, nobles, and
the bourgeoisie,” who successfully constituted themselves as citizens (Isin 2002, 2). This is a point
that has been thoroughly criticized by scholars: citizenship has been historically defined in
universal terms while, in practice, it has excluded different categories of people (see for example
Dietz 1992; Mignolo 2006). From applying exclusively to white, European, and propertied men,
the status of the citizen has expanded throughout the centuries and in different countries to formally
apply to more and more groups. Today, most countries that are governed by regimes considered
to be democratic recognize as entitled to citizenship women, peasants, racialized groups, the
illiterate, among other originally excluded groups. Still, the always-purported universality of
citizenship is in tension with the fact that individuals’ specific location in society “—their group
membership and categorical definition by gender, nationality, religion, ethnicity, ‘race,’ ability,
age or life cycle stage—mediates the construction of their citizenship as ‘different’ and thus
determines their access to entitlements and their capacity to exercise independent agency”
(Werbner and Yuval-Davis 1999, 5).
Bridget Anderson’s (2013) notion of the “community of value” reminds us that citizenship
is always differentiated, despite its universalistic formulation. As she argues, to be a citizen in law
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does not automatically entail inclusion as an equal, unquestionably rights-bearing, and valued
member of society. In Anderson’s words, “modern states portray themselves not as arbitrary
collections of people hung together by a common legal status but as a community of value,
composed of people who share common ideals and (exemplary) patterns of behaviour expressed
through ethnicity, religion, culture, or language—that is, its members have shared values”
(emphasis in the original, 2). The community of value is constituted by the “good citizens”, whose
precise characteristics vary in different contexts and throughout history. Still, overall, according
to Anderson, the good citizen embodies the “liberal sovereign self” (3) with the general qualities
of rationality, independence, and morality.
The identity of the good citizens is built in a relational way; that is, it needs its “others” in
order to exist. Anderson finds the “others” of British citizenship both among the citizenry, the
“failed citizens” (criminals and welfare scroungers, for example), and outside of it, in the noncitizens, the threatening low-skilled and racialized immigrants. Both the failed citizens and the
non-citizens are part of the “underserving poor,” those who are perceived as either disappointments
or threats to the community of value. In Anderson’s framework, there are also the “tolerated
citizens” (or the not-quite-good-enough citizens): those who are accepted in the community of
value, but in a contingent and fragile way, who are always under risk of slipping out of the virtuous
group (such as the hardworking immigrant and the deserving benefit claimant). Because of their
fragile position, the tolerated citizens tend to be the guardians of good citizenship behaviours,
constantly seeking to differentiate themselves from the failed and the non-citizens. Thus,
individuals and groups can shift positions within and without the community of value. By paying
attention to the common social exclusions and discourses that apply to the failed citizens and the
non-citizens, this approach draws our attention to the “fantasy” of full citizenship and to the “the
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gendered, classed and racialized borders within formal citizenship” (Anderson and Hughes 2015,
2).
But how does the production of citizenship and its others play out in cities? Engin Isin, in
his book Being Political (2002), also argues that the development of citizenship cannot be
disassociated from the production of forms of alterity, but he proposes that cities are key
battlegrounds through which citizenship and its others are constituted. In Isin’s perspective,
citizenship is also conceived in relational terms, as a particular and virtuous identity that certain
groups in the city are able to claim for themselves. A virtuous identity, of course, always depends
on the existence of others who lack the valued virtues. The citizens are “those who were able to
constitute themselves as a group, confer rights on and impose obligations on each other, institute
rituals of belonging and rites of passage, and above all, differentiate themselves from others,
constructing an identity and an alterity simultaneously” (2). Isin is less interested in the constitution
of citizenship through the exclusion of absolute outsiders or “aliens” (as in Bosniak [2008], 30 for
example), and more in how citizenship gets constituted through the positionings of different
immanent groups. For Isin, the virtuous identity of the citizen is thus produced in relation to those
other members of the city who are nevertheless framed as the strangers and outsiders within the
city itself.31

Linda Bosniak (2008) claims that we can discern the meaning of citizenship through the lens of “alienage.”
Citizenship is often understood as being universally applicable on the inside of national borders (applying to all the
nation’s citizens), while being exclusionary on the outside (denying rights and membership to non-citizens). However,
Bosniak shows that this dichotomy is not so clear-cut. Non-citizen immigrants are entitled to rights in many democratic
states. As such, they are partially included and partially excluded. Alienage hence complicates the inside (universality)
versus outside (exclusion) binary. It shows that the exclusions that inform citizenship do not only operate beyond
national borders, but also inside, creating differentiations and hierarchies in access to rights among those living inside
national borders.
31
Isin’s typology of strangers, outsiders, and aliens is not very precise, but it allows us to understand the distinction
he traces between immanent others (strangers and outsiders) and transitive others for the constitution of citizenship.
According to Isin, strangers are those who are simultaneous a member of a group but distanced from it, those who
have been “estranged from citizenship”, while “belonging to the city” and being able to “associate with citizens” (31).
He finds historical examples of strangers in artisans in the Greek polis and in the sans-culottes and workers in early
capitalist cities. Outsiders, assigned a greater degree of alterity but still an immanent group, have been those “neither
30
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For Isin, this process of differentiation and of constituting the superior identity of
citizenship can only happen through the city. But the city, in Isin’s formulation, is not a
geographically bound or administrative unity; instead, it is a “difference machine” understood as
a “figuration”, or “an assemblage of assemblages” (Isin 2005, 380), a “force field” (375) through
which social groups are constituted. “The city is a difference machine because beings are not
formed outside the machine and then encounter each other within the city, but the city assembles
(groups), generates, distributes, and differentiates differences, incorporates them within strategies
and technologies, and elicits, interpellates, adjures, and incites them” (Isin 2005, 375). The “city”
in Isin’s conception stands for a political community through which social groups are constituted
by social interactions that might be solidaristic, agonistic, or alienating. These groups, as they are
formed in a relational way, are not coherent, fixed, or mutually-exclusive, but they are projected
as such by their dominant members (2002, 28-29). For the author, the city should be seen as “the
battleground through which groups define their identity, stake their claims, wage their battles, and
articulate citizenship rights, obligations, and principles” (2002, 283, emphasis in the original).
According to Isin, a key political moment happens when those groups that have been classified as
the “others” of a virtuous citizen identity make claims to justice or speak out against injustice.
Moments of “becoming political” are precisely those when “strangers and outsiders question the
justice adjured to them by appropriating or overturning those same strategies and technologies of
citizenship…Being political, among all other ways of being, means to constitute oneself

belonging to a group nor interacting with it, but belonging to and necessary for the city in which citizens and strangers
associate” (31). Isin sees examples of outsiders in the slaves of the polis and in the refugees of contemporary cities.
Finally, and in contrast, aliens are not defined by the logic of alterity but by the logic of pure exclusion, and therefore
they are a less illuminating category in Isin’s framework. For Isin, relations that seek to eliminate or efface groups are
not political per se, and they can tell us little about how the identity of a virtuous citizenship is constituted. As Isin put
it, “Alienating strategies that constitute aliens and barbarians as enemies, while serving certain purposes as frames of
reference and identity, are not necessarily a primary focus of the formation of political and social beings” (32). As
examples of aliens, he identifies the “barbarians” for Ancient Greeks and Romans and “orientals” for modern
Europeans.
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simultaneously with and against others as an agent capable of judgement about what is just and
unjust.” (Isin 2002, x).
I find Isin’s conception of the city as a “difference machine” and as a battlefield through
which citizens and their others get constituted illuminating. Yet, the highly abstract character of
his formulation and his conception of the city as a force field does not clearly shed light on how
the constitution of citizens’ others is also reflected in more material and territorial terms in actual
cities. Even though the chapters of Being Political go over different stages in a Western lineage of
citizenship’s development in cities, it is overall difficult to discern how the “difference machine”
operates. Some chapters seem to engage more in intellectual conversations with earlier authors
(such as thorough challenges to Max Weber’s views on citizenship and urban development in the
early 20th century) than in clearly demonstrating how Isin’s theoretical propositions illuminate
different citizenship struggles (a point also raised by Anne Godlewska [2005, 348]). Lynn Staeheli
(2005, 349) has expressed a similar difficulty in grappling with Isin’s framework: “In arguing that
cities are a difference machine, I find myself wondering where people fit into this perspective and
how changes to the machine are effected.”
As discussed in the previous section, cities have historically worked as a difference or
sorting machine in very concrete ways: they have been able to attract and segregate differentlyvalued people in differently-valued territories and forms of housing. How can we think forms of
urban segregation vis-à-vis the constitution of citizenship? Or, how is the constitution of
citizenship’s others reflected in the city’s territories and forms of habitation?

The eviction room as a heuristic tool
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My attempt at answering these questions is informed by reflections on the empirical material of
this dissertation. By analysing the history of São Paulo, its different stages of development
combining cycles of migration and patterns of segregation, the strategies and political horizons
pursued by squatters in the city’s central districts, the frictions and promises of the coalition
between international migrants and Brazilians in these squats, I came to see marginal urban spaces
(which are traditionally spaces of arrival) as central for reflections on the meaning and relevance
of citizenship.
In order to develop this line of reasoning, I have borrowed the notion of the “eviction room”
from the late writer and former São Paulo favela dweller Carolina Maria de Jesus (2017 [1960]).
While I give a brief overview of De Jesus’ life in Chapter Two, here it suffices to say that she was
a poor and black woman from a rural village in the interior of Brazil who migrated to São Paulo
in 1947, a time when her dreamed “illustrious city” was rapidly growing thanks to the arrival of
hundreds of thousands of people like her. But reality in São Paulo proved extremely hard, and she
ended up selling scrap material at junkyards to barely sustain herself and her three children in an
improvised wooden shack at the Canindé favela. Reflecting on her experience, De Jesus came to
imagine the city of São Paulo as a house with different rooms for different people. The city centre
was the luxurious living room, “with crystal chandeliers, rugs of velvet, and satin cushions” (2003,
29); the favelas were the “eviction rooms” (quartos de despejo). De Jesus (2017, 195) explained
that she came up with the term because in 1948 cortiços (tenements)32 in the central area were
being demolished to give way to “tall buildings.” At the time, the poor who lived in those cortiços,

A cortiço, often translated as a “tenement” or a “rooming house,” is a house with many rooms for subletting.
Families live crammed in small rooms that often are also kitchens, and they share bathrooms and water sources with
other families—these shared water sources are usually situated either in a corridor or outside the house. Poor air
circulation, leaks, lack of proper illumination, and unsanitary conditions have characterized these dwellings from their
emergence in the 19th century in São Paulo until today.
32
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including herself, were evicted and ended up moving to nearby favelas. The favelas were hence
where the urban poor were evicted to—the eviction room—where they were hidden from the view
of the elites, who were, in their turn, secluded in the adjacent and more comfortable rooms.
Using Carolina Maria de Jesus’ notion as a point of departure, I see eviction rooms as the
product of an urban pattern of attraction and segregation of disenfranchised people, and as spaces
of social stigma at the margins of the city’s community of value. On the material side, eviction
rooms can take different shapes and be in different locations, but they are spaces that are not quite
part of “the city proper.” Eviction rooms, as Saunders’ arrival cities, can be seen as marginal spaces
of arrival: most often, they are initially settled by disenfranchised newcomers to cities, whose
networks tend to facilitate the further arrival of such migrants. Marginalized longer-term city
residents or city natives can also be found in them, especially when cities cease to grow at rapid
rates. Squats, cortiços, favelas, and neighbourhoods on the outskirts of cities with little or no urban
infrastructure, for example, can all be seen as eviction rooms. The mechanisms through which this
residential segregation operates are multiple and each city and neighbourhood will experience a
different combination. These mechanisms can include, for example, real estate speculation,
exclusionary urban zoning policies, urban development plans that evict the poor from well serviced
areas, social housing that is insufficient and situated in underserved territories, racist practices
from landlords, homeowners, banks, real estate agents, and policy makers, among others.
While eviction rooms are places to which disenfranchised groups are pushed or evicted,
their dwellers’ stay in these places is also haunted by the imminent risk of yet another eviction.
The eviction rooms’ relationship with the formal housing and land market and with the state is
often marked by ambivalence and fluctuations. Even when dwellers own property or land titles
that are recognized by governmental authorities, their tenure might be forcibly suspended with
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little or no compensation depending on urban development plans. Eviction room dwellers are thus
in what urbanist Raquel Rolnik (2019, 128) has called a situation of “permanent transience.”
More importantly for the purposes of this dissertation, we can see disenfranchised groups’
eviction to these spaces of habitation as being accompanied by a symbolic eviction, an eviction to
the margins of the city’s community of value. They are pushed simultaneously to the margins of
the city and of citizenship. Regardless of formal citizenship status, the inhabitants of the eviction
rooms are commonly portrayed as the immanent others’ of citizenship’s virtuous identity: the
vagrants, the criminals, the morally deprived, the diseased, the burdens to society, the helpless
abject poor in need of charity or humanitarian assistance, etc. Even when they are formally citizens,
these city dwellers are “only tenuously and even then ambiguously and contextually, rights-bearing
citizens’’ (Chatterjee 2004, 38). When making claims to justice or to access to rights, they often
need to first shake off the stigma attached to their neighbourhoods and communities, and show
their deservingness (of justice and substantive rights)—they might insist they are honest and
hardworking people, taxpayers, responsible mothers, upstanding individuals not involved with
criminal activities, etc. If and when they participate in the discourse of deservingness which
undergirds a city’s community of value, they can have their demands met and even become
“tolerated citizens” (in Anderson’s [2013] terminology), but they also risk reproducing the very
boundaries of the community of value—that is, they risk unintendedly reinforcing the idea that
certain urban dwellers, who do not demonstrate the same values and exemplary patterns of
behaviour, are not (or not as) deserving of rights, protection, or political participation.
Eviction here does not mean the sovereign ban in an Agambian sense, and I do not see the
eviction room as another iteration of “the camp,” or its dwellers as examples of “bare life.” Bare
life, in Agamben’s writings (1998), is a form of life produced by the sovereign ban, that is, by
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sovereign power’s prerogative to decide on the state of exception. Bare life is situated in an
indeterminate zone between bios (politically qualified life) and zoē (purely biological life). It is a
form of life that is only included in the juridical ordering by its exclusion; it is subject to the law
but is not protected by it. “Bare life, included by exclusion, then, becomes sacred life—life that
can be killed but not sacrificed, or homo sacer” (Edkins and Pin-Fat 2005, 7). The camp is the
spatial materialization of the state of exception, a space inhabited by bare life where the normal
juridical order is suspended (or “The camp is the space that is opened when the state of exception
begins to become the rule.” [emphasis in the original, Agamben 1998, 169]). The camp’s original
evocation comes from the Nazi concentration camp, but it is also identified in other places, such
as the refugee camp, often interpreted as “an exemplary zone of indistinction where individuals
can be subject to various forms of violence without legal consequence on territory that is outside
the normal juridical order” (Owens 2009, 572).
Life in the eviction room is often marked by recurrent suspensions of rights and protections,
as in police incursions resulting in arbitrary and unpunished killings, or in forced removals for
development projects, for example. But to define these marginal urban spaces as camps gives us a
totalizing view of sovereign power and a static notion of inexistent political life in them, none of
which seem to be helpful in analysing these spaces. Instead of being inhabited by bare life, I see
eviction rooms as being inhabited by the others of the “full” or “good” citizens, by those whose
rights-bearing status is tenuous regardless of formal entitlements. Their belonging to the city’s
(often more importantly in this case than the nation’s) community of value is tenuous at best, and
they might be tolerated members if they are able to show certain exemplary behaviours (which
vary with time and context). So rather than a priori excluded via an absolute ban, the inhabitants
of the eviction room often have some room to negotiate their belonging to the city’s community
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of value, if they judge that such belonging is worth their efforts, or if is in tune with their aspirations
of existential mobility.
The relevance of housing for people’s access to citizenship has been noted by different
authors, especially those analysing the circumstances of groups at the urban margins of cities of
the global South. For example, reflecting on the circumstances of slum dwellers in Mumbai, Arjun
Appadurai noted how housing was fundamental to their material wellbeing, their ability to claim
rights, and their access to a realm of social services:

Housing is at the heart of the lives of this army of toilers. Their everyday life is dominated
by ever-present forms of risk. Their temporary shacks may be demolished. Their slumlords
may push them out through force or extortion. The torrential monsoons may destroy their
fragile shelters and their few personal possessions. Their lack of sanitary facilities increases
their need for doctors to whom they have limited access. And their inability to document
their claims to housing may snowball into a general invisibility in urban life, making it
impossible for them to claim any rights to such things as rationed foods, municipal health
and education facilities, police protection, and voting rights. In a city where ration cards,
electricity bills, and rent receipts guarantee other rights to the benefits of citizenship, the
inability to secure claims to proper housing and other political handicaps reinforce each
other. Housing—and its lack—set the stage for the most public drama of
disenfranchisement in Mumbai. In fact, housing can be argued to be the single most critical
site of this city’s politics of citizenship. (Appadurai 2002, 27, emphasis added)
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Appadurai recognizes that slum dwellers’ ability to claim rights can be undermined by their lack
of documentation attesting formal housing. What I mean to add is that slum dwellers’ ability to
claim rights is often undermined by virtue of where they live, whether their housing is documented
or not. This is because those living in these forms of housing and territories (in different eviction
rooms) are often constructed and treated as the others of the city’s “good citizens,” as those whose
political belonging and ability to claim rights is, in practice, always under question.
It needs to be emphasized that eviction rooms are not just places of deprivation but also
sites of solidarity, livelihood, creativity, aspirations, learning, consciousness raising, political
organizing, entrepreneurialism, and social mobility, among many other “positive” aspects. I do not
see the eviction room as a descriptive category characterizing places and their inhabitants as abject,
or as vibrant and promising. Clearly, they are both. In a way, I am trying to escape what Ananya
Roy (2011) identified as a limitation in “subaltern urbanism”: its tendency to contradict
mainstream bleak views of marginalized urban communities in cities of the South, and instead
emphasize these communities’ political promise and economic vibrancy. Like Roy, I am
sympathetic to this body of literature that, without disputing the severity of the economic, political,
social, or environmental problems faced by cities of the global South, has thoroughly criticized
catastrophic interpretations of them (see, for example, Chatterjee 2004; Nuttall and Mbembe 2005;
McFarlane 2008; Roy 2009; Caldeira 2017). These authors have sought to not only put cities of
the South at the centre of urban theory creation, but also to challenge abject perceptions of the
people inhabiting the margins of cities of the South. As such, studies aligned with this agenda have
often focused on the themes of entrepreneurialism and agency, showing the economic dynamism
and the political promise of subaltern urban subjects and spaces. In seeking to contribute to this
literature, I try to take up Roy’s (2011) call to go beyond these “itineraries of recognition” (224).
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Rather than a descriptive category, I see the notion of the eviction room as a heuristic tool that
allows us to explore broader urban logics which connect different territorial locations and social
processes, and that makes room for “paradoxical forms of social agency that troubles, disrupts and
expands the realm of subaltern urbanism” (232).

Seeing citizenship from the urban margins: the politics of the evicted

What sort of political responses are devised by those evicted to the margins of the city and of
citizenship? Do they strive for inclusion into the order of the “city proper” (obtaining formal
property tenure, for example) and of its community of value? Or do they refuse both orders and
seek to carve out other forms of inhabiting the city and of being political in it? What sort of political
visions and goals might inform coalitions between disenfranchised citizens and non-citizens
inhabiting cities’ eviction rooms?
These are questions that can only be answered empirically. In his book The Politics of the
Governed, Partha Chatterjee (2004) argues that the notion of citizenship has limited purchase when
we consider the mobilizations of those at the urban margins. For the author, their politics cannot
be captured by the theoretical concepts of civil society, popular sovereignty, or citizenship—all
these categories are associated with bourgeois society and the elites in his perspective. In
considering those living in squatter settlements across Calcutta’s railway lines, Chatterjee claims
that these people are only formally citizens, and that, in practice, they are “population,” groups to
be taken care of and controlled by governmental agencies. Given the fact they are not perceived
as rights-bearing citizens, these marginalized urban dwellers participate not in civil society, but in
what the author calls “political society,” deploying their condition as “population” to influence
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policy-making in their favour. The associations of the poor, organized as political society, are often
able to obtain welfare services and recognition from the state; they represent how “most of the
world” has been managing to “choose how they should be governed” (77). While I agree with the
authors’ point that citizenship status has limited impact on the access to rights and standards of
living of those living at the urban margins in “most of the world,” I question whether citizenship
is necessarily irrelevant when we consider their horizons.
In the following chapters, I show that even though citizenship status did not have a great
impact on the marginalization of citizens and recently-arrived non-citizens in São Paulo, the
horizon of citizenship did set these two groups of eviction room dwellers apart. Regardless of their
citizenship status, squatters are generally treated as those at the margins of São Paulo’s community
of value. They are normally perceived as “bums” (vagabundos), criminals, “invaders,” and even
“terrorists,” and they are often portrayed as such by the media and by many politicians. The
common sense held in São Paulo is that squatters are people who have chosen a criminal and
relatively easy option of forcibly taking other people’s property instead of working hard to obtain
their own. In this context, I show that the Brazilian squatters leading housing movements in the
city’s centre have invested in a political agenda of inserting squatters into the city’s community of
value, while their migrant neighbours have raised questions about the value of pursuing the horizon
of citizenship in a highly exclusionary city.
But what do we gain by seeing citizenship from the urban margins? The term “margins” is
most commonly used in the social sciences to refer to sites distanced from the centres of power,
i.e. sites of relative exclusion and powerlessness (Mainwaring and Walton-Roberts 2018). This
does not mean that those inhabiting the margins form a homogeneous group; there are also social
and power hierarchies within the margins. “Not everyone on the bottom rung has a zinc roof; some
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only have thatched,” as Cynthia Enloe (1996, 22) reminds us. However, as Enloe also insists, the
term “margins” cannot be reduced to a mere story of relative and gradated exclusion. The margins
in fact harbour struggles that are central to the legitimacy and effectiveness of power. In this sense,
margins and centres are not a binary per se, but mutually constitutive. This point is also stressed
by Veena Das and Deborah Poole (2004), who contradict the common assumption that life in the
margins is simply informed by a lack or absence of state authority. For them, the “practices and
politics” of life in the margins “shape the political, regulatory, and disciplinary practices that
constitute, somehow, that thing we call ‘the state’” (3). In a similar vein, a recent special issue on
“citizenship from marginal spaces” stressed how “practices, experiences, legacies of marginality
(en)gender different sites of political struggle, which in turn shape, contest and disrupt citizenship
as it is both practices and conceptualized” (Turner 2016, 141, emphasis in the original).
Seeking to contribute to these reflections, I have argued in this chapter that the urban
margins are central for the definition of the “good citizen” identity in cities (or for the definition
of the contours of cities’ communities of value). In addition, throughout the next chapters, I show
that by looking closely at the “politics of the evicted,” we are able to see the extent to which
citizenship is able to capture the horizons of those marginalized in cities. That is, by investigating
the sorts of visions of transformation and desired futures of those at the urban margins, we can
have a sense of how much notions of “full citizenship” in cities are able to mobilize notions of
progressive change. Finally, the following chapters highlight the generative potential and
limitations of the horizon of citizenship for those at the urban margins. How far can a pursuit of
full citizenship in cities take eviction room dwellers?
But before fully exploring these issues in the experiences of Brazilians and international
migrants living in central São Paulo’s squats, the next chapter illustrates the production of eviction
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rooms throughout São Paulo’s history. The chapter situates the reader in the politics of citizenship
in Brazil and in São Paulo, and it explores how different patterns of segregation and cycles of
migration have been combined throughout the decades to produce different territories and forms
of housing at the urban margins and at the margins of the city’s community of value. The chapter
explains the current urban context of a relatively abandoned city centre, where empty buildings
are squatted, and the recent migration context marked by an increased arrival of international
migrants from the global South. But, more importantly, it situates both processes within São
Paulo’s urban history, arguing that the presence of international migrants in squats can be seen as
a more recent rendering of an enduring urban process of material and symbolic segregation of
disenfranchised newcomers.
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Chapter Two: Seeing like a squat(ter)

Introduction

The presence and participation of international migrants in squats in downtown São Paulo
constitute a fairly narrow, temporally and spatially circumscribed phenomenon. The relative
novelty and invisibility of migrant squatters in the city partly help explain the virtual absence of
scholarly research on this particular topic. 33 Paulistanos in general, especially those who do not
live, work, or circulate through the old central neighbourhoods, can go about their everyday lives
in the city oblivious to this migrant presence.
When a 24-story squatted building known as the “glass tower” caught on fire and collapsed
at the central Paissandu square on 1 May 2018, making international headlines, journalists were
intrigued by the finding that an estimated 25 percent of the building’s dwellers were international
migrants, mostly from Angola (Machado 2018). This tragedy spurred the municipal government
to conduct a survey on the conditions of squatted buildings in São Paulo’s central districts. The
survey estimated the existence of 51 squatted properties in the city centre, and that 58 percent of
these squats had international migrants living in them (Prefeitura de São Paulo 2018). However
rough this estimate might be, it indicates that squats have become a key housing strategy for the
city’s disenfranchised international newcomers. Still, when I interviewed municipal public
servants in 2018 (before the glass tower’s collapse), they were quite candid about their lack of
understanding of the phenomenon of migrant squatting in the city. They explained that they only
became aware of the presence of international migrants in squats once they were asked to assist
migrant families during evictions.

33

The only research-based text I could find on this topic was a blog post by Heike Drotbohm (2016).
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In addition to being recent, limited in scale, and relatively invisible, the participation of
international migrants in squats in downtown São Paulo might be short-lived, or it might at least
decrease in the foreseeable future. As Brazil’s economy flounders, and as the Jair Bolsonaro
federal government adopts a confrontational stance towards both disenfranchised international
migrants and squatters, we can speculate that fewer migrants and asylum-seekers from the global
South will see São Paulo as an attractive (even if temporary) destination or regard the city’s squats
as a viable housing option.
To study this phenomenon of migrant squatting in isolation, seeing it only as a recent,
curious episode or event in the city—in other words, to see it exclusively in a synchronic way,
within its immediate time—would illuminate only so much of São Paulo’s urban and migration
politics. This might be a fleeting urban and migration phenomenon, but it does not exist outside of
history, divorced from the contradictions, cycles, and recurrences of the past. In this chapter, I seek
to understand the presence of these migrants in São Paulo’s squats in a diachronic way, placing it
within a particular narrative of the city’s history, 34 a narrative that focuses on the city’s successive
patterns of immigration and spatial segregation, suggesting how these patterns have, in confluence,
produced different eviction rooms. By learning about São Paulo’s history through the works of
historians, sociologists, geographers, and urbanists, I came to see the presence of international
migrants in the city’s squats as a recent rendering of a much older and broader urban phenomenon.
Put simply, I came to see it as a product of the recurrent production of spaces of arrival at the urban
margins and at the margins of the city’s community of value.

With no pretense of taking the role of a historian of the city of São Paulo, I nonetheless share Braudel’s (1982) and
other historians’ belief that “it is not possible to avoid history” (79), for the past and the present cannot be separated.
Appropriating a question posed by Braudel (1982, 80): How illuminating can the analysis of this recent phenomenon
be “if it does not record the direction, the speed or slowness, the ascent or descent of the movement which carries
along any social phenomenon, and if does not attach itself to the movement of history, to the resounding dialectic
which runs from the past to the present, and even to the future?”
34
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This chapter thus proposes a way of “seeing (the city) like a squat(ter),” by focusing on the
formation of different marginalized communities in interpreting the urban history of São Paulo.
What is unveiled by seeing the city from this vantage point? In exploring this question, this chapter
takes inspiration from James C. Scott’s (1998) acclaimed book Seeing Like a State. In it, Scott
argues that officials of the modern state apprehend or see the irredeemable complexities of the
social and natural order under their authority by radically simplifying, abstracting, and
standardizing it. These processes make social reality and space legible, and therefore amenable to
being governed. The world, from the vantage point of the modern state, is observed through
administrative grids (such as maps and censuses) that facilitate the tasks of monitoring, counting,
assessing, controlling. Such grids allow, for example, for key modern state capacities such as
taxation, and conscription, as well as universal vaccinations and welfare provision. Importantly,
in seeing the world this way, officials of the modern state are not so much interested in accurately
describing the people and nature under their authority, as much as they aim at “transforming the
population, space, and nature under their jurisdiction into the closed systems that offer no surprise
and that can best be observed and controlled” (82).35 Seeing like a state hence unveils a world of
schematic categories and measures aimed at facilitating the tasks of governing and transforming
reality. Seeing like a squat(ter) unveils an urban history marked by different iterations of processes
of attraction and segregation of people which, I believe, fundamentally shape questions of
citizenship.

The author shows that the modern state’s desire for legibility and control over people and nature has its culminating
point in the massive scale social engineering projects of the 20th century (such as soviet collectivization and the
creation of planned cities like Brasília). According to Scott, these projects, which were guided by a “high-modernist”
ideology, orchestrated by an authoritarian government, and made possible by an overpowered civil society, have failed
in promoting their utopian goals, ultimately because they ignored the value of practical local knowledges, informal
processes, and improvisation.
35
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But before delving into this particular way of seeing São Paulo’s urban development, I will
briefly elucidate the origins and notion of the “eviction room,” the guiding metaphor of this
chapter’s diachronic analysis.

Recycled eviction rooms

Since its emergence as an urban center in the late 19 th century, São Paulo has attracted and often
depended on precarious migrant labour (both domestic and international) that is nonetheless
spatially segregated in particular forms of housing and in particular territories of the city. In
different phases of the city’s history, these territories and forms of housing have changed, as have
the provenances of the newcomers, and the ways they are governed. But at the risk of
oversimplification, we can see a recurrent confluence of migration, segregation, and citizenship
dynamics that positions the newcomers inhabiting the urban margins at the margins of the city’s
community of value, their rights-bearing status always in question.
In search of a metaphor or image that could help me analyse this enduring dynamic, the
literary work of Carolina Maria de Jesus (2017 [1960]), a village-born migrant to São Paulo who
lived in a favela of the city, proved to be of great help. Carolina Maria de Jesus (1914-1977) was
born in Sacramento, a small town in rural Minas Gerais, a state in the interior of south-eastern
Brazil. In 1947 she moved to São Paulo in search of an existential mobility she could not find amid
rural deprivation. She moved by herself, but she was part of the massive waves of rural-urban
migrants that fed São Paulo’s industrialization and exponential growth in the mid-twentieth
century. As many other poor, black, and newcomer women in the city, De Jesus initially found
employment as a maid, and lived in her employers’ home. When she got pregnant, De Jesus found
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herself both jobless and homeless. Squaring both losses proved to be a persistent challenge for her.
She first lived in a cortiço (tenement) but was shortly evicted. She then moved to the Canindé
favela near the city centre, where she eked out a living by picking up scrap material and selling it
at junkyards. De Jesus had three children from different fathers, and she struggled daily to make
enough money to sustain herself and her children in the favela—her meagre and unstable earnings
going from hand to mouths.
While her story so far is not very distinct from those of her favela neighbours, Carolina
Maria de Jesus’ trajectory became internationally known thanks to her passion for writing. She
only had two years of schooling, and, in the favela, her every waking hour was haunted by the
imperative to earn money to attenuate her and her children’s constant pangs of hunger. Still, she
managed to make time, even if only a few interrupted minutes a day, to write. 36 Using notebooks
and scraps of paper, which she collected over time, De Jesus kept journals, wrote novels, plays,
poems, and samba songs. The journalist Audálio Dantas, once visiting Canindé for a news article,
met De Jesus by chance and learned about her writing. A few years after this encounter, in 1960,
Quarto de Despejo: Diário de uma Favelada (2017 [1960]) was published collecting some of her
journal entries from the previous five years. The journalist only edited her punctuation and kept
the original grammar and spelling of her writing. The book became an immediate best-seller in
Brazil, and it was later translated into 14 other languages. With the book’s revenue, De Jesus
managed to move out of the favela and into a small brick house, her long-held dream of existential
mobility. However, even though she published three other books in her lifetime, De Jesus died

36

Writing allowed her to move away from the incessant survival imperatives weighting on her, as well as to
therapeutically express her frustrations, dreams, and criticisms of the city’s injustices and stark inequalities. As she
once put it, “When I didn’t have anything to eat, instead of swearing, I used to write. There are people who, when they
are nervous, swear or think about death as the solution. I used to write my diary” (2017 [1960], 195, my translation).
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poor and forgotten by Brazil’s cultural elite who had initially met her work with a mixture of
admiration, fanfare, and voyeurism.
In English, De Jesus’ first book was oddly titled “Child of the Dark: The Diary of Carolina
Maria de Jesus” (2003).37 The original title Quarto de Despejo, however, can be translated as
eviction or dumping room, and this was how De Jesus called the favelas of São Paulo. In different
passages of the book we can catch a glimpse of how the author creatively conceptualized the city’s
segregation pattern. Eviction or dumping room is part of her metaphorical conception of the city
as a house where things, functions, and people are purposefully located:

I classify São Paulo this way: the Governor’s Palace is the living room. The mayor’s office
is the dining room and the city center is the garden. And the favela is the backyard where
they throw the garbage. (2003, 24)

When I am in the city center I have the impression that I am in a living room with crystal
chandeliers, rugs of velvet, and satin cushions. And when I’m in the favela I have the
impression that I’m a useless object, destined to be forever in a garbage dump. (2003, 29)

I see De Jesus’ reference to the urban poor pushed to the favelas as “garbage” as expressing the
way she felt they were treated: not like people with inherent dignity, but like disposable objects to
be hidden from view. While these quotes might suggest “dumping room” as the fittest translation
for quarto de despejo, I opt for “eviction room” because I believe it better captures the literal
eviction of the urban poor from well-equipped and valued areas of the city. In an interview, when

The English translation also differs substantially from the Portuguese original, because De Jesus’ neologisms and
grammatical constructions were not preserved but turned into formal or “correct” English.
37
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asked about the title she picked for her first book, De Jesus made the eviction aspect of the
expression she coined explicit:

It’s because in 1948, when they started demolishing the small houses to make room for the
tall buildings, us, the poor, who resided in the cortiços, were evicted and we had to live
under the bridges. That’s why I call the favela the eviction room of the city. We, the poor,
are the old junk. (2017 [1960], 195, my translation)

De Jesus’ portrayal of her quotidian struggles in the favela often made me reflect on the
similar struggles of the Brazilian and migrant squatters I met in São Paulo during fieldwork, many
of whom were women of colour and of migrant origins like the author. What insights can we gain
by putting the different but parallel experiences of segregation and marginalization of different
generations of disenfranchised newcomers to São Paulo? How can past patterns and struggles
illuminate the current circumstances of squatters in central São Paulo?
In the next sections, I rely on secondary literature to provide a brief overview of how
eviction rooms have been recycled through São Paulo’s history. I say “recycled” because the
eviction room re-emerges in different shapes in each of the migration and segregation phases of
the city. The adjective also hints at how eviction rooms often get assembled or built from discarded
urban material, in improvised shacks in favelas and peripheral neighbourhoods, houses converted
into cortiços, and squatted buildings.
The particular telling of the history of São Paulo that I articulate here follows a three-part
division that has been used in previous historical overviews of the city (most notably, Caldeira
[2000] and Rolnik [2017]). I seek to add to these historical panoramas by focusing on how
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migration and segregation intersect in each phase, and by suggesting how, in each phase, poor
newcomers to the city were positioned or positioned themselves vis-à-vis the city’s community of
value. This is admittedly a tentative historical narrative, that, as any, has to select certain aspects
and neglect others for the sake of coherence. A strict isolation of the history of São Paulo from the
history of Brazil, Latin America, and the world, is, of course, artificial and impossible, so the
different spheres are often interwoven. The focus, though, is on the production of different eviction
rooms throughout the city’s history, and on reflections on how those living in these marginal urban
spaces were differently constructed as not quite full citizens.

São Paulo: migration, segregation, and citizenship in three phases

Phase one: A condensed cosmopolis, cortiços, and a sanitary approach (late 19th century-1940s)

São Paulo’s rise to economic prominence in Brazil began in the mid-19th century, when the country
had just become independent but was still a monarchy. Founded in 1554 by Jesuit missionaries on
the anniversary of the conversion of St. Paul (January 25th), São Paulo had been eclipsed by Rio
de Janeiro’s economic dynamism throughout the colonial period and most of the 19th century.
When Brazil’s main export crop abruptly changed from sugar cane to coffee—responding to
American and European demands for productivity in their industrialization processes—the
thriving coffee plantations of the Paraíba Valley catapulted the exponential growth of São Paulo
and its export port, Santos.
The emerging coffee barons of São Paulo, however, faced a serious labour obstacle at the
time. Their crops depended on African slaves, whose availability was decreasing and whose price
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was rapidly rising thanks to the decline of the trans-Atlantic slave trade, strangled by mounting
British pressure. In 1850, just as coffee sales rose sharply, the Eusébio de Queiroz Act was passed,
formally prohibiting the maritime slave trade in Brazil, which doubled the price of a slave in the
domestic market (Schwarcz and Starling 2018, 305). A plan to replace African slaves on Brazilian
plantations through the subsidising of European immigration was developed and put in place
before the Lei Áurea (“the Golden Law”) was signed by Princess Regent Isabel in 1888, making
Brazil the last country in the West to abolish slavery.
Even though we have just started considering the initial phase of São Paulo’s urban
development, we need to make a brief pause here to consider the implications of this historical
event of 1888. The consequences of the long-lasting slavery system and its abolition have proven
highly consequential for the development of citizenship in São Paulo and in Brazil more broadly.
Abolition incorporated the former slaves in the formal realm of citizenship, but it came without
any form of compensation—no land, payment, or educational opportunities were accessible to the
former slaves. Despite the lack of racially discriminatory laws and even the existence of an official
discourse celebrating Brazil’s “racial democracy” in the twentieth century 38 (especially from the
1930s to the 1980s), the black population’s insertion into the country’s citizenry was compromised
from the start. Brazil has been marked by an ambivalent but pervasive and violent form of racism 39
that statistics recurrently denounce: for example, census data from 2018 shows that the average
income of the white population is 73.9% higher than that of the black and pardo (of darker mixed
skin) population (Agência IBGE Notícias 2019); in 2017, of the total victims of homicide in the
Gilberto Freyre’s book Casa Grande e Senzala, published in 1933, was largely responsible for a rebranding of
miscegenation in the country: from Brazil’s curse, it came to be seen as a positive and key feature of Brazil’s culture.
For an overview of the distinct race ideologies developed through Brazil’s history, see Telles (2004, Chapter Two).
39
Brazil’s culture of racism is usually contrasted with the one found in the United States and South Africa. In contrast
with these two societies, in Brazil the basis of discrimination is not so much informed by the amount of black blood
one has, but is instead more flexible and negotiable, and associated with one’s social standing (Schwarcz 2013). For
more on anti-black racism in Brazil, see Schwarcz (2013), Guimarães (2002), Telles (2004), and Maggie (2007).
38
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country, 75.5% were black (IPEA 2019). In São Paulo, the inhabitants of the eviction rooms have
always been darker-skinned than those of the posh living rooms. As an illustration, a 2015 survey
conducted by São Paulo’s municipal government showed that the city’s most peripheral and most
underserved neighbourhoods have the highest concentration of the black population: the
population of Parelheiros, on the southern edge of the city and with the lowest average income, is
57% black; the population of Pinheiros, to the city’s centre-west and with the highest average
income, is only 7% black (Prefeitura de São Paulo 2015, 5-6). 40 To help situate the reader, a map
of the city of São Paulo and its districts (i.e. neighbourhoods) is available in the Appendices.
Having considered this important culture of racism, we can now return to the late
nineteenth century, when freed slaves were passed over in the coffee crops in favour of European
immigrants. The fazendeiros (plantation owners) of the Paraíba Valley spurred a plan to “recreate
Brazil in Europe’s image” (Lesser 2013, 61), and São Paulo was to be the poster child for this
project, as it attracted more than half of the white newcomers (Andrews 1991, 53). 41 European
immigrants were attracted both to work on the coffee crops and to help “whiten” the Brazilian
population, a goal inspired by the social Darwinist “theories” of the time. 42 Initially, fazendeiros
themselves attracted and helped fund the arrival of Europeans, but this system proved to be highly
exploitative and collapsed in the 1860s, being replaced by state and federal support in subsidizing
the attraction of laborers.43

In this report, the category “black” (negro) includes both those who are classified as black and as pardo.
In 1872, of the city of São Paulo’s 32 thousand inhabitants, a third were blacks or mulattoes (Bastide and Fernandes
1955, 41).Two years before the abolition of slavery, the proportion of blacks and mulattoes in the city of São Paulo’s
population had already dropped in relation to 1870 and reached 21% (42).
42
Earl Joseph Arthur de Gobineau, a French diplomat and friend of Brazil’s elites and Emperor D. Pedro II, was
perhaps the most influential figure in lamenting the lack of “blood purity” among Brazilians—a feature which he held
responsible for the “decay” of the Brazilian people (Rocha 2010, 24).
43
The initial privately-sponsored arrival of European immigrants was implemented through a system called
“partnership.” Despite its benevolent name, this system was tantamount to slavery through debt accumulation, and
many tricked immigrants left for the towns. A revolt staged by European farm workers in the plantation of Ibicaba in
1856 ushered in the abandonment of this system, replaced by wage payments and also by the stepping in of the federal
40
41
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Also thanks to the pressure of fazendeiros, interested in keeping both freed slaves and the
new immigrants exploitable and unable to own plots of land, the Land Act of 1850 was passed,
creating a national land market and prohibiting the acquisition of Crown land by means other than
sale (thus making ownership by occupation and land grants to newcomers or freed slaves
impossible). In contrast to the previous regime of land grants (sesmarias), from 1850 onward, “the
only legal form of land possession became properly registered purchase” (Rolnik 1995, 39). At the
moment when labour was becoming free, access to land was restricted. According to Holston
(2008), the most lasting consequence of the Act was that it successfully impeded, on a national
scale, “the access of poor immigrants and citizens to small-scale property” (133).
Like the long reign of slavery and its abolition, the unchecked and extensive powers of
landowners also proved to be highly consequential for the development of citizenship in Brazil.
Poor Brazilians depended “on the big property owners for a place to live, for work, and for defense
against the arbitrary powers of government and other property owners” (De Carvalho, 2018 [2001],
my translation). This has led to the development of clientelistic and paternalistic relationships
between the local boss, the figure of public authority, and those dependent on his “favours” and
“generosity.” The “favours” were to be reciprocated with loyalty, especially during elections.
Citizens’ freedoms and material circumstances were thus much more determined by their
relationship with the authority of the local coronel44 than by their anonymous legal status within

and state governments in the attraction of immigrants (Buarque de Holanda 1972). Even after this shift, many
European migrants staged revolts, escaped to the surrounding growing towns (most notably, São Paulo), and
denounced their abuse and exploitation to their governments. This led to Prussia’s prohibition of emigration to São
Paulo in 1859 and to Brazil more broadly in 1871. Italy followed suit in 1902, forbidding its citizens from immigrating
to São Paulo (Iotti 2010, 7).
44
The colonel was a man from the local elites picked by the governors to impose order and quell revolts in a recentlyindependent Brazil. When the country went from an independent monarchy to a republic, in 1889, the National Guard
lost its military status, but the colonels kept their political authority over municipalities. Coronelismo stood for the
reign of these local bosses over the population: it became “one of the cornerstones of the traditional oligarchic structure
based on the power of local individuals, generally the owners of farms and large estates” (Schwarcz and Starling 2018,
360).
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an impersonal state. Whence comes the popular saying still heard in contemporary Brazil: “For
friends, everything; for enemies, the law.” The powerful or those protected by the powerful are
above the law and can use it and bend it to their advantage; those who lack power or connections
to the powerful are left with the impersonality, convolutedness, and strictness of laws and
bureaucracies. Teresa Sales (1994) has called this the political culture of “citizenship by
concession,” according to which citizenship and rights are emptied of meaning and replaced by
arbitrary private authority and the transactional yet erratic distribution of dádivas (gifts or alms)
of citizenship by powerful individuals. For Sales, a possible escape from the sphere of influence
of the coronéis was in rural-urban migration. But large scale rural-urban migration only took off
in Brazil in the mid-twentieth century, in the next phase of São Paulo’s development. For now, the
city’s emergence is mainly marked by the massive arrival of Europeans.
In the trans-American race for settlers of the late 19th and early 20th century, Brazil trailed
behind the United States, Argentina, and Canada respectively. 45 Still, the city of São Paulo became
a melting pot of different cultures during this period—the lawyer, journalist, and literary author
Guilherme de Almeida (2004 [1929]), who chronicled different neighbourhoods of the city,
famously referred to it as a “cosmopolis.” The newcomers were mainly from Italy, followed by
Portugal and Spain, and smaller groups from Poland, Germany, and other European countries. The
Japanese, who were originally regarded as racially undesirable, became the fourth most numerous
national group to immigrate to Brazil in the early 20th century.46 São Paulo’s diversity was further
increased by the arrival of around 50 thousand Syrian and Lebanese immigrants from the

45

Between 1880 and 1910, the United States attracted 20 million newcomers, followed by Argentina with 3.5 million,
Canada with 3.1 million, and Brazil with 2.6 million immigrants (Lesser 2013, 62).
46
Following the modernization promoted by the Meiji Restoration, Japan began encouraging emigration in order to
attenuate a mounting land pressure caused by the growth of its rural population, and the Japanese elites drew on the
country’s industrialization and westernization in order to market Japan as Asia’s “white country” (Lesser 2013, 152).
The arrival of Japanese laborers in Brazil was also designed to serve the needs of São Paulo’s coffee plantations, but
it peaked between 1924 and 1934, when the Japanese government itself subsided the travel costs (Sakurai 2000).
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disintegrating Ottoman Empire, and an estimated 35 thousand Eastern European Jews after the
First World War (Rolnik 2017, 20). In 1893 the foreign-born made up to 55% of São Paulo’s
population, in a decade when the city’s annual growth rate was of 14% a year (Holston 2008, 157).
A significant part of these millions of migrants, along with many Brazilians, helped build
the incipiently industrializing São Paulo of the early 1900s. As Warren Dean (2012, 3) succinctly
stated, “The coffee trade begets industry” and, indeed, the buoyant coffee export system produced
a money economy that allowed for the investments required for an initial and timid
industrialization and urbanization of São Paulo. The coffee planters moved to the city of São Paulo
and invested their assets in real estate, railroads, banking, exporting, and factories geared towards
the domestic market (most notably textiles, food, furniture, and construction material). European
immigrants and Brazilians left (not rarely, fled) the farms for the growing city. São Paulo, thus,
quickly grew from a village of 23,000 in 1872 to a city of 580,000 by 1920 (Dean 2012, 4).
São Paulo’s rapid growth turned it into a chaotic urban space that nonetheless had a
territorial and residential ordering based on class segregation. Even though the upper and lower
classes were practically neighbours, living geographically close to each other—the city’s perimeter
at this time was concentrated in a limited area covered by the trolley tracks—, they were separated
by an abyss in terms of the conditions of the dwellings and their tenure arrangements. The elites
lived in their mansions and single-family homes, situated on higher-land neighbourhoods protected
from the flooding rivers. The poor and predominantly immigrant factory workers lived mostly in
lower-lying neighbourhoods on alluvial land along the banks of the Tietê and Tamanduateí rivers
and along the railroad tracks, where the factories were located. They most commonly rented rooms
in the stigmatized tenements known as cortiços. At this time, many former slaves also migrated to
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São Paulo, becoming part of the poor industrial, service, and domestic workforce, 47 and they also
often inhabited cortiços around the central districts.48 Cortiços can thus be seen as the city’s initial
rendering of the eviction room, the places where disenfranchised newcomers were pushed to live
in the city.
The main factor that pushed the urban poor to these spaces was not, in essence, different
from a key factor leading Brazilians and international migrants to the squats of central São Paulo
today: the impossibility of affording the city’s rents with low wages. A 1916 report by the Work
Department of the State of São Paulo explains this long-standing quandary faced by São Paulo’s
urban poor:

Among the poor class, especially the working class, rent costs absorb a great part of the
limited revenues of the householder. The low wage… forces the factory worker to face an
anguishing problem: to either eat little and badly, or to live in a cortiço. In nine out of ten
cases, he opts for the latter. (Boletim do Departamento Estadual do Trabalho 1916, 146
quoted in Bonduki 2017, 61, my translation)

While both the immigrant poor and the former slaves living in cortiços were granted
Brazilian citizenship, they were evicted to the margins of São Paulo’s community of value and
recurrently targeted by the authorities as threats to the health and morality of the city. In a racist
society where rights were replaced by the favours of elite members, the urban poor, especially the

Bastide and Fernandes (1955, 55) explain that the black population of the city was limited to “the simplest activities,
requiring the most elementary aptitudes, or the activities confined to domestic work, all of which terribly paid...”
48
As Rolnik (1989) argues, even though São Paulo and other Brazilian cities do not have ethnic ghettos per se, this
does not mean that there are no urban territories characterized by a greater proportion of black inhabitants. In the late
19th and early 20th century, the black population was concentrated in cortiços and basements around the city centre,
close to the homes of wealthy Paulistanos in whose houses many worked.
47
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former slaves, were exposed to different forms of arbitrary violence. As mentioned, and as will be
further explored in the next chapter, citizenship status per se has carried little purchase in Brazil.
Rights have been conditioned to personal connections and special status, rather than being
distributed equally to the anonymous “citizenry.” It is in this sense that Roberto DaMatta (1997)
argues that in Brazil, traditionally, “citizen” is not a positive and moral universal category invoking
rights and belonging (as in the liberal definition of the term), but a term that denotes lack of
personal connections and special status and, therefore, inferiority. 49 For the cortiço dwellers,
citizenship status was particularly irrelevant for protection against urban interventions that sought
to literally wipe their dwellings off the city’s map.
In the late 19th century, a sanitary approach was mainstream among public authorities in
Brazil and in many European countries similarly challenged by the rapid growth of cities (Rolnik
1995; Kowarick 2003; Bonduki 2017). Urban planners and politicians in Brazil’s urban centres
were mainly concerned with the hygienic conditions of the poor’s dwellings (i.e. of the cortiços),
regarding them as breeding grounds for both disease outbreaks and epidemics in cities (especially
yellow fever in the 1890s) and for a perceived promiscuity and generalized “lack of morals” among
the urban poor. An 1886 report presented to the Council of Public Health in Rio de Janeiro, for
example, concluded that the crammed conditions of cortiços produced “criminality, prostitution,
disease and the repression of the moral and physical level of people” (Figueira de Mello 1886,
quoted in Rolnik 1995, 76).

As DaMatta (1997, 61) illustrates: “It [Brazil] is a society that has differentiated forms of definition of its members,
according to a set of relationships that they can claim or demonstrate in specific situations. So, if I am a citizen at the
civic party of Independence Day or at a political rally, I definitely do not want to be just a citizen when I am entangled
with the police in a theft case, or when I am trying to take out a loan at the bank, or yet if I need to provide explanations
to the income tax agency. Here the first measure I take is to be recognized right away, but not as a citizen.”
49
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In order to fight these perceived problems and address the largely unregulated urban
growth, the state and municipal governments of São Paulo sought to impose a “sanitary control”
over homes (specifically cortiços) with constant inspections, mandatory disinfections, and the
demolition of many cortiços. The local administration also passed laws regulating constructions
in the city (which prohibited the construction of new cortiços), it promoted sanitary works along
the lowlands, the implementation of water supply and sanitation systems, and the
“haussmannization”50 of the rich downtown, which entailed the demolition of cortiços in this area.
The city of São Paulo, therefore, emerges under the shade of coffee trees and as a
condensed but segregated urban center. The disenfranchised newcomers, immigrant and Brazilianborn, that sustained the incipient industrial and urban development of this phase had as their main
housing option precarious cortiços that could be demolished at any moment. Despite being entitled
to formal citizenship status, the inhabitants of the nascent city’s eviction rooms were often framed
by a sanitary urban governance as threats to public health and morality.

Phase two: The arrival of the “Northeast,” the centre-periphery dyad, and the urban popular
movements (1940s to 1980s)

50

Haussmannization refers to a particular form of urban planning and transformation originally conceived by GeorgesEugène Haussmann who acted as prefect of the Seine under Emperor Napoleon III. Haussmann’s urban renewal of
central Paris in the 1850s and 1860s involved both sanitary, logistical, and public order concerns about a city that had
an unorganized transit system and a central area of meandering narrow streets with open sewers and slums. In order
to “rationalize” the urban growth, facilitate circulation, prevent the spread of disease, and also undermine urban revolts
barricading the centre, Haussmann’s project of urban renewal included the construction of broad boulevards, the
expansion of areas for leisure, the general improvement of urban infrastructure, and the development of a unified
transport plan for the city (Scott 1998, 59-63). In this process, slums of the city’s central area were destroyed.
Haussmannization as an approach to urban planning was particularly influential in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century.
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From a condensed emerging city largely sustained by international migrants, São Paulo became a
sprawling metropolis powered by domestic migrants from the 1940s onwards. The end of
subsidized immigration, the world economic depression, the Second World War, and a restrictive
immigration regime imposed by president and later dictator Getúlio Vargas 51 meant that the
number of international migrants in São Paulo’s population decreased significantly in this period.
During this phase, the city went through a fervid industrialization aimed at replacing imports. This
process relied on the steady source of cheap labour mainly from the drought-stricken states of the
Northeast of Brazil, as well as from Minas Gerais and the interior of the São Paulo state. The
newcomers to the city were still overwhelmingly village-born, but now Brazilians. 52 Between 1950
and 1960, two thirds of newcomers to São Paulo were born in the country (Rolnik 2017, 40). By
1970, almost 20 percent of the city’s population was born either in Minas Gerais or in the Northeast
of Brazil, while the city’s approximately 380 thousand international migrants came from over 70
different countries (40). But São Paulo consistently kept its role as the main destination for
international newcomers to Brazil: from 1872 until 1972, 57 percent of the approximately 5.4
million newcomers to Brazil settled in the city (Wejsa and Lesser 2018).

Getúlio Vargas acted as Brazil’s president from 1930 until 1945. In 1951, he democratically returned to the
presidency, which ended with his nation-convulsing suicide in 1954. He first came to power in 1930 through a coup
d’état and from 1937 until 1945 he established a dictatorial regime of fascist inspiration called Estado Novo (New
State). Since his first government, Vargas put in place policies seeking to nationalize the workforce. Restrictions were
imposed on immigration while the migration of Brazilians from other parts of the country to São Paulo was
incentivized. Vargas, as other authoritarian leaders in Europe in the 1930s, expressed a concern about “foreign
colonies” and “unassimilable aliens” in Brazil which could constitute “racial cysts” in the nation’s body that threatened
national security and unity (Seyferth 2002). But his migration policies also mirrored those taken by the US in the
1920s, establishing quotas for immigration by countries. The nationalist and xenophobic approach adopted by the
various Vargas governments justified restrictive immigration policies by emphasising the need to protect the “national
worker,” the threats posed by foreign communities to national security (especially Japanese and German communities
during the Second World War), and racist theories (stigmatizing Jews, for example). For the immigrant communities
already residing in the country, an agenda of national and forced “assimilation” sought to eliminate their cultural
practices (such as speaking their languages in public), and they were often blamed for Brazil’s social and political
problems (such as unemployment rates and the threat of communism, seen as an “alien” ideology) (Geraldo 2007).
52
In 1920, international migrants constituted 75 percent among the newcomers to the city of São Paulo, while domestic
migrants represented 24 percent. In contrast, by the 1930s, international immigrants constituted 21 percent of the new
arrivals, as compared to 68 percent of Brazilian migrants (Paiva 2004, 34)
51
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As most Latin American countries, Brazil went through a fervid period of urbanization in
the mid-twentieth century: while in 1940, 31 percent of the population lived in urban areas, that
rate jumped to nearly 56 percent by 1970, having stabilized since the 2000s in between 80 and 85
percent (IBGE n.d.). In the 1950s, São Paulo surpassed Rio de Janeiro in population size and
wealth generation, reaching 3.8 million in total population by 1960 (against 3,3 million in Rio),
and about 6 million by 1970 (when Rio had 4,3 million inhabitants) (IBGE n.d.). In this phase, São
Paulo became known as the “train” pushing the country’s economy forward. “São Paulo cannot
stop!”, the motto coined by governor Ademar de Barros in the 1960s, became attached to the city’s
identity in its dizzying pursuit of economic prosperity.
This phase proved to be a crucial period reshaping the political culture and the legal
configuration of Brazilian citizenship. In a rapidly urbanizing and industrializing Brazil, social
rights were introduced by the authoritarian and corporatist Estado Novo, a regime led by Getúlio
Vargas from 1937 to 1945. The introduction of such rights was part of a political strategy to quell
social strife in the factories and secure a close grip over trade unions. Following the logic of
citizenship by concession, the populist Vargas positioned himself as the generous and selfproclaimed pai dos pobres (the “father of the poor”) (Wolfe 1994). As José Murilo de Carvalho
(2018 [2001]) stressed, the development of citizenship in Brazil did not follow the historical but
also logical path described by T. H. Marshall (1992) in England. 53 In contrast to the English
example, in Brazil social rights took precedence over civil and political rights, being introduced

As we learn in Marshall’s text, in England, civil rights were introduced in the eighteenth century, which allowed
citizens to claim and obtain political rights in the nineteenth century, which in turn allowed them to claim and obtain
social rights in the twentieth.
53
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and expanded during authoritarian periods when political activity, individual freedoms, and the
justice system were curtailed. 54
Importantly, under Vargas’s regime not all workers had access to the full range of social
rights, but only those workers whose occupations had been recognized by the law. Those whose
occupations had not been legally recognized were denied the right to join unions, to access labour
courts, and to receive labour benefits, for example. The self-employed, domestic workers, and
rural workers, not to mention informal workers and the unemployed, were similarly excluded from
such rights. As Wanderley Guilherme dos Santos put it, under this regime of “regulated
citizenship,” “citizenship is attached to a profession and the rights of the citizen are delimited by
the rights of the place one occupies in the productive process, as recognized by the law” (1979,
75).
Even though many did not qualify for the social rights of citizenship within these
parameters, Vargas’s propaganda machine managed to elevate the figure of the honest worker as
that of the model citizen—an association so successful that it still shapes Brazilians’ perceptions
of citizenship today. The Vargas regime defined the “good citizen” as the worker, while it placed
the unemployed “at the moral margins of society, labelling them ‘bums’ (vagabundo) and
excluding them categorically from the only kind of citizenship rights most Brazilians at the time
might realistically exercise” (Holston 2008, 194). Blamed for their poverty, the unemployed were
thus placed at the margins of the community of value.
Vargas’s authoritarian regime profoundly impacted São Paulo’s migrant composition and
Brazil’s citizenship regime and political culture, but it also reshaped São Paulo’s pattern of spatial
segregation. The city’s uncontrolled growth and degradation reached its peak in the 1930s and

The authoritarian periods referred to here were Getúlio Vargas’s Estado Novo (1937-1945) and the military
dictatorship (1964-1985).
54
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1940s with “one of the most severe and dramatic housing crisis in the history of the country”
(Bonduki 2017, 217, my translation). At this time, a consensus emerged around the need for
government intervention in the housing market. Vargas’ response to the crisis came through the
building of subsidized worker housing programs (of limited scope and mostly targeting the middle
and upper classes) and, most importantly, through the passing of the Lei do Inquilinato in 1942
(Renters’ Law). Amidst unprecedented inflation and real estate speculation, the law froze all rents
at their December 1941 levels and established regulations for the terms of renting. The law was
subsequently amended and extended until 1964. Far from solving the housing crisis, the Renters’
Law and its subsequent reiterations discouraged investment in new rental units and encouraged
mass evictions and demolitions by landlords seeking to recover their investments.
The most important but unforeseen effects of the law were to motivate both the spread of
property ownership among the city’s poor and middle-classes and the horizontal expansion of São
Paulo. This expansion led to a new pattern of social and spatial segregation, where the poor were
pushed to peripheral areas beyond the perimeter of the actual city. The inauguration of a bus system
allowed for this urban sprawl, as buses, in contrast to trolleys, were able to conquer the dirt roads
of the outskirts and connect workers to their working places in the city’s central districts. Prestes
Maia’s Plan of Avenues literally paved the way for this segregation pattern by creating a system
of large avenues radiating from the city center towards the peripheries. The avenues redeveloped
the downtown area and were driven through working-class neighborhoods whose residents were,
unsurprisingly, evicted.55
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In São Paulo, as in most other Brazilian and Latin American cities, the urban peripheries were thus initially inhabited
by the urban poor while the upper classes remained in the central neighborhoods. This is a marked contrast to the
process of suburbanization as it took place in North America, where the white-fenced and single-family homes of the
middle-classes have traditionally symbolized the urban periphery and the “inner cities” concentrated the urban poor.
For a discussion on different global patterns of suburbanization, see Murat Güney and colleagues (2019).
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The city’s low-income workers now inhabited the city according to a different model,
based on the tripod of home ownership, land parcelling in the city’s periphery, and
autoconstruction (Bonduki 2017). 56 This model was seen as a solution to the housing problem and,
conveniently, it also allowed for the lowering of wage costs (rent prices no longer needed to be
factored in), while avoiding the real estate devaluation of previously overcrowded central regions.
Cortiços became an increasingly risky housing option for the urban poor, as many were being
demolished. Some evicted or recently-arrived families squatted vacant lands and built improvised
shacks in the central districts,57 as did Carolina Maria de Jesus’ and her neighbours of the Canindé
favela. But these few favelas that emerged at the time were eventually removed by the municipal
government, pushing their dwellers to the periphery—the Canindé favela, for example, was
removed in the mid-1960s, a few years after De Jesus left it. Thus, for the poor, living in the city
centre became increasingly less viable due to evictions, demolitions, and high rents. The city’s
hinterlands, territories that were effectively (and often also legally) rural, without electricity,
sanitation, reliable public transit, or other urban services, became the main option for the settlement
of São Paulo’s newcomers, or the city’s main rendering of the eviction room during this phase.
Hence, while in the previous phase of São Paulo’s development, rich and poor inhabited
distinct but adjacent areas of a densely urbanized and bounded urban area, from the 1930s onwards,
the geographical gap between the two classes grew significantly in a city rapidly expanding
towards previously rural hinterlands. The upper classes now lived in verticalized neighbourhoods

The term autoconstruction is often used in academic publications in English about this phase of São Paulo’s
urbanization (See Holston 2008 and Caldeira 2017). It is a translation of the popular Portuguese term autoconstrução,
which refers to a form of improvised housing provision by and for poor workers, in which they gradually build their
own homes on their time off. They might literally lay bricks and do the complete construction work by themselves
and with support from friends and neighbours or, as is most common, they might hire people to do the construction
work. In the context of other developing countries where this housing strategy is also widespread, the most commonly
used English term is “self-help housing.”
57
According to Bonduki (2017, 270), São Paulo’s first favelas emerged between 1942 and 1945—this is a late date if
compared to the emergence of favelas in Rio de Janeiro, which happened in the late nineteenth century.
56
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to the center-southwest area, where job opportunities, schools, hospitals, cultural attractions, and
a consolidated urban infrastructure were concentrated—the city’s “living room” with sophisticated
decoration in De Jesus’ metaphor. The lower classes pioneered the wilds of the municipality, the
eviction rooms in the “backyard” of the city. As we saw, in the beginning of the twentieth century,
the city’s working poor were mainly of foreign origins and lived mostly in the cortiços in the
central districts. But from the middle of the twentieth century onwards, the urban poor was
represented by the “nordestinos” (those from the Northeast of Brazil) and had in the
autoconstructed periphery its home. As Rolnik (2017, 41) observes, “The further away and the
more precarious the periphery, the darker-skinned and the greater the [domestic] migrant presence”
(my translation). São Paulo’s periphery today is far from homogeneous, as older neighbourhoods
become better equipped and inhabited by low- to middle-income families, while poorer workers
are pushed to the more distant, newer, and more precarious peripheral neighborhoods, the so-called
“periphery of the periphery.”
This process of “peripheral urbanization” proved to be highly significant for the evolution
of citizenship in São Paulo and in Brazil more broadly. Teresa Caldeira (2017) defines peripheral
urbanization as a common form of production of urban space in cities of the South. 58 It involves
poor residents gradually and unevenly building their homes and neighbourhoods, in a way that is
“transversal” to official logics (such as the legal property regime and state regulation). By
“transversal,” Caldeira refers to how this form of urbanization is not easily captured by
dichotomies such as formality and informality, regulated and unregulated. Rather, peripheral
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As Caldeira explains, peripheral urbanization does not always have to take place in the actual peripheral areas of
cities, as it did in São Paulo. Rather, what makes forms of urbanization “peripheral” is actually “the role of its residents
in the production of space and how as a mode of urbanization it unfolds slowly, transversally in relation to official
logics, and amidst political contestations” (4). In São Paulo, as in Santiago, New Delhi, and Istanbul, for example, the
urban poor slowly and unevenly “autocontruct” their homes and neighbourhoods and strategically engage with
governmental and legal actors and institutions in both clientelistic and activist ways.
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neighbourhoods are marked by complex relationships with the state and the market; they can, for
example, be simultaneously built on a planned grid and following legal standards and have the
land be parcelled and commercialized by irregular means. For the author, the transversal logics of
the peripheries “generate urbanizations of heterogeneous types and remarkable political
consequences” (7). These neighbourhoods often generate new kinds of citizens and claims. As
residents press local authorities for basic services and for the regularization of their properties,
they engage with political authorities in ways that can be clientelistic (therefore reproducing the
culture of “citizenship by concession”) but also “insurgent” (Holston 2008) (challenging periphery
dwellers’ stigmatization and asserting their rights).
In order to understand the relevance of the political mobilizations of São Paulo’s eviction
room dwellers, we need to briefly shift our gaze to the broader political context in Brazil in the
1970s and 1980s. In the mid-1970s, the military dictatorship (1964-1985), after ten years of
systematic and violent repression, had begun to gradually loosen its grip over civil society. At the
time, there (re)emerged different social movements, such as the feminist, black, and human rights
movements. Among these, urban popular movements attracted particular attention. These were
movements composed of the urban poor, living in favelas and underserved peripheral
neighbourhoods, and of their supporters, mostly from leftist groups and the Catholic church. 59 The
MSTC (Movimento Sem Teto do Centro, i.e. City Centre’s Roofless Movement) has its political
lineage in the movements of periphery and favela dwellers of São Paulo, who demanded from the
state various public services such as running water, electricity, sewers, paved roads, reliable public
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Urban popular movements often relied on the support of the Catholic church, especially through the Comunidades
Eclesiais de Base (CEBs, Christian Base Communities). These were centres that, inspired by Liberation Theology,
not only provided religious guidance but also encouraged the collective organization of the poor to press local officials
for their material needs.
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transit, schools, medical facilities, and housing projects, as well as the regularization of their land
and property tenure.
These urban popular movements, along with other social movements, resorted to
citizenship as an umbrella rallying cry, one encompassing both the general push for
democratization and for ample demands presented as rights, even if such rights were not officially
or culturally recognized (Dagnino 2003, 2007). According to different scholars, these movements
were redefining citizenship in Brazil, challenging the political culture of citizenship by concession
that had historically denied the poor, less educated, and darker-skinned Brazilians both formal and
substantive rights.60 Scott Mainwaring (1987, 148), for example, considered that “one of the most
important aspects of the grass-roots [urban] popular movements” was in allowing the urban poor
to acquire “a sense of citizenship.” For the author, “these movements can be an important means
of constructing a new popular identity that implies a fuller citizenship”; the “process of
independent participation in political life indicates a change from past patterns of submission”
(149). Along the same lines, Maria das Dores Costa (1988, 9) stated that these social movements
“widen the democratic spaces for a revision and redefinition of citizenship in Brazil; they open the
path for the conquering [conquista] of full citizenship for all members of the community” (my
translation). For her, a particularly powerful aspect of these social movements was that through
them, poor Brazilians “claimed as rights—and not as concessions, privilege or paternal donation—
the material conditions necessary for social reproduction” (9).
These movements ushered in the end of the military regime, and they played a crucial role
in the elaboration of a new, democratic and more egalitarian Constitution for the country. The
elaboration of a new Constitution to mark the end of the military dictatorship, in fact, sedimented

60

There is a vast literature analysing the political relevance of these social movements. For some other key references,
see Eder Sader (1988), W. E. Hewitt (1990), and Leonardo Avritzer (2002).

91

the frame of citizenship among Brazilian social movements (Hochstetler 2000). Passed in 1988,
the new charter became known as the Constituição Cidadã (“Citizen Constitution”) due to its
reliance on wide popular participation during the Constituent Assembly (1987-1988) and the
incorporation of social movements’ demands. Brazil’s Constitution has been celebrated for
providing ample and universal social rights as well as for formal channels for popular consultation
and deliberation on public policies (through participatory policy institutions) (Abers 2000;
Avritzer 2002). The pressure exerted by urban grassroots movements, organized under the Fórum
Nacional da Reforma Urbana (National Urban Reform Forum), led to the inclusion of provisions
such as the “social function of property” (every private property has to be put to some use) in
article five, and the universal right to housing in article six—the latter introduced through a
constitutional amendment in 2000 (Maricato 2011). Later, continued pressure from urban
grassroots movements led to the passing of the City Statute in 2001, a federal law regulating urban
development and making Brazil the first (and still only) country to have “the right to the city”
enshrined in law as a collective right (Fernandes 2007; Rolnik 2013). São Paulo’s housing
movements have, over the past decades, frequently resorted to these specific legal provisions in
their claims-making, and they tend to take seats in participatory policy councils.
Having considered this larger process of political mobilization and change in Brazil, in
which urban popular movements played a key role, we can now return to the particular conditions
of São Paulo’s eviction room dwellers. As we saw, in this phase, São Paulo’s urban poor lived
overwhelmingly in underserved peripheral neighbourhoods. In pressing for improvements in their
concrete lived conditions, they often couched their demands in terms of rights, many of which
became enshrined in the Constitution (such as the right to housing). As inhabitants of the eviction
room, however, these periphery dwellers were not a priori perceived as valued members of society
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and bearers of rights. In order to be recognized as such, they often relied on other characteristics
beyond their status as Brazilian citizens that positioned them in a higher moral ground.
This is something central to but often forgotten in Holston’s (2008) analysis of the politics
of São Paulo’s periphery dwellers in the 1980s and 1990s. His work examines how periphery
residents’ claims to rights were justified in terms of a combination of their legal entitlements as
citizens, their identity as workers and homeowners, and their contribution to the city (as taxpayers,
for example). He calls these three rationales as, respectively, “text-based rights,” “right as
privilege,” and “contributor rights” (254-267). Through Holston’s analysis, we can see that
resorting to the universal rights established by the Brazilian Constitution was an important element
in the claims of the periphery dwellers of his study. However, constitutional prerogatives alone
did not suffice. In order to be regarded as bearers of rights and as members of the city’s community
of value, these disenfranchised citizens stressed social identities (homeowner, taxpayer, and honest
worker) that qualified them as superior to all those eviction room dwellers whose rights are not
recognized beyond mere formality.
In a way, we can interpret the position of these periphery dwellers as that of the tolerated
citizens within São Paulo’s community of value. Their acceptance within the community is fragile
and contingent, and so they need to constantly separate themselves from other eviction room
dwellers who do not show the same virtuous qualities: those who squatted land instead of paying
for their property and those who were unemployed (the stigmatized “bums” since Getúlio Vargas).
Dagnino (1994) found a similar dynamic in her study of the political mobilization of favelados
(shanty town dwellers) in Campinas in the early 1980s. She shows that the first step taken by their
organization, the People’s Assembly, was to conduct a survey of their communities to legitimize
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their claims to rights. The survey showed they were not idlers, criminals, or prostitutes, as
commonly assumed, but honest workers, and therefore bearers of rights.
In this second phase of São Paulo’s history, the eviction rooms shifted from centrally
located cortiços inhabited mainly by international migrants to autoconstructed homes on the
outskirts of the city inhabited mainly by domestic migrants. The beginning of this phase saw
crucial shifts in Brazil’s citizenship regime, with the introduction of social rights and the
emergence of the honest worker as the good citizen par excellence. The final decades of this phase
saw the political mobilization of different social sectors against the military dictatorship, when the
term “citizenship” was used as a rallying cry for rights and recognition. As São Paulo’s periphery
dwellers became key actors in the country’s transition to democratic rule, they stressed their status
as citizens, but also other identities that positioned them within the community of value. They
sought to differentiate themselves from the “failed citizens” of the eviction rooms by insisting on
their deservingness of (beyond entitlement to) rights.

Phase three: The emergence of a global city, the squatting of the city centre, and the newcomers
from the global South (1980s-present)

The tragic fire and collapse of the “glass tower” squat, mentioned in the beginning of the chapter,
is situated in this third and contemporary phase of São Paulo’s history. The landscape of the city
today combines contrasts: high-rise corporate towers and dirt floor wooden shacks; luxury malls
with just as internationalized informal street trading; world-class restaurants with over 100
thousand homeless rough sleepers (Ramos and Buono 2019). While the city’s eviction rooms can
still be found in the ever-expanding periphery, the city centre has been increasingly occupied by
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the urban poor, who inhabit the re-emerging cortiços, but also proliferating squatted buildings in
the area. In recent decades, the city has attracted hundreds of thousands of disenfranchised
migrants and asylum-seekers from the global South, who have joined the city’s eviction room
dwellers. As this dissertation is focused on the encounter between marginalized Brazilians and
international migrants in the squats of the central area, particular attention will be paid to the
positioning of squatters vis-à-vis the city’s community of value.
The city that “cannot stop” kept growing, but from the 1980s onwards, at increasingly
lower rates (IBGE N.d). From 9.6 million inhabitants in the 1990s, the city counted around 10
million in 2000, and an estimated 12 million in 2019 (IBGE, N.d). The 1980s, known as the “lost
decade,” were marked by a severe economic crisis in Brazil, with three-digit inflation rates and
mounting unemployment. During those years, São Paulo lost many of its factories to municipalities
in the metropolitan region and to other states, and it began its conversion to a service-based
economy (Gaspar et al. 2015). In this context of high unemployment and loss of jobs in the
industrial sector, the 1980s also witnessed the phenomenon of return migration, with almost half
a million people leaving São Paulo and other cities in the Southeast and returning to the Northeast
(Baeninger 2012, 43). Since then, domestic migration flows to São Paulo have picked up but paled
in comparison to the peak years of the city’s expansion in the mid-twentieth century (Baeninger
2005; Da Cunha 2005). The arrival of international migrants in São Paulo and Brazil also reached
its nadir in the 1980s, and since then, Brazil has been a country of emigration, sending more
Brazilians abroad than receiving international migrants. But the past two decades have been
marked by an increase and diversification of immigration flows, most notably from the global
South, a point to which I return later in this section.
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From being mostly an industrial city, São Paulo began to emerge as a service-centered
global city during this period (Serrao and Pires Dias 2015). Global cities, as Saskia Sassen (2001,
2012) has thoroughly explained, tend to feed income polarization and create a class structure that
exacerbates social inequality. Manufacturing work that involves unionized and well-paying jobs
tends to decrease with layoffs and plant closures in emergent global cities. The job market becomes
more polarized, opposing high-paying and specialized jobs in the corporate sector (mostly
sophisticated producer and financial services 61) which only absorb a minority of highly-educated
workers, and a much higher number of low-paying, precarious, and often informal jobs in the
service sector (for example, drivers, cleaners, and street traders). From the 1980s onwards, the rate
of employment in manufacturing jobs plummeted in São Paulo and the rate of informal, precarious
jobs soared. By 1990, only 10 percent of the city’s population was employed in the secondary
sector, and by 1995, that percentage reached around 5 percent (Rolnik 2017, 55). A survey
conducted in 2019 showed that 88 percent of the city’s total wealth was produced by the service
sector (Haddad 2019). São Paulo is currently ranked as an alpha global city 62, the main financial
centre of Latin America.
The centre-periphery pattern of segregation is still present in São Paulo. As a rule, the
further away from the centre, the less equipped and poorer are the neighbourhoods. As the material
conditions of the city’s inner peripheries improved significantly in the previous phase thanks,
partially, to the mobilizations of their dwellers, these neighbourhoods became increasingly
inaccessible to the city’s poorest (Caldeira 2000, 232). The population living in the outermost ring
Sassen (2012, 129-30) defines producer services thus: as “services for firms, from the most sophisticated to the most
elementary ones. They include financial, legal, general management matters, innovation, development, design,
administration, personnel, production technology, maintenance, transport, communications, whole-sale distribution,
advertising, cleaning services, security and storage. Central components of the producer-services category are a range
of industries with mixed business and consumer markets. They are insurance, banking, financial services, real estate,
legal services, accounting, and professional associations.”
62
For an economic ranking of global cities, see https://www.lboro.ac.uk/gawc/world2018t.html
61
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of the periphery, the most precarious territories, has concentrated the urban growth in the last three
decades. Cidade Tiradentes, a neighbourhood on the extreme-east of São Paulo, grew by 1,617
percent in the past 25 years, the highest rate in the city (Rodrigues 2019).
However, this centre-periphery dyad has been attenuated by a multiplication of favelas,
cortiços, and squats in the city’s central neighbourhoods, and by a relative “abandonment” of the
city centre by business, investments, and richer Paulistanos. Already in the 1960s, headquarters
of companies and offices began migrating to a new economic hub at the time, to the southwestern
area, around Avenida Paulista and the Jardins neighbourhood—more recently, they partially
migrated again to Avenida Faria Lima and Avenida Berrini, also to the southwest of the centre.
This evasion of the city centre by the business sector was followed by an evasion by the middles
classes and elites, most notably since the 1980s, when violent crime began to rise in the city. 63
Brazil’s democratization was surprisingly accompanied by a sharp rise in violent crime,
especially in the country’s main metropolitan regions (Zaluar 2007, 43; Adorno 2013, 55). Urban
life in São Paulo came to be increasingly dominated by an environment of fear, and São Paulo’s
central districts came to be growingly perceived as a decadent and dangerous area. By the end of
the 20th century, a great part of São Paulo’s middle and upper-classes retreated from the city centre:
the area lost 28.9 percent of its population between 1980 and 2000 (Kohara 2013, 31). Many of
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This was somewhat an inverse process from the one described by Neil Smith (1996) in the New York of the late
twentieth century, even though some similarities can also be identified. It was an inverse process in the sense that, in
New York, the upper classes sought to eliminate the presence of marginalized groups from the city centre and push
them to the periphery (as in the second phase of São Paulo’s history), while in São Paulo the elites themselves largely
deserted the central districts and walled themselves in gated communities in the periphery. The similarities lie in
discourses and urban policies that scapegoat the urban poor for societal problems, in the pervasiveness of fear of
violent crime among the middle classes, and in the implementation of “zero tolerance” policies. The process of
“abandonment” of central quarters by the upper classes which São Paulo went through in the late twentieth century
finds parallels in many other cities of the global South and North, such as Johannesburg, Budapest, Mexico City, Los
Angeles, and Buenos Aires (for more on this, see Caldeira [2000]). However, more recently, especially since the
2000s, there have been some attempts at gentrification of São Paulo’s city centre, but none has yet been comprehensive
or successful in revamping the area as an attractive destination for investors, tourists, and the elites.
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these city dwellers moved to gated communities that were built on large tracts of relatively
devalued land in the city’s inner southern periphery and in towns to the northwest of the
metropolitan region. Part of the more privileged population thus opted for walling themselves off
from the urban poor and public places more broadly in what Caldeira (2000) has called “fortified
enclaves.” These are condominiums, usually high-rise, where multiple residences are “invariably
walled and with security-controlled entrances, usually occupying a large area with land-scaping,
and including all sorts of amenities for collective use” (243). Social classes that used to live in
distant territories now can be found neighbouring each other, but they are separated by high walls
guarded by sophisticated private security systems. The urban periphery thus become more diverse
with high-rise condos dotting jerry-built neighbourhoods.64
The rise in violent crime in São Paulo since Brazil’s democratization has impacted not only
social segregation in the city, but also the positioning of eviction room dwellers vis-à-vis the city’s
community of value. A generalized climate of fear in highly unequal cities has led to a further
stigmatization of the urban poor in Brazil, their ill-equipped territories and generally darker bodies
associated with the world of criminality. The widespread sense of physical insecurity has fuelled
class and (often unacknowledged) race tensions, which are translated in growing popular support
of violent and illegal actions against the poor. As Scheper-Hughes (2006, 154) put it, “Marginal
people (the poor and propertyless classes) are seen by a great many Brazilians, not as rights-bearing
individuals, but rather as bandidos, public enemies, and rubbish people (lixo), those who often are
better off dead.” Such a view is illustrated in two adages that have become popular in democratic

64

This sort of periphery is an urban formation still quite distinct from the traditional process of suburbanization seen
in North American cities (Keil 2020).
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Brazil: “Human rights are only for the proper humans” and “a good criminal is a dead criminal.”65
Both exploit people’s fears of violent crime: the former subsumes a widespread belief that human
rights are unjustly invoked to protect criminals, while the latter elucidates the sort of punishment
criminals deserve. 66 Hence, despite the 1988 Constitution, for many eviction room dwellers of
Brazilian cities today, the universal and anonymous identity of the citizen can still offer very
limited protection. Overall, their rights and physical integrity often depend on proving they are not
bandidos (criminals) but trabalhadores (workers).
São Paulo is the city with the highest housing deficit67 in Brazil, estimated in 2019 as
totalling 474 thousand homes (Silva 2019). The city’s poorest, those living off minimum wages or
odd jobs, find themselves in the same conundrum as their predecessors in the early 20 th century:
they either eat badly or they live in precarious informal housing. For a sense of scale, the rent of a
two-bedroom apartment in São Paulo’s outer periphery, situated two to three hours away from the
centre, costs around 500-700 Brazilian reais per month (Can $175-245), while the minimum wage
in 2018 was of 950 reais a month (Can $335). São Paulo’s current eviction rooms can be found in
the precarious neighbourhoods on the “periphery of the periphery,” in favelas, and in the cortiços
and squats that have proliferated in the central area. As the setting of this dissertation is in central

The first expression in Portuguese is “direitos humanos são para humanos direitos”— “direitos” stands for both
rights and proper, which helps make the expression catchy. The second expression is literally translated from the
Portuguese “bandido bom é bandido morto.”
66
Tereza P. R. Caldeira (2000) analysed this fear-shaped and violent mentality by studying Paulistanos’ opinions
about the human rights of prisoners and the death penalty in the 1980s, right after Brazil’s transition to democratic
rule. As she shows, the social category of “criminals” is regarded as non-human and therefore undeserving of rights
that are understood as only contemplating a privileged layer of society. Given a widespread lack of confidence in the
justice system, Paulistanos interviewed by Caldeira tended to support violent bodily vengeance as an exemplary form
of punishment to those whose humanity is lost by committing a crime.
67
The housing deficit indicates the number of new homes that would need to be offered in order to respond to the
housing demand of a population at a given movement. In Brazil, the housing deficit is calculated by adding up the
number of cases of precarious homes that are not in inhabitable conditions, cases of forced family cohabitation (when
dwellers would like to have unifamilial homes but cannot afford it), cases of excessive spending on rent (when families
with an income of up to three minimum wages spend at least 30% of their income on rent), and rented homes with an
excessive number of dwellers (Fundação João Pinheiro 2018).
65
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São Paulo’s squats, I will focus on this particular rendering of the eviction room in this phase. The
next chapter will delve into the politics of squatting in downtown São Paulo, so here I simply
discuss their emergence and how they have become a key arrival space for disenfranchised
international migrants in the city.
The “evasion” of São Paulo’s downtown in the late 20th century produced many abandoned
buildings in this area. These properties have remained unused due to bureaucratic hurdles (related
to inheritance conflicts and the fact that some are heritage buildings), and real estate speculation,
with many owners waiting for gentrification and “urban renewal” projects so they can sell their
properties at higher prices. Despite the “emptying” and “decadence” of the central area, rent and
property prices have remained high and inaccessible to the city’s poor, who often work there in
the many low-end shops and informal street trade that currently sustain the area’s economy.
Spontaneous squatting of these abandoned buildings by the urban poor has happened since the first
properties were left empty, but, since the late 1990s, the act of organized squatting by politicized
housing movements has taken root in the central districts. The social movements to pioneer the
strategy of squatting in downtown São Paulo were those organized by cortiço dwellers of the
downtown area (Kohara 2013; Neuhold 2016). As will be further explained in the next chapter,
their initiative to occupy these buildings came from the identification of a simple paradox: the fact
that the urban poor were paying high rents to live in extremely precarious conditions in the cortiços
of the city centre, while the area was dotted with empty buildings.
Since the late 1990s, organized squatting in downtown São Paulo has grown exponentially,
as did the number of housing movements running squats. A 2018 estimate points to the existence
of 51 squatted buildings in the city’s central districts, 57 percent of which are organized by housing
movements (Prefeitura de São Paulo 2018). The buildings that are not squatted by housing
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movements are usually organized by shadowy groups that simply occupy the property and
irregularly charge rent for its units, sometimes in association with drug dealers. These types of
squats have proliferated in central São Paulo as well (they will be explored in Chapter 5). Between
2000 and 2010, the population of the city’s central districts began to rise again (Rolnik 2017, 756), mostly due to an increase in the number of squats and cortiços in the area, in addition to some
gentrifying developments inhabited mostly by middle-class youth.
The position of squatters vis-à-vis São Paulo’s community of value has not been
straightforward. As mentioned in the previous chapter, they tend to be perceived by Paulistanos
as vagabundos (“bums”), criminal “invaders” and even “terrorists.” In the current urban dichotomy
between criminals and workers, squatters tend to be situated in the former position, as those who
invade the property of others instead of working hard to secure adequate and formal housing. This
exposes them to all sorts of rights violations and arbitrary punishments. The fact that some of these
buildings are run by profit-seeking and criminal groups further harms squatters’ image, and it
contributes to their criminalization. Scenes of police confrontations during evictions or when large
groups of squatters try to break into an abandoned building have become commonplace in the past
decades. But these eviction room dwellers have also been tolerated, especially those living in
squats run by housing movements. Depending on the politicians at the head of the municipal, state,
and federal governments, these housing movements have been at times persecuted and at times
listened to. In general, they have been able to establish a dialogue with the Partido dos
Trabalhadores (the Workers Part, known as PT)
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administrations and even influence urban
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PT is the main left-wing party in Brazil, and it headed a coalition government at the federal level from 2003 until
2016 (this comprises two presential mandates by Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and nearly two mandates by Dilma
Rousseff, who was impeached in 2016).
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policymaking, but the pitfall of co-optation has also led to their de-mobilization during such
governments.
Squats, cortiços, and the “periphery of the periphery” have become the main arrival areas
for São Paulo’s most recent newcomers from the global South. As mentioned before, the beginning
of this phase was marked by a decrease in the city’s attraction of domestic and international
migrants, but São Paulo has more recently regained its vocation as a cosmopolis. In contrast to the
first phase of significant international immigration, the recent increase in the city’s diversity has
been mostly shaped by the arrival of disenfranchised migrants and asylum-seekers from Latin
America, Africa, and Asia (Bógus and Fabiano 2015; Magalhães et al. 2018).
At the end of the twentieth century, São Paulo received many Koreans, who are now an
established community in the central neighbourhood of Bom Retiro and in the inexpensive clothing
sector (Truzzi 2001). As the commercial ties between China and Brazil expanded from the 1980s
onward, so did the arrival of Chinese migrants, adding up to over 150 thousand immigrants in
Brazil, most of whom live in São Paulo (Yin 2013). Brazil’s diplomatic and economic
approximation with neighbouring countries since the end of the military dictatorships in the
Southern Cone through Mercosur has facilitated migration flows within the region. The Mercosur
Residence Agreement, signed in 2004 and implemented in Brazil in 2009, allowed for the legal
arrival and further establishment of a large community of mostly Bolivians and Paraguayans in
São Paulo. In 2019, Bolivians ranked as the main nationality of immigration in São Paulo,
displacing the historical position of the Portuguese (G1 2020). The Bolivian community has been
concentrated in the central neighbourhoods (Brás, Bom Retiro, Belém and Barra Funda), where
these migrants often live where they work, in precarious clothing workshops (Cymbalista and
Xavier 2007).
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Between 2006 and 2015 Brazil saw its modest immigration numbers rise by 160 percent,
mostly due to South-South flows (Velasco and Mantovani 2016). This was the period of an
“emerging” Brazil of sustained growth and nearly full employment, when the country was seen as
a promising member of the trending BRICS, when the PT administrations invested in South-South
diplomatic and economic ties, and when Brazil was the always-in-construction country to host
world sports events. As the 2008 financial crisis hit the main economies of the global North, many
international migrants and asylum-seekers saw in Brazil an alternative, even if temporary or in
transit, destination (Silva et al. 2018). This was the case of nearly one hundred thousand Haitians
who sought asylum in Brazil after their country was struck by a high-magnitude earthquake in
2010.
In total, between 2010 and 2018, 466 thousand new migrants were registered in the country,
and 116.4 thousand asylum claims were made (Silveira 2019). In 2017, when I began fieldwork in
São Paulo, Brazil had 11,231 recognized refugees, a number overshadowed by the 161,057
pending asylum cases (Ministério da Justiça e Segurança Pública 2019), which made it the country
with the largest number of asylum seekers in South America (IOM 2017). Syrians represented 36
percent of refugees in Brazil, followed by the Congolese (15 percent) and Angolans (nine percent)
(UNHCR n.d.a.). In these cases, as in relation to “voluntary” migrants, Brazil’s growing
international projection and relatively accessible visas were major factors influencing migrants’
journeys. Angolans share with Brazilians the colonial inheritance of the Portuguese language and
this has been a further factor shaping their asylum decisions (and many Congolese asylum-seekers
arriving in Brazil lived in Angola and learned basic Portuguese before crossing the Atlantic). For
Syrian refugees, their access to the Brazilian territory has been facilitated since 2012. They have
been given the possibility to apply, from Middle Eastern countries, for an expedited humanitarian
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visa to travel to Brazil. Upon arrival in Brazil they apply for asylum69. The large-scale arrival of
asylum-seekers from Venezuela began after fieldwork for this research was concluded. Brazilian
authorities estimate that over 200 thousand Venezuelans lived in the country in 2019, and the
Brazilian refugee agency made the decision, in late 2019, to recognize Venezuelan asylum-seekers
as refugees on a prima facie basis—this was a landmark resolution that has been celebrated by the
UNHCR (UNHCR 2019b).
Brazil, as its South American neighbours, has been seen as a relatively open country when
it comes to international migrants and refugees (Acosta 2016). Brazil was a pioneer in
implementing a generous refugee law in South America, Law 9474 of 1997, which incorporated
the broader refugee definition agreed among Latin American countries through the Cartagena
Declaration of 198470 (Jubilut 2006). The Brazilian refugee legislation defines as eligible for
refugee status individuals who have been persecuted (for the reasons enumerated in the 1951
Refugee Convention) as well as those fleeing situations of “grave and generalized human rights
violations” (Article 1). On the regulation of voluntary forms of migration, however, Brazil only
recently replaced the restrictive “Foreigner’s Statute” of 1980, a legal inheritance from the military
dictatorship which framed immigrants as threats to national security and competitors in the labour
market. In 2017 a new immigration law was approved, Law 13445, which expanded immigrants’
rights, including by granting them the right to participate in political demonstrations.71
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In 2018, 83.5 percent of Syrians who applied for asylum in Brazil were granted refugee status, compared to a rate
of 67.9 percent for Congolese asylum-seekers. In contrast, in the same year, only 3.2 percent of Angolan asylumseekers received refugee status in Brazil (UNHCR and Ministério da Justiça e Seugrança Pública n.d.).
70
The Cartagena Declaration recognized as refugees not only individuals facing individualized forms of persecution,
as defined in the 1951 Refugee Convention, but also those “who have fled their country because their lives, safety or
freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of
human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order.”
71
For more on this new legislation, see Guerra (2017) and De Oliveria (2017).
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Tourist visas to Brazil are relatively inexpensive and less demanding than those of
countries of the global North, and the country has no policy of mass incarceration or deportation
of international migrants. Massive regularization campaigns, in contrast, have taken place
periodically since the 1980s (Wejsa and Lesser 2018). For many disenfranchised migrants from
the global South beyond MERCOSUR who cannot access a work or a student visa in Brazil, a
common regularization strategy has been to travel to the country holding tourist visas and apply
for asylum upon arrival, as this is their main path to staying legally in the country besides marrying
a Brazilian or having children born in Brazil. With the exception of Syrian and Venezuelan asylumseekers, whose processes have been expedited, the processing time for asylum claims in the
country can take years, given the backlog. In the meantime, these migrants are able to remain
documented in the country, as they are granted a temporary documentation (the refugee-claim
“protocol”) which gives them ample rights, including the right to work. Haitians have been an
exception in this regard, as they have been granted “humanitarian visas” in Brazil (Thomaz 2018c).
However, if the increase in the numbers of migrants and asylum-seekers in Brazil in the
past two decades can be connected both to the phase of economic prosperity of the 2000s and early
2010s and to the country’s relatively liberal migration policies, the standard of living of these
disenfranchised migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees, tend to be extremely precarious in Brazil.
São Paulo has a concentration of over half of the international migrants arriving in Brazil during
this period;72 in 2018, São Paulo’s immigrant population was estimated at around 600 thousand
people (including the undocumented), which represented about 5 percent of the total population. 73
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This share that has been marginally minimized due to the recent massive arrival of Venezuelans in bordering towns
in the North of Brazil.
73
Interview with advisor of the Centre for Coordination of Policies for Migrants of São Paulo. São Paulo, February
2018.
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São Paulo was the first city in Brazil to develop a municipal law and policies specifically
geared to the rights and assistance of disenfranchised international migrants. These developments
took place during the PT administration of Fernando Haddad (2013-2017), and they were largely
a response to the arrival of thousands of Haitian migrants to São Paulo in 2014. Since then, the
municipal government has established partnerships with local NGOs to manage shelters geared
towards recently-arrived international migrants, be they asylum-seekers or not. Currently, there
are 540 vacancies for international migrants in such shelters throughout the city. The average
allowed stay in these facilities is of six months. In 2014 the municipal government also created
CRAI (Centro de Referência e Atendimento para Imigrantes, i.e Service Centre for Immigrants),
which is managed by the Catholic NGO SEFRAS (Franciscan Solidarity Association). 74 CRAI’s
main responsibilities are to advise migrants about their rights and legal circumstances, and to
instruct public servers in the city about migrants’ reality and rights.75 In 2016 a municipal law was
adopted to put in place a “municipal policy for the immigrant population,” enumerating
international migrants’ rights in the city, promoting their access to public services, and determining
the creation of the Municipal Council of Immigrants. 76 The latter was created in 2016, and it works
as a participatory consultation body tasked with overseeing the implementation of the municipal
immigration law.77
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During my fieldwork, CRAI had a staff of four workers and was situated in a small two-story house in the central
neighbourhood of Bela Vista, right beside a shelter for migrants also managed by SEFRAS.
75
Information about CRAI was obtained in two interviews conducted with different staff members in October of 2017
and March of 2018. At the time of my fieldwork, the main nationalities of the migrants that sought their support were,
respectively, Haiti, DRC, Bolivia, and Angola.
76
The text of Law N 16.478 is available at: https://oig.cepal.org/sites/default/files/2016_ley16.478_bra.pdf
77
The counsel is composed evenly by members of the government and of civil society. It has eight seats for
representatives of municipal secretaries, and eight seats for civil society members. The latter are elected within three
categories: immigrant organizations and collectives, associations or collectives who support international migrants,
and
individual
immigrants.
For
more,
see
https://www.prefeitura.sp.gov.br/cidade/secretarias/direitos_humanos/imigrantes_e_trabalho_decente/conselho_mun
icipal_de_imigrantes/index.php
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Despite these advancements, it is important to highlight that the 540 vacancies for
international migrants in São Paulo’s shelters are not enough to accommodate the number of
disenfranchised newcomers to the city. Further, the shelters are seen as an acolhimento policy,
designed to temporarily “welcome” or “host” those who are new to the city. It is not meant as a
long-term policy targeting migrants’ settlement in the city and their access to adequate housing.
CRAI coordinator in 2018, Sávia Cordeiro, admitted that simply sheltering recently-arrived
migrants was not a sufficient public policy to address the housing struggles of international
migrants in São Paulo.78
International migrants have been living in squats in downtown São Paulo and participating
in the housing movements of this area since politically organized squatting began in the late 1990s.
However, in the past five years or so, there has been a change in the origins of these international
migrants and their numbers have increased considerably. Carla Aguiar, who has worked with
different NGOs supporting international migrants in São Paulo for over thirty years, says that 2014
was the year when an increased presence of international migrants in the downtown squats drew
her attention.79 While Latin American migrants (especially Bolivians) have been a small but
constant presence in squats for decades, in recent years, migrants from different West African
countries (especially Angola and the DRC) and from Haiti (since the 2010 earthquake that hit the
country) have turned to downtown squats. Downtown squats ended up becoming an important
housing strategy for many of these recently-arrived international migrants, who might carry a
humanitarian visa, permanent residency (usually through Brazilian children), or an asylum-seeker
protocol. As a Congolese hairdresser explained to me in one of interviews: “You only needed one
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Interview with Sávia Cordeiro. São Paulo, March 2018.
Interview with Carla Aguiar. São Paulo, February 2018.
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African in a squat for the others to come.” 80 Based on my field research, I believe the same could
be said about the Haitian migrants. It was always by word of mouth (perhaps exchanged in a
shelter, a church, or in the streets) that a new migrant neighbour came to a squat.
In 2017 and 2018, during the time of my fieldwork, Haitians, Bolivians, Angolans,
Congolese and Syrian migrants and refugees, among other nationalities, could all be found
inhabiting São Paulo’s eviction rooms. A survey conducted in 2018 concluded that the city’s
refugees and asylum seekers mostly inhabited peripheral neighbourhoods in the eastern zone of
the city and central neighbourhoods, where squats and cortiços are the only accessible housing
options for the urban poor (UNHCR and Cáritas 2019). With their meagre earning in low-paying
and unstable jobs, especially in construction, cleaning, clothing workshops, domestic services, and
restaurants (Magalhães et al. 2018), they have shared with low-income Brazilians the challenging
of affording adequate housing in the city. According to a survey conducted by the municipal
government, domestic and international migrants represented 71 percent of the total homeless
population of the city in 2015 (R7 2016).
In sum, this recent phase in the history of São Paulo has been marked by an economic
conversion of the city (from an industrial to a service-based economy), by a mitigation of the
centre-periphery dichotomy, by a rise in violent crime which further stigmatized marginal urban
areas, and by the arrival of international migrants and asylum-seekers from the global South. These
disenfranchised newcomers from the global South have been pushed, just like their predecessors
in the city, to inhabit marginal areas, also marginally situated in relation to the city’s community
of value. The question of how these migrants, alongside their Brazilian neighbours, have
responded to their marginalization in the city, is the topic of the following chapters.
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Interview with Congolese woman. São Paulo, March 2018.
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Conclusion

Situating the recently growing participation of international migrants in squats in downtown São
Paulo within the broader context of the city’s history, its successive cycles of migration,
segregation, and its unfolding citizenship struggles, enables us to better understand the contours
of this phenomenon. Rather than being an exceptional, curious, and circumstantial phenomenon
derived from the precarities of contemporary South-South migrations, this phenomenon is a recent
rendering of a centuries-old urban phenomenon. The struggles of disenfranchised international
migrants living in São Paulo’s central squats mirror those of their predecessors, disenfranchised
newcomers who had been similarly evicted from the infrastructure of the “city proper.” If we see
the city like a squat(ter), cortiços, unserved peripheral neighbourhoods, favelas, and squats can all
be regarded as products of the recurrent production of spaces of arrival at the urban margins and
at the margins of the city’s community of value.
The embryonic São Paulo of the turn of the 20th century depended on both disenfranchised
Brazilians and international migrants for its incipient industrialization and urbanization. These
newcomers’ main housing option became the infamous cortiços of the central area, places targeted
for demolition, seen as sanitary and moral threats to the city’s community of value.
The booming São Paulo of the mid-20th century attracted mostly impoverished Brazilians
from the Northeast and interior of the country, a workforce that fed the city’s rapid rise to economic
hegemony as the industrial hub of the country. These newcomers were pushed to inhabit the
unserved urban hinterlands, where they often built their own homes and neighbourhoods. They
struggled for their inclusion in the “city proper” (through the regularization of their property tenure
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and the implementation of urban infrastructure and services in their neighbourhoods), and in so
doing, many of them managed to become tolerated members of the city’s community of value,
helping to challenge Brazil’s exclusionary political culture.
Finally, contemporary São Paulo is a global city with a massive housing deficit. Its
conversion from an industrial to a service-based economy has diminished its ability to absorb
labor, and the city’s growth has stagnated. The rise in violent criminality since the 1980s has led
to both an evasion of the elites and investments from the city centre, and to a further stigmatization
of marginal urban territories, now found in the outer ring of the periphery, in favelas, and in the
cortiços and squats that have proliferated in the “abandoned” central districts. But São Paulo is
still the country’s economic powerhouse and immigration hub. Brazil’s period of economic
prosperity in the 2000s and early 2010s put São Paulo back on the map of international migrations,
but this time of the South-South type. These newcomers have joined poor and racialized Brazilians
in the city’s eviction rooms, most notably squats in the central area.
As squatters tend to be portrayed as criminals and “bums” and situated at the margins of
the city’s community of value, I explore, in the following chapters, how these eviction room
dwellers (from Brazil and abroad) have responded to their marginalization. Have they struggled
together for rights and recognition within the city’s community of value? Have they forged a
coalition or alliance contesting their shared struggles in the city? What sort of visions of
transformation and frictions ensue from this encounter?
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Chapter Three: Returning full citizens to the state

Opening vignette: Organizing a party

Around thirty migrant women and men gathered together on a Friday night in a squatted building
in downtown São Paulo. They sat in a wide circle of plastic chairs in a room illuminated by white
light bulbs, the wiring exposed in the ceiling and the brightness reflected on the impeccably white
but rough walls around. Even when only one person spoke, the room was very loud; its windows
had no glass, just wide rectangular holes in the wall overlooking one of central São Paulo’s main
avenues. Competing for people’s ears against the car horns and zig-zagging motorcycles outside,
seven Brazilian women, who were members of the MSTC (Movimento Sem Teto do Centro, i.e.
City Centre Roofless Movement), tried to explain to the migrants how the movement works. “Do
you think this is a real estate agency? Do you think this is a hostel or a charity?” one of them asked
rhetorically. “Do you know what a movement is?”
None of the migrants answered. Many were, however, familiar with the housing
movement, as most had attended three or four previous reuniões de base (base meetings). This was
my first time attending one of these meetings, and, coincidentally, this gathering was not just about
a basic introduction to the housing movement and the rules of living in a squat—the typical topics
covered in an ordinary base meeting. There was a sense of urgency in the air. Those leading the
meeting strove to leave no loose ends. This was the last meeting before an imminent festa (literally
“party”). Still, the first hour of the meeting was dedicated to the usual round of introductions and
to a discussion about the movements’ ABCs.
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The leader of the movement, Carmen Silva, came into the room during the initial discussion
and someone asked if she would like to say something to the group. Carmen was dressed elegantly
and wore long and recently-made kanekalon braids. She stood upright and, projecting her voice
through the hubbub, didactically said that the movement “is about defending rights guaranteed by
the Brazilian Constitution that are for Brazilians and for foreigners,” such as the right to education,
to health, to public transport, and to housing. She emphasized, and this time with a slightly
impatient and monotonous tone of voice, like someone who had explained this a thousand times
before, that “This movement is not a charity, this has to be clear. Nobody should come here
expecting to be given anything…Everybody has to participate and to contribute to the movement.
This is about fighting for rights together, this is not about the individual.” She repeated this same
message a couple of other times using different words, trying to convey as clearly as possible that
living in a squat required “commitment”: participating in mutirões (group chores) like cleaning,
fixing, and renovating common areas, as well as in more political activities, such as the
movement’s regular meetings and demonstrations. In short, participar (to participate), according
to the movement’s definition of the term, was key for living in a squat.
After delivering her message, Carmen asked if everyone understood what she had said. For
some awkwardly long seconds, no one answered. Some shyly nodded. A soft-spoken Congolese
man eventually offered a tentative answer, but he said it so quietly that only those very close to
him were able to hear it over the traffic noise. A woman from the movement then suggested
discussing the issue in smaller groups. As participants stood up to get rearranged, a woman from
Angola asked, “But what is a party, after all?” One of the women leading the meeting said that that
was exactly what they were about to clarify in the smaller groups.
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Most migrants attending the meeting came from Angola, but some were from the
Democratic Republic of Congo and Haiti. Only one Haitian woman could not speak Portuguese
and had her Haitian friend translate parts of the conversation to her; the others had either learned
Portuguese in Angola or had been living in Brazil for one year or more and were able to follow
the discussion. The smaller group I joined consisted of two Angolan men, both of whom were
Pentecostal pastors, two young Angolan women who were friends, and an Angolan woman who
looked to be in her third trimester of pregnancy. The woman from the movement leading this small
group kicked off the conversation by explaining that “party” was a code for the act of squatting an
abandoned building. “This is what we’re preparing to do in two days,” she said. She explained that
throwing a party consisted of breaking into an empty building late at night with a big group of
people. Ideally, this group of people would aim to resist any police attempts to remove them for a
full 48 hours, after which, according to Brazilian law, the police are able to entre the property only
with a warrant from a judge.
The woman went on to explain what they should bring to the party. “Do you know what
an abandoned building looks like inside?” she asked. One of the Angolan friends said, “It looks
very dirty.” The Angolan woman confided that she had participated in a party before, the one that
occupied the very building where we were gathered that night, but that she had given up on
squatting the building because it was in such a terrible state. The woman from the movement used
this story to show how it was worth staying and committing to the luta (the struggle), pointing out
all the improvements that had been made to the building since the party. She emphasized how hard
they would have to work, during the initial hours of the upcoming party, to make the squatted
space as safe and as clean as possible, and that they would be provided with brooms and would be
expected to collaborate to put the trash out. She told them to bring some sort of blanket on which
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to lie down on the ground, but she admitted that everybody would be tense and that it would be
difficult to sleep. “But isn’t this too risky?” one of the Angolan pastors then pressed her. “Aren’t
they going to evict us? Couldn’t they arrest us because of the invasion?”
The woman from the movement leaned forward on her chair and, speaking in a very
articulate way, gesticulating emphatically, and looking everyone intensely in the eyes, tried to
reassure the migrants that, even though there were risks of police confrontations and eviction, the
movement picked its “targets” very carefully. She advised against referring to what they were
about to do as an “invasion.” According to the Brazilian Constitution, she said, there was
something called the “social function of property.” The building they were going to squat was
violating the Constitution because it was abandoned and deteriorating. Besides, the people doing
the party did not have a place to live, and the Constitution also guaranteed everyone’s right to
housing. So, she concluded, what they were doing was not a criminal invasion but something
legitimate, rightful. They were going to squat that building to call the authority’s attention to the
fact that it was violating Brazilian law, and that there were all these families who had no place to
live.
“Can I leave [the squat] and go to work on Monday?” asked one of the Angolan friends.
Monday would be the first morning after they had broken in, before the crucial 48 hours had
elapsed. The woman from the movement reinforced the importance of everyone staying inside for
the entire 48 hours; the police would not try to break in knowing there were so many families
inside. She did not insist the Angolan woman should skip work, but suggested that everyone should
“try to exchange hours with co-workers or simply ask for a day off.”
As this discussion unfolded in our group, I looked around and noticed that each other group
also had a woman from the movement explaining the same things being explained to my group:
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the basics of the movement, how a “party” works, and what they should expect on party day. When
the meeting was drawing to a close, a man, after having visited the other groups, approached us.
He asked everyone to say their names, introduced himself as “Roberto from the movement,” and
he explained that he lived in another squat. He asked if anyone had any remaining doubts or
questions about the “party.” The Angolan pastor repeated his question about the “invasion.”
Roberto explained the difference between invasion and occupation: an invasion was when you
entered someone’s property without permission (a place where people live or work), while an
occupation was when you entered a place, also without authorization, that had been abandoned for
a long time, that was not being used by anyone. “When you do that because you don’t have a place
to live, that’s an ocupação, not an invasão.” Before leaving, he asked again if anyone had questions
or doubts. The Angolan friend who had initially asked what a party was said, “Now it’s clear.”

Introduction

Much like a base meeting is supposed to introduce those in need of housing to the political agenda
of a housing movement and to the rules informing everyday life in a squat, this chapter introduces
the reader to the politics of squatting in downtown São Paulo. I provide a brief overview of the
emergence of political squatting in the city, and I analyse the vision of transformation that these
movements, and especially the MSTC, articulate. An understanding of the assumptions, discourse,
tactics, and political goals of housing movements helps us make sense of the encounter between
international migrants and the militant Brazilian squatters in the city, which is explored in the next
chapter. Most importantly, this chapter outlines the citizenship agenda of the MSTC (which it
shares with most housing movements organizing squats in the city), and shows how the movement
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has striven to insert squatters (the movement’s members) into São Paulo’s community of value as
“full citizens” (understood as hardworking and politically mobilized people) deserving of social
rights, especially the right to housing. In exploring how the horizon of citizenship informs the
MSTC’s agenda, I argue that such a horizon brings both a generative potential and inherent
limitations for those at the urban margins.
But before going into these analyses, a clarification on housing movements’ terminology
is in order. The MSTC and many other housing movements in Brazilian cities carry the term sem
teto in their names. Sem teto is how squatters are referred to in Brazil. There is no literal translation
to squatters in Portuguese, and a squat is referred to as an ocupação, an occupation, the same
semantics stemming from the verb “to occupy” as used in other Latin American countries, Spain,
and Italy. The literal translation to the term sem teto is “ceiling-less” (precisely) or “roofless”
(more in tune with English semantics), i.e. “homeless.” However, the housing movements analysed
here are not mainly composed of homeless rough sleepers. The adjective sem teto is employed by
housing social movements to include all those who lack adequate housing. As clarified by
Guilherme Boulos (2013), leader of the MTST (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Teto, i.e.
Movement of the Roofless Workers), the term encompasses those who have jobs (informal or
formal but low-paying ones) and still cannot afford dignified housing. Those people also constitute
housing deficit statistics (along with those living on the streets), and they might live uncomfortably
with relatives or friends, they might spend an unsustainable portion of their income on rent, and/or
they might live in extremely precarious conditions in favelas or in cortiços, for example.
The first housing movements of São Paulo’s downtown were mostly named after the
identity of cortiço dwellers, or simply by referring to the housing struggle (luta por moradia).
Housing movements created in the 1990s began using sem teto as part of their identity, as an
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adaptation from the allied sem terra (“landless”) movement, which gained notoriety in that decade
with the fierce land reform activism of the Landless Workers Movement (MST, Movimento dos
Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra).81
This chapter focuses on how housing movements organizing the sem teto in downtown São
Paulo (especially the MSTC) have articulated a set of discourses and practices supporting their
claims to rights. How have the sem teto responded to their eviction to the margins of the city proper
and of the city’s community of value? How do they perceive the notion of citizenship, and what
are the contours of their vision of transformation? In order to explore these questions, I will first
provide an overview of the politics of squatting in downtown São Paulo to give a sense of the
trajectory, challenges, and the “victories” of the different movements behind it.

Occupying the city centre: revolution and government

In the city of São Paulo, the history of the housing struggle has always been one of stopping
the process of expulsion of the poor and excluded families from the best areas of the city.
Benedito Barbosa, lawyer representing different housing movements in São Paulo 82

81

The MST is one of the biggest social movements in the world—it counts over one million members in all regions
of Brazil—and its central call is for land reform in the country. Its main strategy is the squatting or occupation of vast
unproductive rural properties (which are not fulfilling any social function), where highly organized camps are
established for the settlement of landless families. The MST demands these properties be expropriated by the state
and redistributed among the landless as small plots of land for family agriculture. Since its emergence in the late
1970s, MST has managed to guarantee the legal settlement of over 350 thousand families across rural Brazil. The
squatting of peripheral urban land and of abandoned buildings in central São Paulo, and the agenda of urban reform
more broadly, have been influenced by MST’s activism. For more on this movement, see, for example, Wright and
Wolford (2003) and Ondetti (2008).
82
Interview with Benedito Barbosa. São Paulo, February 2018.
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The many grassroots housing movements that organize São Paulo’s eviction room dwellers today
trace their origins to the popular urban movements that emerged in the last decade of the military
dictatorship.83 These movements, briefly discussed in the previous chapter, played a key role both
in ushering in the end of military rule and in spreading a “sense of citizenship” among the urban
poor, thereby challenging the clientelistic and highly exclusionary political culture in place since
colonial times. The term “citizenship,” used as a rallying cry by the different urban movements,
framed their claims to a set of rights (many of which were eventually incorporated in the 1988
“Citizen Constitution”), but it also referred to a bottom-up project of constituting “active political
subjects who can thus become political actors” (Dagnino 2007, 552). These movements invested
heavily in the work of consciousness-raising and popular education, as a way of mobilizing their
members in a collective struggle for dignified living conditions in the city.
São Paulo has been the fulcrum of Brazil’s urban popular movements since the 1970s and
1980s (Gohn 1991). With the support of São Paulo’s archdiocese, The União dos Movimentos de
Moradia de São Paulo (UMM, “Union of the Housing Movements of São Paulo”) was founded as
an umbrella movement in 1987, encompassing different landless collectives organizing the
squatting of vacant land in the eastern zone of the city (Kohara 2013, 151). The UMM soon came
to aggregate housing movements from other regions of the city and even from the broader
metropolitan region of São Paulo. Over the last three decades, the UMM has been a key grassroots
actor influencing urban policies in São Paulo and pressing for good-quality social housing projects
in different areas of the city and metropolitan region. Later, in 1991, the ULC (Unificação das
Lutas dos Cortiços, i.e. “Unification of the Cortiço Struggles”) emerged as the first formal
organization representing the movements of cortiço dwellers in the central districts of São Paulo.
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Brazil’s military dictatorship lasted from 1964 until 1985.
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According to Kohara84 and Neuhold (2016), all housing movements that are currently active in the
city centre have their origins in the ULC.
ULC’s initial approach was to try to promote improvements in cortiços; it pressed, for
example, for decreases in utility bills, renovations, and improvements in the sanitary conditions of
these houses. As Luiz Gonzaga da Silva, known as “Gegê,” who is the leader of the MMC (
Movimento de Moradia do Centro, i.e. Housing Movement of the Downtown) and a central
founding figure of the ULC, explains, this approach presented cortiço dwellers with a conundrum:
the improvements ended up benefiting the landlord, who could then seek to increase rents and
evict the very families who had pressed for the improvements. 85 ULC members, like those of other
housing movements in the downtown area, refused to move away from the central districts. They
criticized the meagre housing projects that existed at the time, which were overwhelmingly based
on the construction of low-quality buildings in the “periphery of the periphery”—a pattern that has
not been broken with more recent housing programs, such as the housing projects of the largescale federal program Minha Casa, Minha Vida (My Home, My Life). 86 Benedito Barbosa, known
as “Dito,” a lawyer working with various housing movements in São Paulo since 1995, aptly
summarized the basic criticism made by housing movements then and now. As he puts it, “What
the state has made [in terms of social housing] has been of bad quality, expensive, and away from
the city, outside of the city, where there is no city… The production of the territory has always
been like this; the city is not for the workers.” 87 The architect, NGO member, and long-term
collaborator of São Paulo’s housing movements Luiz Kohara adds that in the late 1990s “a whole
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Interview with Luiz Kohara. São Paulo, February 2018.
Interview with Luiz Gonzaga da Silva (Gegê). São Paulo, January 2018.
86
For a critical analysis of this housing program, see Marques and Rodrigues (2013), Amore and colleagues (2015),
and Rolnik and colleagues (2015).
87
Interview with Benedito Barbosa. São Paulo, February 2018.
85
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reflection on the right to the city begins. Why is it that poor people, when it’s time for them to
build the city, they can do it, but when it’s time for them to enjoy it, they can’t?”88
Here it is worth making a quick pause to better situate the reader who has never had a
chance to visit São Paulo and its central districts. As we saw in the previous chapter, the central
districts of São Paulo have been perceived as decadent and dangerous by the city’s elites and
private and public investors since the 1980s—even though some gentrifying plans resurface every
so often. So why would some highly mobilized low-income workers of the city insist so adamantly
on living in this area? What does this area look like, and what does it have to offer to the urban
poor?
A new visitor to São Paulo is probably surprised to find the frozen-in-time-like landscape
of the downtown area of Latin America’s financial hub. The high-rise glass towers, exclusive
international boutiques and restaurants, and the shining logos of multinational companies that one
would expect to be surrounded by are nowhere to be found in this part of the city—the visitor
would need to move towards the Jardins, Faria Lima, and Berrini areas to encounter these things.
However, the urban infrastructure of the city’s downtown is impressive despite being visibly
degraded. The architectural richness of this area is a testimony to its past grandeur: mid-20th
century buildings that are still landmarks of Brazil’s innovative modernist architecture (such as
Oscar Niemeyer’s tilde-shaped Copan, the cylindrical Italia, or the oval Hilton buildings) stand
side-by-side with charming shopping centres (galerias) and imposing edifices of the neoclassical
and baroque styles built in the late-19th and early-20th centuries (the Theatro Municipal being
perhaps the most impressive example). While it is true that this area has been abandoned by the
elites and public and private investments since the late 20 th century, the city’s working class has
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Interview with Luiz Kohara. São Paulo, February 2018.
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never left it, and has, in fact, turned it into a vibrant popular commercial hub, at least during the
day. Santa Efigênia street, for instance, is flooded by shoppers elbowing each other in search of
good deals on electronic products and services during the day, but the area is relatively deserted at
night and often frequented by homeless people, many of whom use drugs (mainly crack) in the
area. Also, the area is still privileged in terms of public infrastructure and services. The core of the
city’s subway and bus systems converge in this area, and there are many pedestrian-only streets,
and relatively good-quality public schools, hospitals, and day care facilities that are not as much
in demand as those in other, more densely populated parts of the city.
The cortiço dwellers organized in the ULC were thus boldly claiming their right to enjoy
this urban infrastructure that was largely absent from the outer rings of the city’s periphery (where
housing projects have been overwhelmingly built), and to spend less money and daily hours
commuting to their jobs in or around the urban core. According to Gegê, even among members of
the ULC there was an initial resistance to the idea of making claims to the right of the urban poor
to live in the city centre. Such claims were seen either as too daring or as contributing to prejudice
against the periphery. “For us, wanting to live in the city centre was neither a prejudice [against
the periphery] nor too daring. The property [that is abandoned] isn’t fulfilling its social function,
why leave it there like that? We kept on pressing, and pressing, and pressing until we reached the
point when we began squatting,” he explains. 89 The eighth of March of 1997 was a watershed in
the tactics of housing movements in central São Paulo. On that night, hundreds of ULC members
squatted Casarão Santos Dumont, an abandoned property in the central Campos Elísios
neighbourhood. To their surprise, there were no open confrontations with the police and an
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arrangement with the government was reached in which the squatter families would have
privileged access to social housing.
Since 1997, organized squatting in downtown São Paulo has grown exponentially, as have
the number of housing movements running squats. As of 2018, estimates point to the existence of
51 squatted buildings in the city’s central districts, 57 percent of which were organized by housing
movements (Prefeitura de São Paulo 2018). The remaining 43 percent are believed to be managed
by profit-seeking groups that rent units irregularly. These groups often use the housing movement
identity as a façade, and some of them are believed to have connections with the PCC (Primeiro
Comando da Capital, i.e., “Capital City’s First Command”), Brazil’s biggest criminal organization
involved in prison rebellions, robberies, kidnappings, and especially highly-prolific drug dealing.
These types of squats have proliferated in central São Paulo as well, and they will be further
discussed in Chapter Five.
In relation to the squatting tactics of housing movements, the pioneer UMM moved away
from the strategy of occupying buildings for extended periods of time in the early 2000s. Now it
only resorts to “flash squats” in order to press public authorities to listen to their demands and
negotiate with them (i.e., members of the UMM do not get to live in squatted buildings).
Disagreements within UMM led to the creation of the Frente de Luta por Moradia (FLM,
“Housing Struggles Front”), another umbrella movement focused on the strategy of “squatting and
staying.”90 Despite their different approaches to the squatting of vacant property, both the UMM
and FLM seek to participate actively in the spheres of urban policy-making: their leaders and
members often take seats in participatory policy councils, they seek to meet with public officials
to discuss their demands, and they propose different plans and projects to advance the urban poor’s
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For more details on the distinctions between the UMM and FLM see Kohara (2013), Earle (2017) and Donaghy
(2017).
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access to dignified housing. The MSTC, an offshoot of the pioneer ULC, was created in 1998, is
part of the FLM, and is one of the main housing movements in the downtown area; certainly, the
main one to be hosting international migrants. According to Carmen Silva, leader of the MSTC,
in early 2018 the movement was responsible for seven squats in the central districts.
A great part of the scholarship produced on the politics of these housing movements has
focused on their relationship with the state (Levy 2005; Tatagiba 2010; Donaghy 2011, 2017,
2020). Different authors have shown how, instead of either adopting confrontational and disruptive
strategies or seeking to negotiate directly with public officials and formal channels, these
movements have invested in both paths in order to advance their goals. Squatting is the most visible
component of housing movements’ strategies to press public authorities for social housing, but it
is not the only one. More than a way of challenging state authority, squatting is often a tactic
deployed by housing movements to bring public officials to the table and to gain leverage in formal
negotiations. Collaborating closely with different levels of government and administrations, using
the participatory channels introduced by the 1988 Constitution, 91 and speaking the official
language of laws, rights, citizenship, and policymaking is thus a key facet of their modus operandi.
As Kohara (2013, 196, my translation) puts is, “The strategy of squatting, participating in
institutional spaces, and the dialogue with government officials, in a way, have been
complementary actions, to the extent that squatting serves as a negotiation channel and the lack of
dialogue leads the movements to the squats.”
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Representatives of these movements seek to meet regularly with the municipal housing secretary, and they take
seats in deliberative councils at all levels of government, such as the National Council of the Cities, the Council of the
Nacional Fund for Housing of Social Interest, the State Housing Council, and the Municipal Housing Council. These
bodies are a product of the “Citizen Constitution” and, even though they lack enforceable decision-making power,
they act as fora for public discussion about policy-making related to housing, with civil society members (both from
housing movements but also those representing the interests of real estate developers) taking seats to deliberate,
oversee, and be consulted on the housing management of the city.

123

In negotiations with government officials, housing movements present proposals for
housing projects; they critique and seek to alter housing programs that are not accessible to the
poorest city dwellers; and they present technical studies proving the viability of particular housing
projects, among other interventions. All families participating in the city’s housing movements are
required to apply for social housing programs, indicating what they see as the durable solution to
their members’ plight. The more social housing units or funding schemes each movement is able
to secure for its members, the greater number of new members the movement is able to attract.
The more members a movement has, the greater influence it is able to exert on public authorities,
and the more likely it is to secure future social housing units or funding schemes (Tatagba 2010,
72).
Carmen Silva, the leader of the MSTC, who is also a veteran of organized squatting in the
central area, shuns portrayals of housing movements as radical or revolutionary organizations. She
stresses that “The idea [of the movement] is to be able to inform public policies. The movement’s
idea has always been this one. It’s about having room to inform policy.” But she does see the
movement’s actions as, in a circumscribed way, revolutionary. For her, the ability to influence the
different levels of government to provide dignified housing to the urban poor amounts to both
govern and revolutionize:

They [the general public] have the totally wrong idea of us, right? That we are always
making the revolution. We can revolutionize and also govern. We make the revolution
when we present many proposals to the government, [showing] that it is actually possible
to have a [housing] service for the low-income worker, to fulfil the Constitution, right?
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Within articles five [referring to the requirement that every property must “fulfil a social
function”] and six [referring to the right to housing]. 92

Depending on the orientation of a particular government, housing movements can be
criminalized or allowed to participate in urban policymaking. They have found a greater opening
for their participation in urban politics with PT administrations, and many leaders and members of
central São Paulo housing movements are affiliated with the party. The UMM has been particularly
close to the PT, with many of its leaders having taken up positions in politicians’ offices (Earle
2017, 124). However, this relationship with PT is not always straightforward, and movement
leaders are wary of their co-optation or demobilization during more “friendly” governments
(Tatagiba 2010; Earle 2017; Donaghy 2020). Also, the risk of being criminalized with changing
governments and political winds is always present. Gegê, leader of MMC and one of the founding
members of ULC, for example, was jailed for 50 days and spent about six years under house arrest
until finally being absolved in 2011. He was accused of involvement in a murder that took place
in one of the squats organized by MMC in 2002. No evidence of his involvement in this crime was
ever found, and Gegê still bitterly recalls those years of unfreedom, which he attributes to the
persecution of governor Mário Covas (1995-2001) from the centre-right PSDB, with whom he had
previously tried to negotiate a housing solution for MMC members who had been evicted from a
squat.
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As briefly mentioned in the previous chapter, depending on the orientation of a particular government, housing
movements can be given more or less attention. In the city of São Paulo, housing movements have found a greater
opening for dialogue about social housing in the central districts with PT administrations (Luiza Erundina from 1889
to 1992, Marta Suplicy from 2001 and 2004, and Fernando Haddad from 2013 to 2017); however, this relationship is
not always straightforward and even in more right-leaning governments they strive to be listened to as legitimate
actors in the city’s policy-making arena. For more on this topic, see Tatagiba’s (2010) work analysing the relationship
between São Paulo’s housing movements and political institutions.
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Despite episodes such as these, São Paulo’s housing movements still generally strive to be
listened to as legitimate actors in the city’s policy-making arena by right-leaning governments. For
example, during my fieldwork, the São Paulo mayor was João Dória, an openly conservative and
neoliberal businessman-turned-politician from the PSDB who sees squatters as criminals. Despite
his antagonistic stance, Carmen Silva stressed that his administration’s housing secretary,
Fernando Chucre, was respectful and open for dialogue with the housing movements, more so than
the housing secretary for the first two years of the administration of Fernando Haddad, the former
PT mayor.93
Another important aspect of these movements is the fact that they tend to have more women
in their rank and file than men, especially women who are unmarried heads of households. Not
only that, women have often taken leadership roles in these movements (Levy et al. 2017),
especially black women from more impoverished parts of Brazil, such as Carmen (she migrated
from the North-eastern state of Bahia to São Paulo in 1996). Women have had an important
presence within urban popular movements since their emergence in the 1970s and 1980s (Lobo
1991; Alvarez 1990). As Sonia E. Alvarez (1990, 44) stressed in her analysis of these movements,
“Women join community movements in far greater numbers than men because social norms and
patriarchal ideologies hold women responsible for articulating kinship, friendship, and community
networks and organizing family survival strategies.” Hence, on the one hand, women’s roles in
these movements provide them with the space to engage in urban politics as important political
actors, which is all the more remarkable considering that these have been poor women of colour,
many of migrant origins. On the other hand, women’s predominance in these movements is shaped

93

The housing secretary then was José Floriano de Azevedo Marques, a member of the right-wing PP, who took this
position as a result of the broad coalitions the PT administrations have commonly made with other parties in order to
obtain more stable “governance” conditions.
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by their particular concern over housing and home, the domestic reproductive sphere assigned to
women under the culture of patriarchy. Whenever I asked members of central São Paulo’s housing
movements why they thought women were so predominant and powerful within these movements,
they invariably explained it in gendered terms of women caring more and fighting more
passionately for their “homes” than men.
Still, this should not subtract from the political relevance of women’s protagonism in
housing struggles. Feminist notions of citizenship have questioned the private-public separation,
insisting that the two spheres are political and inform one another (Lister 1997). The distinction
between the oikos (the household and domestic sphere) and the polis (the city and public sphere)
was at the core of Ancient Greek theorizations of citizenship (especially that of Aristotle), and
Western conceptions of citizenship have been shaped by this distinction. As Pococok (1995, 32)
explains, in Aristotle’s formulation, to “qualify as a citizen, the individual must be the patriarch of
a household or oikos, in which the labor of slaves and women satisfied his needs and left him free
to engage in political relationships with equals.” In this conception, the citizens gather in the public
assembly and discuss the affairs that are perceived as not concerning the oikos, such as matters of
trade, war, and peace among cities. The women and the slaves, immersed in the private affairs of
social reproduction, cannot qualify as citizens, understood as equals able to rule and be ruled in
public. A question that arises from this distinction is whether those confined to the domestic sphere
should seek to escape it so they can be recognized as citizens, or whether they should refuse the
distinction and hierarchy between the private and the public, the home and the city, and propose
an alternative conception of citizenship. The participation and protagonism of disenfranchised
women in housing movements in São Paulo is more aligned with the latter path. They not only
show that women can care for and have a say in both the matters of the home and the city, but that
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the two spheres cannot be dissociated. Their ability or inability to secure an adequate home is
political, and they treat it as such (rather than as a matter of private management or individual
capacity). In fighting for dignified homes for themselves and their families, they are propelled to
organize public demonstrations and engage with formal government channels. These women thus
demonstrate that the oikos is a problem of the polis, and that citizenship cannot fulfil its ideals of
equality and inclusion if it neglects the matters of the household.
In relation to these movements’ demands for social housing in the central area of the city,
they have managed to obtain some “victories” on that front. According to a 2017 survey (Anitelli
2017), São Paulo’s central districts had 17 buildings that were “rehabilitated” and transformed into
social housing projects, while 14 other buildings had already been expropriated for social housing
ends, but not yet “rehabilitated.” However, as Luiz Kohara, a long-term collaborator of the city’s
housing movements, sums it up, “If the [housing] struggle has been the size of an elephant, the
victories are the size of a little mouse.” The norm in housing policy is still the construction of
precarious housing projects on the outskirts of the city or in São Paulo’s metropolitan area.
But how have grassroots movements representing the city’s eviction room dwellers
managed to obtain these victories (however limited)? What sort of discourses and tactics have they
relied upon to get a seat at different government tables and influence urban policymaking? More
to the point, what sort of discourses and tactics did they develop in order to position organized
downtown squatters as rights-bearing individuals?

“Those who squat are not at fault”
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As the opening vignette of this chapter suggests, housing movements have an eloquent explanation
for why squatting abandoned buildings is a legitimate action, distinct from “invading.” When
candidly asked if squatting is a crime (as in the vignette), or when openly accused of being
criminals, members of housing movements deploy a series of arguments that constitute a discourse
that legitimises their tactics, developed to persuade their own rank and file, the general public, but
especially public authorities (judges, mayors, housing secretaries, and the police, for example) of
their cause. Housing movements constantly strive to distinguish themselves from other groups
squatting abandoned buildings in central São Paulo. The discourse they articulate contrasts their
actions and motivations to those of profit-seeking groups and groups allegedly associated with
drug dealers who similarly squat vacant property in the city’s centre. This discourse affirms the
legality of their squatting action, the social and political need for it, and the contribution their
squats bring to the neighbouring areas.
In the literature on housing movements and their organizing of squats in São Paulo, three
aspects are commonly mentioned as constituting the rationale for the legitimacy of squatting (for
example, Levy [2005]; Dos Santos [2010]; Irazábal [2018]). These three aspects are the ones that
are most repeatedly articulated by housing movements, and they are mentioned in the vignette
opening this chapter. As the MSTC members explain to the migrants, the Brazilian Constitution
stipulates (under article five) that every property has to perform a social function, something that
the owners of abandoned buildings disrespect. The Constitution also stipulates (under article six)
everyone’s social right to housing. Finally, and this is a social necessity and not a law-based point,
the families that resort to living in squats urgently need a roof over their heads. Hence, housing
movements elaborate a three-part argument granting legitimacy to their act of squatting private
property: they are denouncing the existence of property that does not perform any social function,
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they are claiming for the poor families’ right to housing, and they are providing a temporary
housing solution to these families.
“Our Constitution is very clear: private property isn’t absolute, it’s relative,”94 explains a
coordinator at an MSTC squat. Dito, the lawyer representing different housing movements, echoes
his argument, stating that, if we analyse the Brazilian legislation, “the right to housing has gained
a status superior to that of the right to property.”95 While the Constitution does introduce the
requirement that every property must “fulfil a social function,” the City Statute of 2001 96 details
the measures that the government should take in order to address the problem of vacant property.
These measures consist of an incremental taxation on such property and, if after five years of
progressive taxation the property still does not perform any social function, the municipal
government can expropriate it and pay the original owner with government bonds. Activists and
lawyers of housing movements, therefore, resort to these stipulations in legal battles with property
owners (sometimes the owner is the local or federal government itself) and in their claims to and
negotiations with the government. They denounce the irregularity of abandoned property and press
the authorities to “put the law into practice” by expropriating these buildings and turning them into
social housing. Housing movements thus argue that “Squatting is not a crime, but a right. The sem
teto workers who squat are demanding the fulfilling of the social function of property and
legitimately claiming the right to housing, also established in the Constitution” (Boulos 2014, 81).
For Carmen, this is a key legalistic aspect of their struggle which public opinion grossly
misunderstands.
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Interview MSTC coordinator. São Paulo, January 2018.
Interview with Benedito Barbosa. São Paulo, February 2018.
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For an examination of the Statute, the role of social movements in elaborating it, and its “right to the city” provision,
see Fernandes (2007).
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Beyond the Brazilian Constitution, these housing movements also refer, though less
frequently, to housing as a human right, or to their struggle as being about fighting for the right to
the city. Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights mentions every human being’s
right to housing, but this declaration is rarely invoked by members and leaders of housing
movements, perhaps because it is not as persuasive in their negotiations with public authorities in
Brazil. The right to the city, as previously mentioned, is enshrined in the City Statute, and it is
often invoked by members and leaders of São Paulo’s housing movements, but in vague terms.
The right to the city agenda has been approached by urban grassroots movements in Brazil mostly
through a legalistic and policy-oriented approach (so much so that they successfully campaigned
for it to be enshrined in a federal law!), and not so much as part of a revolutionary, anti-capitalist
and anti-state agenda. The City Statue does not abolish property rights, but it reinforces the
“relativization” of such rights, something that was already signalled in the Constitution. In other
words, the right to the city defined in the City Statute leaves property rights still in place, but it
makes such rights dependent on whether or not a social function is being fulfilled. The claims
made by housing movements organizing squats in downtown São Paulo is in keeping with this
legislation; they seek to give a social function to abandoned property by transforming it into social
housing.97 This approach to the right to the city is quite distinct from the radical platform laid out
by Henri Lefebvre (1996), generally seen as the “father” of the right to the city agenda. Lefebvre’s
anti-capitalist and anti-statist vision involved the working classes’ takeover of the management
and production of the urban, with their appropriation of the space of the city (thereby refusing
property rights) and an eventual withering away of the state (Purcell 2013).

This agenda has informed urban popular movements in Brazil since the 1970s and 1980s. For example, Gohn’s
(1991) analysis of these movements stressed that they were fighting for the urban poor’s access to private property
(homeownership) (176), and that they have from the start “recognized the importance and necessity of interacting with
the state” (177).
97
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In addition to “fighting for the law to be implemented,” activists of housing movements
also interpret the legitimacy of their actions in terms of “filling the gaps left by the state.” As a
coordinator of an MSTC squat explained, “The state doesn’t do its part, so what can we do? That
which the state doesn’t do: provide a home to those who lack one.” 98 Housing activists stress that
the state has welfare obligations towards its citizens that it does not fulfil. Among those
obligations, housing is seen as the most fundamental one, the one that allows for people’s dignity
and for them to access other rights (such as health, education, food, work, culture, etc.). They point
out that the state’s omission, negligence, and lack of political will have produced a city with
thousands of homeless people. In 2018, the municipal government of São Paulo identified over
107 thousand people living on the streets of São Paulo (Ramos and Buono 2019).99 “It would be
another multitude living on the streets if the [housing] movements didn’t exist,” concludes the
MSTC squat coordinator.100 The squat is not a definitive housing option, but its temporariness can
extend over years in a row. The convoluted court disputes between the property owner and a
housing movement can take many years, and the families are at least housed in this meantime.
Squatting, thus, is defended as a legitimate act not only from a legal point of view, but also from
a social welfare standpoint.
But these are not the only arguments these movements put forth. Concerns about the health
and security threats posed by abandoned property are also used to grant legitimacy to squatting.
This argument was particularly emphasized by the MSTC’s leadership and coordinators, and it
might not be so central or even mentioned by other movements. Ironically, the sanitary approach
employed by urban planners since the late 19th century to justify the demolition of the urban poor’s
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Interview with MSTC coordinator. São Paulo, February 2018.
This is an underestimation of the actual total figure, since it only accounted for those who were assisted by municipal
bodies.
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99

132

dwellings and their expulsion from the city centre is currently employed by housing movements
to justify the urban poor’s taking of centrally located property. Housing activists emphasize that
whenever they squat an abandoned building, they contribute to public health in the city by filling
up “many trucks” with “tons” of garbage where diseases proliferated, and by eliminating breeding
spots for the Aedes aegypti mosquito (the primary vector of dengue fever, Zika fever, and
chikungunya viruses). “As we sanitize this place for us to live, we also contribute to the
surrounding area,”101 as an MSTC coordinator sums up. Less frequently, the movement’s
contribution to the neighbourhood where the squat is located is explained in terms of public
security as well. Their presence, they argue, keeps criminal groups, who could be using the space
for their criminal purposes, away.
In sum, the social function of property, the right to housing, the need to assist homeless
people, and the contribution of squatters to their surroundings are key elements of the discourse
developed by housing movements legitimising the act of squatting. They substantiate housing
movement’s claim-turned-motto that “Quem ocupa não tem culpa!” (“Those who squat are not at
fault!”) and that what they are doing is rightful and necessary because the state “doesn’t do its
part.” But how do they substantiate a prior, more fundamental claim they make; that is, the claim
that squatters, eviction room dwellers largely regarded as “bums” and criminals, have rights that
the state must guarantee in the first place?

From “beaten-up” individuals to “full citizens”
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As discussed in the previous chapters, despite citizenship’s assumptions of anonymous and
universal equality before the law, some citizens are invariably considered “more equal than others”
(in the Orwellian formulation); some are more safely inserted in a nation’s or city’s community of
value than others. São Paulo’s eviction room dwellers from the past and from the present are
generally pushed to the margins of the city’s community of value, and therefore they often need to
show their deservingness to rights and justice in order to claim rights, as mere formal entitlement
does not suffice. Thus, I believe that the sophisticated discourse developed by housing movements
organizing squats in São Paulo would have very little purchase and chance of success were housing
movements unable to position their members, the stigmatized squatters, as rights-bearing
individuals in the first place, even if such positioning is fragile and contingent. In order to develop
this argument, I now explain how the MSTC, in line with other housing movements, especially
those organizing squats, has sought to position its members as valued and dignified members of
São Paulo’s community of value. I highlight that while this approach to claims-making can lead
to important achievements, it also inadvertently ends up reinforcing the boundaries of the city’s
community of value.
“The individual comes to our squat completely beaten-up [todo arrebentado] and we return
a full citizen [cidadão pleno] to the state.” This sentence was often said by Carmen, the leader of
the MSTC, whenever she explained the role of the housing movement in squatters’ lives. It is a
telling sentence: it presents us with the idea that squat life is transformative, and it defines the
result of the transformation. But why would a grassroots movement that is engaged in squatting
abandoned property frame its politics in terms of producing full citizens, and for the state, no less?
The MSTC’s citizenship-producing discourse might perhaps be more explicit than that of other
housing movements in São Paulo. But it is not exceptional in its attempts to socialize and educate
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its members on the value of a strong work ethic and collective political mobilization. This is
something that the city’s contemporary movements have inherited from the modus operandi of the
urban popular movements of the 1970s and 1980s, which focused their efforts on popular
education and consciousness-raising, precisely to encourage people to overcome ingrained patterns
of submission and scepticism regarding the importance of seeking change collectively rather than
individually. Leaders of different housing movements organizing squats in downtown São Paulo
today celebrate the transformative power of their actions as promoting the “rescuing,”
“awakening,” or “conquering” of squatters’ citizenship.

Who are the full citizens?

The MSTC’s notion of “full citizens” is based on a combination of legal entitlement (“the
Constitution grants these rights…”), on squatters’ contribution to the city (as honest and hardworking people), and on their active mobilization for their rights. These three grounds for claimsmaking can be otherwise understood as based on conceptions of (1) text-based rights, (2) a
contribution-based citizenship, and (3) an active-activist citizenship. The first two bases can be
identified in this statement made by a coordinator of an MSTC squat:

So, these are conceptions that we have to share with people [squatters] in the sense that
they can feel like citizens, that we are not invisible, that we exist. And as we exist and as
citizens, we have all our rights guaranteed in the laws, in the biggest law mainly, which is
the Brazilian Constitution. And we have the right to demand as long as we also give
something back to society or to the state. The state can’t only give, there has to be
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something given in return, too. From the moment that you are a full citizen, that you meet
your obligations as a citizen, from the moment that you are a person who produces in
society, from the moment that you are someone contributing to the development of the
country as a whole, then you have the right to demand from the government that which
you need: schools, health, education, work, dignity, respect. 102

In this quote, the seeming contradiction between having rights because of universal legal
entitlement as opposed to having rights due to individual deservingness is squared. For the
coordinator, everyone has formal rights under the Constitution. However, in order to be able to
demand that those rights be guaranteed in practice, one needs to deserve them by being a
contributing member of society, a member of the community of value. We can identify the
combination of the two classical approaches to citizenship in this line of reasoning: a liberal
(passive and legal-status-based) one and a republican (active and ethical) one. It is only in uniting
a formal (and passive) legal entitlement to rights with a set of ethical and active behaviours—that
is, by performing certain duties towards society (here defined in relation to work obligations)—
that one can be in a position to demand treatment as a “full citizen.”
Even when not articulated in this explicit way, this assumption that only certain, selfsufficient, and contributing members of society deserve to have substantive rights is held by
members of São Paulo’s housing movements and by the Brazilian population in general. Even
when rights are universal, they are not expected to be universally applicable. Knowing full well
that squatters are not generally perceived as members of the select club of those deserving the
fulfilment of their rights, housing movements such as the MSTC seek to exhort their members to
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behave as self-sufficient and hardworking people, those who contribute to society instead of
burdening it. As we saw in the previous chapter, the equation of the “honest worker” identity with
that of the good or full citizen has been quite prevalent in Brazil. It harks back to Getúlio Vargas’
regime in the 1930s—that is, since much earlier than neoliberal formulations of the citizen as the
self-sufficient individual of the late 20th century.103 In the Brazilian cities of today, where fear of
violent criminality has further stigmatized the territories of the eviction rooms and the bodies of
their dwellers, the dichotomy “worker” versus “criminal” has gained central relevance, separating
those whose lives and rights should be respected from those who cannot expect the same.
But I believe the definition of the “full citizen” according to the MSTC and other housing
movements also conjugates a component of political awareness and collective mobilization. This
component is often illustrated in the life trajectories of the leaders of housing movements. As
mentioned, many of the leaders of housing movements in São Paulo are women who migrated to
the city from other Brazilian cities or states in search of opportunities and a better life. Struggling
to survive in the city, they found a network of support and became imbued in urban politics by
participating in a housing movement and by living in squats alongside fellow “comrades.” Carmen
Silva, leader of the MSTC, for instance, arrived in São Paulo from Salvador, Bahia, in the 1990s
and faced severe hardships in a city she considered “very cold” both in its weather and in its human
interactions. While staying in a public shelter, she made a friend who convinced her to join the
meetings of a housing movement. Carmen became one of the pioneers of squatting in downtown
São Paulo, occupying and living in the same building for six years in a row. She describes those
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Neoliberalism shifts the relationship between the citizenry and the state, once social rights are recast as social
obligations to be fulfilled by active citizen-subjects who display autonomy, entrepreneurship, and individualism (Isin
et al. 2008, 5; Miller and Rose 2008). As Brodie (2008, 41) stresses, “citizens are expected to shape themselves into
self-sufficient market actors who provide for their needs and those of their families.” Once citizenship is related to
individuals’ success in their entrepreneurship, the concept of the public is significantly weakened, and social
oppressions and inequalities are depoliticized, as they are seen as a failure or lack of efficiency in individuals’ decisionmaking and self-care.
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years as crucial for her political maturing, and for her sense of belonging to and citizenship in the
city of São Paulo:

Here [in the squat], in addition to strengthening myself, socially, politically, financially,
that was when I managed to really change my life, right? Because the biggest gain in
squatting and participating in the movement was precisely the political change, of
understanding what it means to participate. That was when I began to effectively participate
in São Paulo’s life. Participating in the many conferences, participating in the councils,
participating in the political meetings, in the plans and operations, in everything the city
had. I participated and so I began to have another perspective, the perspective of belonging.
That was when I began to say that I could be a Paulistana [from the city of São Paulo]
citizen because I knew the city. 104

Here, Carmen underscores the importance of being a politicized and mobilized person,
someone who is aware of her rights and who is actively participating in local politics in order to
make those rights a reality, that is, in order to have her citizenship completely realized. This aspect
of the full citizen is more in line with the roots of the republican approach to citizenship, in its
Greek (more precisely Aristotelian) ideal of an active, participatory and politically engaged
citizenry. In this ideal, citizens take responsibility for deciding on and contributing to the “common
good” (Lister 1998). In the examples Carmen gives, and in the efforts made by housing movements
in general to influence urban and housing policies through participatory channels, active citizens
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follow the scripts provided by law and try to use them to advance their vision of a more just society
(Isin 2008).
Isin (2008, 381) distinguishes the active and the activist citizen thus: “By contrast to active
citizens who act out already written scripts such as voting, taxpaying and enlisting, activist citizens
engage in writing scripts and creating the scene.” The act of squatting stands out in this regard, for
it is a more disruptive (activist citizenship-like) practice than seeking to influence politics through
official channels, and, importantly, it does not follow the legal scripts available but effectively
breaks the law. I believe the mixed claims-making tactics deployed by housing movements such
as the MSTC, which combine following the scripts of participation but also creating their own
disruptive scripts (through squatting), indicate that the active and activist citizens do not need to
be in a dichotomy as mutually exclusive figures, as implied by Isin’s (2008) definition, but that
they can coexist. By both squatting and participating in formal political channels, the squatters of
central São Paulo’s housing movements are positioned in the middle ground between the active
and the activist citizen—we could cumbersomely say they are active-activist citizens.
The discourse espoused by the MSTC, which qualifies squatters as people deserving of
rights (rather than punishment) is in line with the discourse articulated by the organized periphery
dwellers in the 1980s and 1990s, mentioned in the previous chapter. In his work, Holston (2008)
describes how periphery residents’ claims to rights were justified in terms of a combination of
their constitutional guarantees, their identity as workers and homeowners, and their contribution
to the city (by paying taxes, for example). Lucy Earle’s (2012, 2017) work on housing movements
in São Paulo, which was focused on the experiences of the UMM, critiques Holston’s argument
for not duly emphasizing the “emancipatory potential of text-based law” (261). For her, Holston’s
analysis ends up underplaying “the extent to which citizenship as a concept grounded in the social
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rights set out in the 1988 Constitution has become critical to the projects of groups of the organized
poor” (263). She emphasizes how these groups in São Paulo have relied on constitutional and other
legal entitlements, and she downplays the part of their discourse in which rights are justified in
terms of their contribution to society.
However, by analysing the MSTC’s discourse, what strikes me is the extent to which they
qualify their claims to rights beyond mere legal entitlement. Perhaps the fact that Earle’s research
was based on ethnographic work with the UMM, an umbrella movement that no longer organizes
squats where its members live, might have influenced the emphasis she places on the importance
of text-based law. As I see it, for movements that represent squatters, the insistence on their legal
entitlement to rights alone is insufficient. José Murilo de Carvalho’s (2018 [2001]) seminal work
on the evolution of Brazilian citizenship notes that, despite the great legal advances brought by the
“Citizen Constitution,” many Brazilians are treated not as second- but as third-class citizens. He
includes in this category “the marginalized population of the big cities, rural and urban workers
who lack formal jobs, squatters, domestic workers, street peddlers, abandoned children, the
homeless” (218, my translation). These people, he argues, “are only nominally part of the national
political community” (218). This helps us understand why housing movements in São Paulo have
striven to communicate the legitimacy of their claims to rights and developed such an elaborate
discourse. Squatters are the epitome of those who are not seen to be deserving citizens or proper
humans, those who are not considered to be entitled to protection and rights.
Hence, I see the discourse articulated by the MSTC at the time of my fieldwork (and it
might change under different political circumstances) as developed in a defensive way, to counter
squatters’ framing as criminals and “bums” (vagabundos). These two categories of people,
regardless of their formal citizenship status in Brazil and their constitutional entitlements, are not
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generally regarded as deserving of the fulfilment of their rights. Considering this, the MSTC
defends its members’ right to dignified housing by insisting on their contribution to society and
the city, and on their moral superiority as politicized citizens. My point is not that the text-based
law does not have an emancipatory potential, nor that it is not central to these movements’ claims,
but that, given Brazil’s exclusionary political culture of citizenship and the positioning of eviction
room dwellers at the margins of São Paulo’s community of value, legal guarantees are often
insufficient. This requires housing movements to include in their discourse a qualification of the
rights-deserving status of their members which, inadvertently, helps perpetuate the exclusionary
premises of citizenship in Brazil and São Paulo. 105
But an important caveat needs to be made here. While we can say that this defensive
discourse unintentionally perpetuates the notions of deservingness underpinning the city’s
community of value, it does not follow that the MSTC’s leadership maintains that those who do
not behave as full citizens according to their definition of the term should not have their rights
realized. Following mere logic, we could interpret the movement’s discourse as implying that those
who are not hardworking or politically mobilized are not deserving of rights. Following this logic,
we could list categories of underserving urban dwellers, such as criminals, squatters who are not
politically organized, and even those who are addicted to drugs and cannot act as “contributing”
members of society. However, such a judgement cannot be attributed to the MSTC. The
movement’s leadership does not frame certain urban dwellers as unworthy of rights or protection.
Even though the logical implication of their discourse is that certain people are not full citizens,
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workers communicates the deserving status of its members.
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the movement’s leadership would reject such a judgment on moral grounds. But how is this
apparent contradiction possible?
Again, the defensive and strategic character of the movement’s citizenship discourse needs
to be emphasized. The movement finds itself in a challenging position: it must advance the
concrete housing needs of its members, but it is confronted with a context in which squatters are
criminalized. How to claim for the rights of those who are not seen as rights bearers? If they took
a “pure” and “principled” route of insisting that squatters are deserving of rights because all urban
dwellers or all citizens or all human beings are deserving of rights, their claims would fall on deaf
ears, because such an assertion goes against the basic assumptions governing São Paulo’s and
Brazil’s culture of citizenship. This does not mean that the movement’s leadership rejects the idea
that everyone deserves to have their rights and dignity realized. Rather, it means that, pressed to
advance their members’ urgent housing needs, they cannot afford to focus on completely
dismantling deeply ingrained inegalitarian discourses of citizenship. By saying this, I am making
a case for sympathy for the instrumental strategy. Visions of systemic overhaul might be a privilege
of those whose lives and rights are secured. We cannot discount the importance and transformative
potential of grassroots agendas that seek to advance the rights and belonging of marginalized
groups, simply because these agendas are imbued in and tactfully responding to exclusionary
contexts.

How are full citizens produced?

At the most basic level, by living in a squat individuals and families obtain a home address, which
is necessary for accessing a set of documents and services associated with citizenship. Proof of
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residence is required, for example, for obtaining documents such as a voter registration card and a
labour passbook, for opening a bank account, and for accessing public services (for example, for
enrolling one’s children or oneself in school). As a coordinator summarized it, “The home address
is the starting point for citizenship.”106
However, the transformation of squatters from “beaten-up” individuals into “full citizens”
involves much more than their simple acquisition of an address. Crucially, this transformation is
supposed to happen through dwellers’ socialization in the squats run by housing movements. In
this section I unpack how this ideally transformative socialization is organized around a set of
specific rules and regulations in the MSTC’s squats. The discipline governing squatters’ everyday
life is in keeping with the one found in other institutions in modernity, such as the school system,
the army, and the prison. As analysed by Foucault (1995), these institutions have relied, for
instance, on detailed codes of conduct for everyday life, on systems of positive and negative
sanctions (rewards and punishments), and on the imbuing of its members of the responsibility to
respect and help enforce the assigned rules. These techniques of disciplinary power are designed
to produce a particular sort of subject that is not forced but trained to behave according to certain
values; the subject’s “soul” is the target of such techniques. The disciplinary nature of squat life is
supposed to produce hardworking and politically mobilized subjects, those understood as
deserving of rights and of having a say in urban politics. This discipline also seeks to counter
squats’ overall bad reputation as lawless places, and protect squats from eviction, criminalization,
and the infiltration of drug gangs.

106

Interview MSTC coordinator. São Paulo, January 2018.

143

The MSTC, as other housing movements organizing squats in São Paulo, has its own set
of regulations governing everyday life in its squats, which are consolidated into a written
Regimento (i.e. a statute):

The goal of this Regimento is to lay out the general rules that promote the organization and
the wellbeing of the squats managed by the MSTC – Movimento dos Sem Teto do Centro,
and also to encourage the constant political education [formação] of the dwellers. (my
translation)

The statute is a written codification of the expected behaviours and rule-compliance of residents,
and it is mentioned whenever these rules need to be introduced or reminded to residents, so as to
convey the non-arbitrary but fair and legitimate nature of expectations, complaints, and requests
of those organizing the movement. According to Carmen, the statute was developed
democratically by members of the MSTC in assemblies, and with the assistance of a lawyer. The
statute explains the hierarchical structure of management in squats, it lays out the elements that
constitute members’ “participation,” it describes the behaviours that are prohibited in the MSTC’s
squats, and it explains the purposes of the financial “contribution” charged from members. Base
meetings, such as the one described in the vignette opening this chapter, are the occasion when
those interested in living in an MSTC squat are introduced to these administrative elements of
squat life. Even if a hardcopy of the statute itself is not commonly handed out to each prospective
squatter/member of the movement, its core elements are repeatedly explained in these meetings,
in everyday situations in the squat, and in the general meetings.
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As anticipated by Carmen in the opening vignette, the central component of living in a
squat organized by the MSTC is to regularly participate and contribute to a collective struggle for
dignified housing. According to the statute, “to participate” entails attending the meetings,
assemblies, and atos (street demonstrations), and taking part in the mutirões (collective chores,
such as cleaning, fixing, and renovating parts of the building) for the cleanness, improvement, and
security of the squat. In the meetings I attended with international migrants who were interested
in moving into an MSTC squat, statements such as “This is not a shelter” and “This is not a real
estate agency” were repeated by the activists leading the gatherings. The point of such statements
is to make sure potential new members understand they cannot expect to move into a place where
they will simply receive assistance, or where they can just pay a monthly amount and lead their
individual lives as usual. A great deal of emphasis is put on the collective nature of life in a squat,
and on the expectation that all squatters must contribute towards the broader struggle for obtaining
a durable housing solution.
Even though squatters make improvements in the units where they live (referred to as
“spaces”), they are constantly reminded—and this is flagged in the statute—that these spaces do
not belong to them, and that their chances of obtaining a durable (“definitive” in the movement’s
language) housing solution relies entirely on their efforts to keep the squat safe from evictions and
on their ability to pressure the government for social housing. The residents need to make sure the
squat is seen as a respectable and clean place, where no criminal or immoral activities take place.
The threat of eviction is always hovering, and squatters are constantly reminded that any problem
associated with the squat could lead to this dreaded scenario and weaken their claims to rights.
Thus, in order to avoid criticisms of squats as filthy places inviting sanitary interventions
or as unsafe fire- and collapse-prone decrepit buildings, all squatters are expected to form groups
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and take turns in the mutirões. If a building has been recently occupied, after collectively removing
the trash and fixing or installing electrical and gas fixtures, squatters also work together to paint
the walls (at least those of the ground floor), and they are constantly required to help renovate parts
of the building. Engineers and architects collaborate with the MSTC, especially in the initial phase
of occupation, providing mostly guidance on the work that needs to be done so the squat can be a
safe place to live. Mutirões are always required, even when the squat is considered “consolidated,”
i.e., when the major improvement work is completed, and the building looks like a living space. If
no immediate fixing or renovating is needed, squatters still work together to thoroughly wash the
common areas every week.
On some occasions I heard a coordinator or the movement’s leader refer to their vision of
the squat as a “condominium.” They recognize that this is a special, politicized sort of condo,
inhabited by “condôminos who are militants in the struggle for housing,” as a coordinator put it.
Importantly, the image of the condo is juxtaposed with the images of a cortiço or a “vertical
favela,” places that are vulnerable to criminalization and evictions. Therefore, the movement’s
zealous approach to order and cleanness aims to both protect the squat from eviction based on
sanitary or safety concerns and to demonstrate to outsiders (especially to governmental authorities)
that the squatter families are able to live there with dignity. This substantiates their claim that they
are deserving of a formal housing alternative. The main housing program in Brazil, which was
launched in 2009, the Programa Minha Casa Minha Vida, relies on a condo model. So, if
successful in their struggle, the squatter families will most likely either move into one of these
condo-style housing projects built from scratch or live in the squat itself, after it has been renovated
with public funding and formalized as a social housing condominium.
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Relatedly, as condos have a reception or a doorman in São Paulo, squatters are also
supposed to take turns surveilling the main entrance of the building. The doorperson is supposed
to keep a record, in a notebook, of everyone who leaves and enters the squat. But more than the
common anti-burglar function of a reception in formal condos, this reception aims to protect the
squat from the presence of individuals interested in weakening the movement and from potential
drug dealers seeking to take over their territory. Hence, the cleaning, maintenance, and reception
work performed by the squatters aims both to create a “respectable” environment and to protect
the squat from evictions and criminal takeover.
Individual behaviour is also seen as crucial for the production of a dignified space and for
the “success” of the movement’s struggle. The statute prohibits squatters from being drunk in the
squat, from smoking in common areas, from using individual/family spaces for storage (rather than
living), from physically or psychologically abusing anyone (especially women or children) in any
part of the squat, from making loud noise anywhere in the squat between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m., from
littering any common areas, from stealing or storing stolen objects in the squat, and from carrying
any sort of guns or dealing any kind of drugs in the squat’s premises. These prohibitions are part
of squatters’ socialization into becoming full citizens. Also, disrespecting any of these rules can
put the squat, and everyone’s chances of obtaining dignified housing, at risk. Breaking these rules,
depending on severity or frequency, may lead to one’s expulsion from the squat.
The making of full citizens also happens through the sorts of material and emotional
support people find in squats. An individual’s or a family’s standard of living often improves once
they move into a squat, and their sense of self-esteem is boosted. Freed from the obligation of
paying exorbitant rents and living in a neighbourhood with social services, squatters are able to
have some spare money for basic expenses (they are able to eat and dress better, for example). By
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living close to their workplaces or informal jobs, they also save money spent on public transit, and
they are able to spend more time with their families or on continuing their education, for example.
In the squat, people can also access certain forms of support that the housing movement arranges
in partnership with other actors. For example, in the squat I used to visit weekly, the local public
health facility used to send staff members to the building regularly to check on the squatters’ health
needs. Also, the activist network Uneafro used to run a course in the squat to prepare squatters for
entrance exams for university education. Thus, by living in a squat, an individual or a family has
an opportunity to overcome the “beaten-up” phase and “get back on their feet.”
Squatters have their morale and self-esteem boosted by a discourse articulated by the
MSTC’s leadership that emphasizes their worth in society and their dignity. “We don’t want
anything for free” is a mantra in such squats. Instead of being granted a housing unit by the state,
the MSTC insist that squatters want to be able to pay for their own housing solution, if only under
a fair price. This idea of deservingness as opposed to being given things (what they called
assistencialismo, an approach based on aid) is pervasive in their discourse. The MSTC’s members
are encouraged to “battle” for a better life and to look for work and educational opportunities. At
a meeting I attended at one of the MSTC’s squats, one of the Brazilian dwellers, a middle-aged
woman who made a living by selling on the streets fabric dolls she sewed, raised this supportive
role of the movement. She explained she felt like her self-esteem was boosted every time Carmen
said that squatters are not vagabundos (“bums”), as they are commonly portrayed, nor “poor
things,” but low-income working people, individuals with dignity who struggled to afford housing
in the city. The fact that they resort to squatting does not testify against their worth, she explained.
This rationale refuses a mainstream understanding that blames the poor for their poverty, that
portrays squatters as vagabundos, and it emphasizes instead squatters’ dignity and work ethic.
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The orderly functioning of everyday life in squats hinges on a hierarchical authority
structure. Each floor has a mediator, usually a volunteer squatter who is in charge of making sure
her or his neighbours are contributing to the collective chores and behaving according to the rules.
Each squat has a coordinator, a squatter appointed by the leader who supports the floor mediators,
and who is responsible for mediating conflicts with uncooperative or rule-breaking squatters and
for guaranteeing that the squat is “moving in the right direction.”
According to the statute, both mediators and coordinators are also responsible for the other
aspect of participation, that of the political mobilization of the squatters. Squatters are supposed to
attend general meetings which are held at least once a month in the squat where they live in. The
general meetings are “the highest deliberative organ of the squat,” and in them relevant issues
pertaining to the squat and the MSTC are discussed and democratically decided upon. These
meetings serve to communicate current political matters pertaining to their political struggle, to
update residents on the judicial process against the owner of the building and prospects for
obtaining a housing solution, and to address issues related to the everyday management of the
squat. A notebook is supposed to keep track of families’ attendance at these meetings.
The political mobilization component of participation also entails squatters’ regular
recruitment to public demonstrations. Floor mediators and coordinators are responsible for calling
the families and making sure that as many as possible participate. When I asked a coordinator
whether attending demonstrations related to the movement’s agenda was mandatory, she
explained:

It is mandatory [to participate in demonstrations] because, do you want to see an example
that I give? If we are going to fight for housing, how are we not going to the Housing
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Office? Isn’t it there where we have to apply pressure and show that we don’t have
housing? How is everyone not going to go?... The nice thing is if everyone participates.
That’s why the floor mediator knocks on the door: [knocks on a wooden stool] “Today
there’s a demonstration at COHAB”, 107 “Today there’s a demonstration at CDHU.” 108
What do we do at the city hall? We fight for and claim our rights, did you understand? And
it’s awkward if we arrive in those places and it’s just the coordinators and the leadership.
Where are the residents [squatters]? Is it just her [the leader] who needs to find housing?
Is it only the coordinators who are going to find housing? No, the fight is ours, the struggle
is collective.109

As illustrated by this quote, the demonstrations squatters are expected to attend may
concern immediate housing negotiations with the municipal or state government – thus protesting
in front to COHAB, CDHU, or the city hall. But squatters are also expected to attend broader
protests related to national politics that go beyond the specific housing agenda. These protests are
generally held alongside other social movements and entities, such as trade unions and left-wing
political parties (most notably the PT), and they take some of São Paulo’s main avenues and
squares in the city centre (usually a trajectory connecting Praça da República and Avenida
Paulista). Issues such as a perceived political persecution against the PT or a Parliament bill
decreasing workers’ rights and protections, for example, go beyond the strict housing agenda, but
they bring different housing movements and their squatters to the streets. The meetings,

COHAB is the São Paulo’s Metropolitan Company for Housing. It is owned by the city of São Paulo, and its
mission is to develop and implement social housing projects for the metropolitan region of São Paulo.
108
CDHU stands for the Company for the Housing and Urban Development of São Paulo. It is the counterpart of
COHAB for the state of São Paulo; it is responsible for implementing social housing projects in the whole state.
109
Interview with MSTC coordinator. São Paulo, February 2018.
107
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assemblies, and public demonstrations all contribute to the formação política (“political
education”) of squatters, positioning them as politically aware and active people rightfully and
collectively struggling for their rights.
If participation (in political and housekeeping activities) is the most important requirement
for living in a squat, and proper behaviour a condition for permeance, squatters are also expected
to pay a monthly “contribution” (usually around 200 reais or about Can $60) to the movement.
The MSTC’s statute explains that each family is supposed to pay an association fee and a
contribution towards the collective expenses every month. 110 This contribution—never to be
referred to as a “rent”—has been the Achilles heel of housing movements such as the MSTC in
central São Paulo. Often, squats of different kinds are described in the media as being exploitative
of the urban poor, charging them money for living in extremely precarious spaces that are against
the law. In order to avoid criminal charges, the MSTC issues receipts for payment and strives to
keep a record of the movement’s expenses. However, there is another side to these “contribution”
payments that does not weaken but actually works in favour of the MSTC’s discourse. The fact
that the movement’s members are required to pay a monthly contribution in order to reside in the
squat works to reinforce the discourse that they “don’t want anything for free.” The monthly
payment serves to show that the families are able to contribute, even if modestly, towards their
housing solution. As explained earlier, this is a key aspect of the “squatter ethos” promoted by the
MSTC.
Having read the MSTC’s statute only at the end of six months accompanying their meetings
and quotidian workings, I could see that its key elements were being practiced, while some

The association fee refers to expenses towards the “struggle for housing” carried out by the movement beyond the
walls of the squat, which includes buying demonstration signs, renting buses for transporting demonstrators, juridical
assistance, accountants, etc. The more general “contribution” concerns the everyday expenses for the physical
maintenance of the squatted space, such as cleaning products, fire hydrants, renovation supplies, etc.
110
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procedural issues were either ignored or adapted. For example, according to the statute, all
“associated families” (squatters) should participate in at least 70% of all the meetings and group
chores. The statute mentions a table that should be prepared and displayed on the squat’s main
notice board containing all residential units and the percentage of their participation. Keeping track
of each residential unit’s attendance in these different activities and producing these tables would
require an amount of administrative work that the movement is probably unable to afford and
manage. During my fieldwork period, I never saw anything resembling the table described in the
statute. Another example is that the statute stipulates that those who are not up to date with their
contribution payments must contact the coordination within 15 days to negotiate another payment
day, and they should be charged 0.5 percent of the contribution’s total amount per day in case they
do not reach out to negotiate. However, in practice, there seemed to be much more flexibility
towards non-paying families, as long as they were participating in the collective chores and
meetings and not breaking the rules. As a coordinator explained to me “I’ve been in the movement
for four years and I’ve never seen dona Carmen expel someone for lack of payment. She expels
them, asks them to remove themselves, for what reasons? For assaulting a coordinator, beating up
the wife in the movement [i.e. the squat], doing drugs in the movement. Then we do expel them,
not for lack of payment.” She shares her own experience to support this point, admitting that she
skipped some contributions while she was doing her undergraduate studies in social service. She
expresses gratitude towards Carmen for having supported her to continue her education and
contribute in the ways she could—without the support of the movement, she stresses, she would
not have been able to obtain a diploma of which she is very proud.
While the statute is not implemented to the letter, it is an important instrument that the
movement’s leadership can use to support their authority towards the resident families in the
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everyday life in the squats. If for nothing else, the statute works as an important element of the
disciplinary nature of life in squats organized by housing movements, which is supposed to
produce “full citizens.” Squatters are encouraged to have a disciplined and sober life, based on a
strong work ethic and a sense of pride in being low-income people fighting for their dignity and
rights.111
These hardworking, sober, and politically mobilized individuals ideally produced by the
housing movement work to protect it from outside criticism and attacks (from governmental
authorities, the police, the media, neighbours, etc.) and to substantiate their claim to be deserving
of rights. The production of a space inhabited and managed by low-income workers versed in their
rights and rightful claims and who have been surveilled in their proper behaviour (no violence, no
stealing, no drug dealing, etc.), even if loosely surveilled, makes it difficult for outside detractors
to find incriminating evidence to weaken or challenge the movement and its claims.

The limits and generative potential of a citizenship agenda

Having considered the trajectories, strategies, practices, and discourse of housing movements
organizing squats in central São Paulo (especially the MSTC), how can we interpret their vision
of transformation?
The MSTC, as all other housing movements in São Paulo, has as its most immediate goal
the securing of a durable and dignified housing solution, provided by the state, for its members. In
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In a way, the strategy adopted by the MSTC and other housing movements to discipline and portray their members
as full citizens is very similar to the moral and evangelizing discourse deployed by Pentecostal churches in the
peripheries of Brazil’s cities. This Pentecostal discourse often shuns universal notions of human rights and citizenship
and especially left-wing discourses that position the urban poor involved in violent crimes as victims of societal
injustices and inequalities. Instead, this discourse emphasizes the importance of personal agency and the urban poor’s
ability to transform their lives and become empowered, hardworking, and sober individuals (Freston 2011).
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the pursuit of this goal, the movement’s members behave as active-activist citizens, pressing public
authorities both by organizing squats on vacant buildings and by engaging in participatory policy
channels and formal negotiations with public officials. Given the law-breaking nature of squatting
and the fact that squatters are situated at the margins of the city’s community of value (stigmatizes
as “bums” and criminals), the MSTC and other housing movements have developed a sophisticated
discourse legitimising the act of squatting and substantiating their members’ deservingness of
rights (as “full citizens”). Their strategies and discourse have proven successful at times. Since the
late 1990s, these movements have managed to influence urban policymaking, secure durable
housing for many of its members, and promote the rehabilitation of vacant and centrally-located
property for social housing. Still, their “victories” have been limited and contingent on the political
affinity and will of different government officials, judges, and politicians. Their reliance on an
unreliable state limits how much they can achieve in practical terms.
Likewise, these movements’ reliance on the citizenship agenda somewhat limits what they
can achieve politically. In adopting the horizon of citizenship as the basis for its political struggle,
the MSTC pursues the promise of citizenship’s progressive expansion in time—a promise analysed
by McNevin (2020). The movement’s members actively mobilize for but also wait for the moment
when squatters will be recognized as full citizens and treated as such. This investment in the
promise of citizenship, while galvanizing their important claims to dignified housing and
supporting their contestation of the city’s segregated order, helps to legitimize the unequal
realization of citizenship—those who have not yet enjoyed citizenship’s protection can expect to
be eventually included. Similarly, in pursuing the promise of full citizenship, the MSTC seeks to
socialize its members in a disciplined way of life that instills in them the value of hard and honest
work and of collective political organizing. We can identify an irony here: in an attempt to include
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their members within the city’s community of value, they end up inadvertently reproducing the
exclusionary boundaries of this very community. By investing in a discourse that seeks to insert
squatters within the select club of São Paulo’s “full citizens,” they simultaneously expand the
boundaries of the community of value and unintentionally help reproduce the notion that only
certain, deserving city dwellers can expect their rights to be guaranteed and their claims to be
heard.
In this way, one could interpret these movements’ modus operandi as representing what
Barbara Cruikshank (1999) has called “technologies of citizenship.” These are discourses and
programs that, through non-coercive ways and without the direct engagement of the state, end up
contributing to the disciplining of marginalized people so as to turn them into self-sufficient
citizens. In seeking to “empower” people, and despite good intentions, these technologies work to
“constitute and regulate citizens,” as the author argues (2). In the end, these technologies of
citizenship end up constraining the political subjectivity of the “empowered,” by making them
voluntarily conform or mould themselves according to a particular set of behaviours expected from
citizens. Indeed, different authors have shown how citizenship agendas are not always liberatory,
especially when they are conceived according to statist or liberal framings, for example.112 In these
cases, the horizon of citizenship can restrict the possibilities of social change and limit (rather than
broaden) people’s imagination of what they can achieve.
Still, despite these critiques, I believe we cannot discard out of hand the generative
potential of the MSTC’s and other housing movements’ political agenda. First, these disciplinary
aspects do not cancel out the fact that these movements have managed to challenge São Paulo’s
segregation pattern, and to insert the poor’s right to inhabit the city centre in the urban agenda and
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For some empirical explorations of the conservative and restrictive potentials of citizenship, see, for example,
Rygiel (2010), Papadopoulos and Tsianos (2013), and Nuijten (2013).
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laws. They have paved the way for groundbreaking good-quality housing projects in central São
Paulo, which are a sharp contrast to the precarious projects that have been historically built in the
periphery of the periphery.
Second, in addition to making a dent in the city’s inequality and exclusionary urban
planning, these movements have managed to support their members’ sense of their own self-worth
in and belonging to the city. The ethos and rules found in the MSTC’s squats encourage squatters
to collectively organize against the city’s inequalities, to “battle” together for their rights instead
of accepting what the city has offered them. The “political education” these eviction room dwellers
are exposed to challenges the naturalization of their marginal position. In other words, the political
mobilization of the sem teto promotes a transformation in their self-conceptions and in their
understanding of the limits of what they can achieve and who they can be in São Paulo. Through
their socialization in squats, they become able to see themselves and speak as rights-bearing
subjects, challenging ingrained patterns of submission that have been historically prevalent among
Brazil’s popular classes. These squatters are encouraged to challenge deep-seated prejudices that
blame the poor for their circumstances. They are not just encouraged to be hard workers, they are
also imbued with the value of struggling alongside others for improvements, instead of simply
seeking upward social mobility on their own. In meetings, assemblies, and public protests, they
are exhorted to question the injustices of a city that has, simultaneously and contradictorily, so
many “homes without people” and “people without homes.” These are not minor transformations.
It is no small feat that, for example, through these movements, disenfranchised women of colour,
newcomers to São Paulo who lived on its streets, such as Carmen, have become confident
grassroots leaders negotiating directly with legislators, urban planners, and mayors.
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We cannot pre-empt the results that these changes in worldview could generate, or judge
these changes as always necessarily compromised because of these movements’ reliance on a
disciplined way of life and a citizenship agenda. I believe that, for those at the urban margins,
contesting prejudices against themselves and their communities, and claiming for their recognition
as valuable members of the city (more precisely, of the city’s community of value) is often a
strategically necessary and invaluable step. Citizenship agendas that engage with the
deserving/undeserving, worthy/unworthy binaries of the community of value are bound to
reproduce inequalities, but they can also be springboards for more radical ways of seeing oneself,
one’s relation to other urban dwellers, and the city itself. We cannot foresee what the ultimate
consequences might be when, for example, women of colour living in São Paulo’s squats begin to
see themselves as valuable city dwellers who must have a say in its planning and provisions. Their
claims and the coalitions they might forge with other city dwellers could pave the way for an
unsettling of the very premises of the city’s community of value, for agendas that do not
differentiate between those deserving and those undeserving of inclusion.
International migrants who join the MSTC are thus presented with a very particular sort of
citizenship politics. How do housing movements such as the MSTC, used to speaking to fellow
citizens deeply imbued in the exclusionary realities of the country, adapt their discourse when
welcoming international migrants? What sort of coalition is produced by this encounter? What sort
of premises, promises, and frictions characterize this coalition? This chapter’s opening vignette
already hints at some answers, at least from the MSTC’s side of the story. In it, we saw Carmen
explaining to the Angolans, Haitians, and Congolese women and men gathered in the base meeting
that they were entitled to the same social rights as citizens under the Brazilian Constitution. We
also saw that international migrants who join the MSTC’s squats are expected to “participate” and
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contribute to the joint struggle just as much as Brazilian squatters—they are basically expected to
act as “full citizens” despite their lack of citizenship status. An analysis of the different
expectations at stake in this encounter is developed in the next chapter.
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Chapter Four: Are we all refugees?

Opening vignette: Birth and baptism in a world of dead rights

The last MSTC base meeting I attended in April 2018 contrasted sharply with the first one, which
opens the previous chapter. Even the room where the meeting took place had changed. In
November 2017, the squat was one of the sites of intervention for an international architecture
biennale and, as part of this, a group of architects from the Netherlands had renovated the squat’s
meeting room for an exhibition. 113 The room now had a couple of bright yellow walls, a couple of
wooden tables, and many minimalist wooden stools that could be piled up and turned into shelves.
The room looked much more cheerful, and the stools gave it an almost hipster-coffee-shop vibe,
although it still lacked windows. Now we all sat on the wooden stools, in a circle, but we were not
many. Only four international migrants attended this meeting—one from Haiti, two from the DRC,
and one from Angola. Joining them in the circle were: me, another Brazilian woman who, like me,
was there as an MSTC collaborator (i.e. someone who supported the movement but did not live in
a squat), and a Brazilian MSTC coordinator. As the coordinator opened the meeting with the usual
round of introductions, she asked that the international migrants disclose how many people lived
with them. “You can’t say you’re the only one moving in [to a squat], but then you turn out to be
six. You can’t do that because those other people won’t have passed through the formação [the
political education component of the base meetings].” Her suspicion set the tone for the gathering.

This was part of a research project called “Architecture of Appropriation” carried out by the Research Department
at Department of the Het Nieuwe Instituut. Along with renovating the room, the researchers had left some poster
display stands with images and texts explaining how squatting works in the Netherlands, as part of an exhibition
composing the international architecture conference. Later, they removed the exhibition material, but the furniture
they assembled remained in the squat. For more on this research project, see: https://www.architekturausstellungen.de/het-nieuwe-instituut/the-architecture-of-appropriation
113
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The coordinator went on to explain the rights that both Brazilians and international
migrants should have access to in Brazil, especially the right to adequate housing. “The work that
the movement does is the work that the state was supposed to do,” she said. She shared her own
story: how the movement helped her get an education, have a better life, feel more self-confident.
“Many other families have also gotten back on their feet after joining the movement,” she told the
group. As she explained the movement’s rules and expectations, two women from Angola who
lived in the squat, one of them with a toddler, joined the meeting. (The movement’s leadership had
been insisting that migrants already living in the squat should join the base meetings to help explain
to migrant newcomers how things worked.) The women sat beside each other and remained quiet.
The coordinator continued with her explanations, now detailing the steps of a “party,” a term with
a special meaning that the migrant men had no notion of. The movement had no vacancies at the
moment, she told them; the only way new people could move into an MSTC squat was if the
movement successfully occupied new buildings. She went over the logistical details of squatting
an abandoned building: what to bring, how people got to the address they were going to squat,
what to expect, for how long they should stay inside the building.
At this point, Carmen Silva, the MSTC’s leader, joined the meeting. The coordinator
introduced her as “the person who is at the frontline, challenging the police.” Addressing the
migrants, Carmen went straight to her point: “The first thing is that you need to understand where
you are. For us it is hard to know for sure, but we feel we are being used as a lifeline by the
government, or by yourselves.” She explained that, for the movement, “everyone is together, there
is no differentiation,” but that she felt the international migrants were not participating in the
movement enough, that they were not effectively “coming to join the struggle.” For her,
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international migrants had been “forming ghettoes,” isolating themselves, and, because of this, she
was reconsidering whether the MSTC should continue welcoming them.
When the Haitian man asked to clarify what exactly a “party” meant, Carmen was reluctant
to spell it out. Instead, she said, “For us, to live in the city centre is a reason for celebration, for a
party.” Seeing the migrants’ confused faces, the other collaborator suggested I could jump in to
complement what Carmen had just said. I explained that “party” was a code word for the act of
squatting a new building, of breaking into an abandoned building with a big group of people and
resisting attempts by the police to evict everyone. The other collaborator added that the movement
had a lot of experience with this, and she reiterated some logistical details. Carmen concluded that
“Those who do not participate in a party are not baptized; they don’t have an experience of the
movement.” The Haitian man said, “OK, now I get it.”
Carmen tried to convey to the migrants (both to the four men and to the two women who
already lived in the squat) that by actively participating in the movement, they could learn so much
about their rights, about politics. She mentioned her own trajectory, referring to the moment when
she first offered to help at a base meeting as the moment when she was “born”—which I interpreted
as her political birth, that is, as a militant—and to her “baptism,” when she first broke into a vacant
building. In contrast, she expressed exasperation that most international migrants were not
participating in the MSTC’s activities—not joining in group chores (mutirões) for the maintenance
of the squats, and not attending the movement’s administrative and political meetings. She seemed
less interested in introducing the movement to the migrants and more in having the migrants
introduce themselves—and, more importantly, their own objectives—to her. “Why did you come
to Brazil? Are you just on your way to another place? Or do you want to stay, to have your own
home, to build public policies?”
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Without giving them time to answer, she assured the migrants that she wanted to simply
invite reflection, and that she did not mean to reprimand them. She explained that there are
different political institutions that international migrants can participate in in the city, such as the
municipal council for immigrants, but that migrants were not taking advantage of those spaces.
Lisa, the Angolan woman who had come to the meeting with her toddler, said, with indignation,
that she did not know about any of this, and that “migrants can’t even go out on the streets.” Lisa’s
statement triggered Carmen to reinforce her own point. “You have the right to fight for your rights,
you just can’t get involved in criminal activities. See the case of the Syrians, the Palestinians, they
are fighting for themselves, going to the streets,” Carmen said. 114 One of the men from the DRC
supported Lisa’s point by saying “This is the first time we’re hearing about that. This information
doesn’t get to us. We can’t claim rights we don’t know we have.” Carmen quickly replied that that
was precisely why they should actively participate in the movement’s activities, that in the
meetings they got to discuss these political topics, that they could learn this kind of information.
As the meeting drew to a close, Carmen summarized her message to the migrants present
in the room thus: “A right without action is a dead right; you need to run after it.” But the question
she had posed to them, enquiring if they were interested in running after their rights in São Paulo
or if they intended to leave Brazil, remained unanswered.

Introduction
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Carmen is referring to the mobilization of Palestinians from Syria and Syrians in general who have sought asylum
in Brazil in recent years, alongside the Haitians and West African migrants featured in this research. Carmen alluded
to how the Syrian community in São Paulo has been very visible (given special media and general popular interest)
and also very politically mobilized, organizing cultural and political events in the city, and seeking participation in
political forums.
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Six months had passed between my first and last MSTC base meetings, which provide the
backgrounds to the opening vignettes for this and the previous chapter. During this time, the
relationship between the movement and the international migrants gradually deteriorated. The
MSTC’s efforts to “integrate” them into the movement were being reconsidered. While in the first
meeting there was a clear intention to recruit migrants for an upcoming “party,” in the last one
there was reluctance on the part of the movement’s leadership to do so. The vignette which opened
this chapter illustrates the main conundrum haunting the MSTC’s attempts to have international
migrants join its active rank and file—that is, whether and to what degree Brazilian militants and
international migrants, while sharing a common condition of urban marginalization, also share the
same political goals and aspirations in the city. This chapter focuses on the coalition that has been
forged between the MSTC militants and the international migrants who live in its squats. It
analyses the political promise of this coalition, as well as its limitations and challenges.
Clearly, there is a generative potential in the MSTC’s efforts to integrate disenfranchised
international migrants in a joint struggle for dignified housing in São Paulo. Remarkably, this
coalition refuses an “us” versus “them” mentality that commonly portrays newcomers, especially
disenfranchised newcomers, as additional and illegitimate competitors for scarce resources, such
as jobs, housing, and social services. This coalition challenges the citizenship divide as a basis for
political struggle, and it posits all marginalized city dwellers as equal “comrades in the struggle”
(companheiros de luta) battling for their right to adequate housing. As such, this coalition opens
up space for ways of imagining political life beyond the constraints of the modern categories of
migrants, citizens, and national borders.
At the same time, and without cancelling out its political promise, this coalition—as I
observed it—was fragile and riddled with frictions, ironies, and contradictions. These ensued
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mainly from the two groups’ divergent horizons and engagements with citizenship. The movement
sought to insert all squatters (citizens and non-citizens) in the city’s community of value as “full
citizens.” The movement’s leadership generally assumed that all squatters aspired to being
recognized and treated as hardworking, politically mobilized, and therefore rights-bearing model
citizens of São Paulo, deserving of their social rights, especially the right to social housing. Even
though the citizen/non-citizen divide was not the starting point of the coalition the MSTC sought
to forge, the movement’s vision of transformation was informed by the horizon of citizenship.
However, the international migrants, generally disillusioned with their circumstances in the city
and not necessarily tied to its struggles, were, for the most part, uninterested in committing their
time and efforts to a long-term battle for full citizenship and dignified housing in the city—the
horizon of full citizenship in São Paulo did not seem to capture their imagination or aspirations.
These migrants had travelled a long way to reach the city, and their horizons stretched beyond it.
As I further explore in the next chapter, these migrants were connected to transnational networks
of fellow migrants living in destinations seen as more prosperous, which signalled to them possible
brighter futures elsewhere.
Hence, I argue that the unity between citizens and non-citizens—which is the politically
promising aspect of coalitions such as this—can also be the main factor undermining them, if
practice and analysis rely too much on a presumption of unity. Shared urban marginalization does
not lead automatically to coalitions or shared goals.
In what follows, I discuss a recent and growing literature on the phenomenon of “migrant
squatting,” which is focused on recent experiences across European cities. While sympathetic to
this literature’s emphasis on the political promise of this phenomenon, I stress the importance of
taking into account the possible contradictions and complications that might be found in initiatives
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that bring together different groups of people with distinct backgrounds and aspirations. Building
on this, I then analyse the relationship between the MSTC and the international migrants,
examining this relationship’s promise, its paradoxes and ironies, and its everyday frictions.

The promise of migrant squatting

Recently, and especially since 2016, scholars have been analysing the participation of international
migrants, asylum-seekers, and refugees in squats. This still small but burgeoning literature has
focused mostly on European cities—from Rome, Athens, and Madrid to Paris, Berlin, and
Copenhagen. This literature has emerged at a “critical” time: the “housing crisis” and the
“migration crisis” have been making headlines and influencing politics in Europe since the
financial meltdown of 2008 and the recent arrival of greater numbers of refugees, which peaked
in 2015. The participation of international migrants in squats reflects these two apparent crises or,
more accurately, unaffordable housing, increased unemployment, and restrictive immigration and
asylum policies (which also lead undocumented migrants to resort to underground forms of
housing).115
Regardless of the theoretical approach taken to analyse these European squats, it is clear
these spaces have characteristics that are inherently disruptive and have a generative potential:
They (1) challenge the sanctity of private property, (2) support the mobility or settlement of
undocumented migrants (thereby challenging their criminalization), and (3) show forms of
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Many of the migrants living in European squats are undocumented or find themselves in a juridical limbo (such as
rejected asylum-seekers who nonetheless cannot be returned to their countries of origin). In contrast, the international
migrants living in São Paulo’s squats most often have legal status in Brazil (see Chapter Two). They generally either
carried an asylum-seeker “protocol” (commonly reoffered to as “the protocol”), which is a temporary document
granted to those who have claimed asylum but are still awaiting a response to their claims, a humanitarian visa (in the
case of many Haitians), or they had permanent residency, mostly through Brazil-born and therefore Brazilian
offspring.
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solidarity that bridge the citizen/non-citizen divide. Focusing on these characteristics, this recent
literature has tended to emphasize the political promise of these squats—especially the promise
inherent in the encounters between squatters of local and activist backgrounds, on the one hand,
and those of international origins, on the other. In a nutshell, this literature has tended to see in
these European squats the seeds for important transformations in society at large. Pierpaolo Mudu
and Sutapa Chattopadhyay (2016, 285-286), for example, identify in these squats “practices that
represent an incubator of different global relations opposed to any form of exploitation.” For the
authors, these struggles make up “some of the most advanced frontier [sic] of class contestation”
(286). Along similar lines, Deanna Dadusc, Margherita Grazioli, and Miguel Martínez (2019, 524),
assert that the “forms of inhabitance enacted through migrants’ protests and through occupation of
land and vacant buildings, do not only reverse the exclusion they experience, but produce
ungovernable resources, alliances and subjectivities that prefigure more livable spaces for
everyone.”
In general, this literature tends to treat the agency of the various actors involved in squatting
as homogenous or at least as aligned. The agency of the undocumented migrants, asylum-seekers,
and refugees is generally interpreted as overall in line with that of local activists of autonomist,
anarchist, and other left-leaning orientations. This agency is often framed in terms of anti-capitalist
and anarchist struggles (mainly through the notion of autonomy and “the commons”) and in terms
of urban citizenship. Illustrating the former, Martínez (2017, 2476), asserts the following: “I
assume that many squatters and migrants are aware of their broader political and spatial role in
challenging some taken-for-granted assumptions in capitalist societies. That is to say, the rigid and
absolute right to private property and the arbitrariness of setting and managing the state boundaries
are continuously questioned by both squatters and migrants.” This is in line with the notion of
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autonomy, which is abundant in this literature—“autonomy” is employed to characterize social
relations that precisely seek to escape capture by the state, capitalism, and other forms of
domination and hierarchy (Mudu and Chattopadhyay 2016, 6; Raimondi 2019, 566).
Illustrating the framing of migrant’s agency in terms of citizenship, Nadia Nur and
Alejandro Sethman (2016, 78) refer to international migrants participating in squats, which are
organized by the Right to Inhabit Movement in Rome, as manifesting “an emergent urban
citizenship” (emphasis in the original, 78), and as constituting a “new powerful political and social
subject” (84) that challenges both housing and migration policies. According to the authors,
migrants have been assuming leading roles in the social movement for housing in Rome, uniting
with locals who are also struggling to find adequate housing so as to build a “common platform to
claim a series of basic rights” (86). They argue that by squatting, migrants challenge the notion of
national citizenship and the laws that seek to enforce borders and control their mobility and access
to rights. For the authors, by circumventing those restrictions, migrants enact a local, urban
citizenship.
Margherita Grazioli (2017), also reflecting upon squats in Rome, similarly refers to migrant
squatters as “citadins” following Lefebvre’s and Purcell’s work on the right to the city. According
to Grazioli, migrants obtain the status of citadins by virtue of their everyday contribution to the
construction of the space of the city, and especially because of their appropriation of living spaces
according to their needs, and thus challenging appropriations of the city’s space according to the
demands of profit and real estate speculation. She combines the concept of the right to the city to
that of the “mobile commons” (Papadopolous and Tsianos 2013, 191) to argue that squats are also
a way of “commoning life,” a place where people who suffer from housing deprivation take care
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of each other, and share knowledge and strategies for survival which, she states, constitute a new
“ontology.”
I am sympathetic to this literature, especially to the way different authors emphasise the
disruptive character and generative potential of squats organized and inhabited by both citizens
and non-citizens. However, I wonder if some interpretations of migrants’ agency (framed in terms
of autonomy and citizenship) and of the relationship between local and migrant squatters might
not efface more contradictory or ambivalent forms of social agency, as well as the potential
frictions stemming from the different backgrounds and aspirations found among activist citizens
and international newcomers. Most analyses so far tend to treat migrant squatters as, for example,
“pioneers” of a “constant battle between the deprivation of the means of production and the
struggle for life and emancipation” (Makrygianni 2016, 255). Migrant squatters, who are most of
the time squatting out of necessity in precarious conditions, are often bestowed with the heavy
mantle of leading class contestation and devising alternative and just local and global relations.
The relationships between these migrant squatters and the local, activist squatters are often
portrayed in purely positive terms, through the construction of horizontal and solidarity-based
forms of self-management.116
Milena Belloni’s (2016) ethnographic analysis is perhaps the work that most clearly
challenges this harmonious view. In her analysis of Eritreans’ participation in squats in Rome—
and in contrast to the work focusing on the same city by Nur and Sethman and Grazioli, mentioned
above—Belloni shows that refugees “were fundamentally concerned with finding accommodation
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Martínez (2016, 2017), for instance, groups the different interactions between the native and migrant squatters in
four progressively-labeled dynamics: “autonomy” (when migrants initially squat by themselves), “solidarity” (when
migrants and native squatters cooperate in occupying a space and campaign together for housing and migrants rights),
“engagement” (when migrants participate in political and self-managed squats run by natives), and “empowerment”
(when native political squatters help migrants to squat and later the two groups may live together).
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and a job to be able to send money back home” and that “their collaboration with native squatters
was mainly instrumental to achieve these specific migration-related goals, rather than based on
shared political views or vindications” (523). Belloni examines the Metropoliz squat, which is
organized by a Marxist-anarchist group (and also studied by Grazioli), and the Collatina squat,
which is run exclusively by refugees. Belloni shows that in Metropoliz refugees did not share the
political values of the squatters’ movement, that they barely knew what the movement’s acronym
stood for, and that they would only participate in weekly demonstrations so as not to lose their
accommodation. In Collatina, refugees, after appropriating tactics they had learned from native
activists to negotiate with public authorities to avoid their eviction, went on to exclude the local
activist group that originally occupied the place, turning the squat into a business by renting and
selling units. Belloni’s analysis of these squats contradicts the unambiguous view of these
international migrants as urban citizens struggling alongside locals and challenging capitalist
appropriations of the city.
Other authors have also identified divergences between the goals and agendas of migrants
and local activists. For example, looking at the Dutch context, Dadusc (2016) identifies the contrast
between the agenda of undocumented migrants fighting for “papers for all” and seeking
negotiation with the government to better their circumstances, and that of local activists who
mobilized for “no papers at all,” for a life free from state control over people’s statuses. Romain
Filhol (2016) highlights that in Caserta, Italy, most international migrants squat out of necessity
and seek to leave Italy, while local activists are engaged in a radical struggle in the name of the
working class. He highlights how activists face a double risk in welcoming international migrants
in their squats: the risk of becoming service providers and unintentionally supporting the trend of
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cuts in social provision, and the risk of manipulating migrants so they conduct “a struggle that
local workers seem to have abandoned long ago” (239).
These works show some of the complexities in analysing the joint mobilization of
international migrants and native activists—whose causes are not always convergent or even
compatible. These works make room for adding nuance to the politically hopeful lenses through
which most of this recent literature sees migrants’ participation in squats and their relationships
with local activists. My analysis of the participation of international migrants in the MSTC’s squats
seeks to contribute to this nuance.
In this regard, I advance two interrelated arguments. First, that these coalitions carry within
themselves an irony that we should be attentive to. This irony, simply put, is that the unity between
citizens and non-citizens—which is the politically promising aspect of coalitions such as this—
can also be the main factor undermining them, if practice and analysis rely too much on a
presumption of unity. Second, that we should not assume that those who find themselves in similar
situations of marginalization, even those sharing the same roof over their heads, necessarily have
the same horizons. 117 Specifically, I believe that if we default to framing migrants’ agency as
heroic and revolutionary—that is, as aligned with the sort of progressive visions of transformation
that we scholars might feel particularly hopeful about—we risk portraying them in ways that deny
their full humanity, their lived experiences, and their aspirations.
The rest of the chapter substantiates these arguments by examining the everyday dynamics
of the fragile coalition forged between the MSTC and recently-arrived international migrants. I
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In contrast to the situation in São Paulo, in some European cases, the native activists living in squats or helping
organize them are not necessarily marginalized individuals squatting out of necessity but left-leaning activists who
engage in squatting as part of an agenda for alternative ways of living and relating to the city. See Vasudevan (2017)
for a historical analysis of squatting in Europe and North America.
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show how this coalition both challenges and reinforces the centrality of the citizen/non-citizen
divide as a basis for political struggle.

“We are all refugees”

International migrants are not initially inclined to join squats in São Paulo. More to the point, they
are disinclined to participate in an activity they suspect to be illegal (e.g., the “party”), or to live
in a place that might be in conflict with the law. This is no surprise; Bridget Anderson (2016, xvii),
for example, remarks that avoiding (possibly) illegal activities is a common trait among
international migrants: “they have often sought to distance themselves from ‘criminals’ and (nonimmigrant) forms of criminal activity.” More than fearing deportations—which are rare in Brazil,
and most international migrants living in squats are documented—these migrants feared being
caught by the police. As Philippe, a Congolese migrant who participated in a “party” mentioned
when describing this experience, “Unfortunately, or maybe fortunately, I don’t know, the police
arrived and I tell you: an African always fears the police, and so does everything to avoid
trouble.”118 In this episode, the police officers let all migrants go and only checked the criminal
records of the Brazilians participating in the party. For Philippe, the police had an understanding
that the migrants were “a little naïve,” that they did not know what they were getting themselves
into, which he thought was “very fair.”
As was visible in the vignette of the base meeting that opened this chapter, international
migrants are not particularly enthusiastic about the prospect of joining a movement that demands
their commitment and daily effort. They learn about the MSTC’s squats by word of mouth, and

118

Interview with “Philippe.” São Paulo, December 2017.

171

they join them out of necessity, as they struggle to afford the city’s rents with their low-paying and
often informal jobs. Most of the international migrants I met who were living in squats worked as
cleaners, construction workers, cooks, hairdressers (in salons specializing in African braids), or
they sold clothing, sunglasses, small electronics, etc., in the informal street trade of São Paulo’s
central neighbourhoods. Whenever I asked international migrants why they moved into a squat,
their explanation would echo the words of the Congolese Emmanuel: “The wage here is very, very
bad. With the wage you can buy clothes, you can buy food, but if you pay for a house, then it’s
over, there’s nothing left.”119
In addition to being unable to afford formal rents, many of these international migrants also
faced extra bureaucratic obstacles and prejudices. Many migrants did not have a bank account,
which prevented them from proving their income to potential landlords. Some migrants told me of
landlords and real estate agents who refused to rent to them once they met in person, a refusal they
attributed to racism. Finally, those who carry an asylum-seeker protocol often complained that the
document was not recognized as “serious” by various people in the city—the “protocol” is a form
printed on a A4 sheet of paper with a passport photo of the migrant glued to it. In this regard, it is
important to note that while these international migrants were documented, which signals a certain
degree of inclusion and a formal entitlement to rights, the material aspect of their documentation
worked to compromise the quality of this inclusion. The precarious aspect of the document
compounded prejudices against them as asylum-seekers and as people of colour, and jeopardized
their access to jobs and formal housing, for example. Beyond this, some asylum-seekers
complained that, carrying this protocol, they were unable to obtain drivers’ licenses and credit
cards. Also, while asylum-seekers have the right to enrol in public (free of charge) and private
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educational institutions in Brazil, they were often unable to obtain official diplomas because the
protocol was not accepted as valid documentation at the time of the issuing of the diploma—it was
paradoxically accepted for enrolment but not for completion of education.
During the period of my fieldwork, the MSTC, in addition to being one of the main housing
movements organizing squats in downtown São Paulo, was also the only housing movement that
had made deliberate efforts to welcome international migrants to its squats. Carmen and the
movement’s coordinators often referred to this welcoming stance as being about trying to “bring”
the migrants “to militancy” (trazer pra militância). For Carmen, this approach was in tune with
the movement’s non-exclusionary stance to potential new members: “One of the main items of the
movement’s statute is that we don’t exclude anybody: nationality, religion, political party.
Everyone is welcome.”120 The MSTC’s leader and coordinators (but not necessarily most
squatters) support a discourse that subsumes the struggles of migrant and Brazilian squatters under
the presumed shared identities of “refugees” and “sem teto.” (i.e., “the roofless”)
“We are all refugees from our rights” was a statement made repeatedly by Carmen. For
her, all squatters, regardless of their place of origin, shared common struggles for the enjoyment
of their rights, especially the right to housing. In an interview, one MSTC coordinator similarly
claimed that “We are refugees within our own country. We suffer here what they suffered over
there.”121 Irrespective of their nationalities, squatters are all seen as people who were similarly
expelled from the group of rights-bearing individuals. There is also a more literal side to this claim.
Carmen emphasized that most Brazilian squatters also have migrant origins, if only from other
towns or cities in the state of São Paulo. “All [squatters] are refugees, internal migrants, all, all.
People leave their places of origin and come here, people who came from the countryside, from
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Interview MSTC coordinator. São Paulo, January 2018.
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the Northeast [of Brazil], from another country. We are all migrants, all.” 122 This is in line with
the findings of a survey conducted in 2016 which estimated that 71 percent of the city’s homeless
population originated from outside the city (R7 2016).
This insistence on shared identities was important to the movement for several reasons.
Carmen saw this homogenizing stance as avoiding the creation of what she called “ghettoes” and
“sectarian” politics. Even though there are other identities and intersecting markers of oppression
among squatters (on the basis of gender, sexuality, and race, for example), these were not to be
privileged by the MSTC’s members. Carmen explained that she was “very careful so that the
MSTC doesn’t create ghettoes.” She continued, “I think that ghettoes are a very reactionary and
sectarian form [of political organizing], and [if we allow ghettoes] we will make the same mistake
that Brazil has made… [The mistake] of forming classes. It’s the class of the women with curly
hair, it’s the class of the LGBTQ, it’s a class of this, and that, and that other thing.” 123 The
assumption is that for the MSTC’s members to achieve their goals of social housing provision,
they needed to be united behind this agenda; making space for other goals and identities could
weaken their effectiveness.
Insisting on a shared identity among all squatters also sought to discourage the “us” versus
“them” mentality that allowed prejudices to proliferate in the everyday interactions among
members. Brazilian squatters were encouraged to see international migrants as “neighbours” and
“comrades in struggle” (companheiros de luta), rather than as competitors for scarce resources
(such as jobs and housing). The idea is that no special treatment should be offered to either group,
or that no group deserves more rights than the other. The MSTC’s squatters were told by the
movement’s leadership that they are all “in this together,” and should support each other.
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Interview Carmen Silva. São Paulo, March 2018.
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This is not an obvious or ordinary stance, as marginalized urban dwellers who are citizens
can often frame disenfranchised non-citizen newcomers as illegitimate competitors, or even blame
these newcomers for their precarious circumstances. For example, Tanja Bastia’s (2015) research
on the grassroots organizations of villa (slum) dwellers in Buenos Aires shows that elected villa
leaders, many of whom are of domestic migrant origins, sought to differentiate themselves from
the more recent residents from neighbouring countries (mainly Bolivia), who were framed as not
really needy and as invaders. Similarly, works on South African cities, most notably Johannesburg,
have shown how local marginalized communities have supported xenophobic policies against
newcomers from other African countries, blaming them for rising crime and unemployment, and
even engaging in repeated episodes of anti-immigrant violence and looting of immigrants’
businesses.124
It is also important to note there was some flexibility in the “unifying approach” taken by
the MSTC’s leadership. An important example of this was when, in early 2018, Carmen supported
the organization of Angolan women living in the MSTC’s squats in relation to their family
migratory situation. Between 2015 and 2017, an increased number of Angolan women migrated
to São Paulo without their husbands, often pregnant and sometimes also with small children—
many of them ended up moving into the city’s central squats.125 Their original plans were that their
husbands, who had stayed in Angola, would join them soon after in Brazil. However, the Brazilian
diplomatic service, having noticed the increased flow of these women, started “intensifying the
control in the analysis of tourist visas in the Brazilian embassy in Luanda” in April of 2017,
because diplomats suspected many were applying for a tourist visa with the actual intention of
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See, for example, Landau (2010) and Crush and Ramachandran (2015).
Their migration flow peaked in early 2016; in the first three months of 2016, over 600 Angolan women, most of
them pregnant, landed in Brazil from Luanda and applied for asylum (Diógenes 2016b).
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staying in the country (Diógenes 2016a). The embassy then began systematically denying tourist
visas to many (perhaps most) of these husbands seeking to reunite with their wives and children
in São Paulo. This, as one can imagine, brought many of these Angolan women to the brink of
despair in the city.126 Nani, one of these woman, who was living in an MSTC squat reached out to
the movement for help, and Carmen incentivized her to get organized with other Angolan women
in the same situation as her, instead of focusing on individual appeals to diplomatic authorities.
Offering the squat’s space for these women’s meetings, where they gathered weekly for over a
month, Carmen supported their initiative to write a collective letter to the Brazilian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs claiming these Angolan migrants’ right to reunite with their family members in
Brazil.
Hence, overall, the MSTC’s leadership insists on framing the struggles of the international
migrants and the Brazilians living in its squats as congruous: they are all people who have been
geographically displaced and displaced from access to their rights. As such, they should act as
comrades in struggle and fight together for their rights in the city. This approach challenges the
centrality of the citizen/non-citizen divide as a basis for political struggle, and it shuns a
competitive mentality among squatters of different origins.
However, the very elements that make this approach progressive and inclusive threaten to
undermine it. As we will see in the next sections, this approach’s strength is also the source of its
fragility, in that it does not make much room for the different aspirations at stake. I now turn to
discuss a particular group within the MSTC which, during my fieldwork, was tasked precisely
with integrating international migrants into the movement and bridging the nationality divide
among neighbours.
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In 2017 one of them jumped onto the subway line with two small children. Her case was often brought up by other
Angolan women living in the MSTC’s squats when they were trying to express the acuteness of their hopelessness.
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The birth of GRIST (Group of Roofless International Migrants and Refugees)

While São Paulo’s downtown squats have always had international migrants as residents, the
recent increase in their presence spurred the MSTC to adopt a more proactive approach towards
them. Before, according to Carmen, international migrants would join the squats and no specific
action was taken by the movement. Now, since their increased arrival over the past five years, the
movement has base meetings only for international migrants (separate from the base meetings for
Brazilians), and it strives to create what Carmen calls a “cultural understanding”—that is, both
explaining to the international migrants what the movement is about as well as promoting a more
harmonious relationship between them and Brazilians squatters, so the former can be seen by the
latter as “just another neighbour.”127
During the time I was in São Paulo and collaborated with the MSTC, these goals were the
responsibility of GRIST (Grupo de Refugiados e Imigrantes Sem Teto, i.e. Group of Roofless
International Migrants and Refugees). GRIST had been organized by a small group of
collaborators (all middle-aged or older middle-class women from São Paulo who support the
movement), which I joined, with the assistance of the MSTC’s coordinators. GRIST’s mission was
defined in terms of promoting the integration of international migrants into the MSTC. To that
end, the group was responsible for organizing the base meetings dedicated to international
migrants, for mediating conflicts between Brazilian and migrant neighbours, and for organizing
cultural activities designed to bring people together.

127

Interview with Carmen Silva. São Paulo, December 2017.

177

However, GRIST’s original configuration and aims were quite different from when I joined
it. The group was formed in 2014 during the shooting of the movie Era o Hotel Cambridge in an
MSTC squat (the building of the former Hotel Cambridge). Released in 2017, the movie was
directed by Eliane Caffé, and it is a docu-fiction hybrid that depicts the struggles of international
migrants and Brazilians living in a squat in downtown São Paulo. The cast is partly composed of
both actual squatters and actors; Carmen, the leader of the MSTC, is the main character, played by
herself. Carla Caffé, Eliane’s sister and art director of the movie, published a comic book narrating
and analysing the making of the movie in collaboration with the MSTC’s members. In the book
(Caffé 2017), she explains that the movie’s production team invited international migrants
(through local NGOs) to participate in meetings at Hotel Cambridge. In these meetings, migrants
exchanged information about their challenges in the city, and they also became familiar with the
MSTC’s work. The movie thus ended up making the MSTC known among São Paulo’s recentlyarrived international migrants and asylum-seekers, and some of them joined the movement. Some
also showed interest in joining the movie’s cast and participated in acting workshops. Throughout
the shooting of the movie and after it, the migrants kept on gathering in the Cambridge squat
weekly, which led to the creation of GRIST. Pitchou Luambo, who used to be a lawyer in the DRC
and, during the movie’s shooting, worked as a forklift operator for Peugeot, joined the cast and
became a founder and leading figure in this initial phase of GRIST.
When I began my fieldwork in 2017, Pitchou had already left his role as GRIST coordinator
and had moved out of an MSTC squat to rent his own place with a Brazilian partner. He opened a
vegan Congolese food restaurant in a hip neighbourhood, upstairs from a vinyl record store and
bar specialized in artisanal beers. His restaurant was small and colorfully decorated with patterned
tablecloths and African art on the walls. One of the walls, though, was covered with copies of news
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articles that featured Pitchou and his activism for migrants’ rights in the city, including his previous
role at GRIST. When meeting Pitchou for an interview at his restaurant, in my third week in São
Paulo, he was curious to hear from me what GRIST had been up to. I explained to him that I had
attended a few base meetings, to which he responded, in a disapproving tone, “GRIST is now just
those meetings!” According to him, GRIST was originally supposed “to have a long-term ideal of
changing mentalities [about refugees, especially those from African countries],” instead of
focusing on the MSTC’s agenda.128
The mentalities to be targeted, in his opinion, were those of low-income Brazilians, who,
in his view, compete with refugees for precarious jobs, and who often showed blunt racism and
hostility towards them. “People from the A class respect me, or at least they disguise well. Here
[in Brazil] racism is done in an intelligent way,” he explained. “People have masters’ degrees,
Ph.D. degrees in racism.” Those “without education” (including an education in disguised racism)
were the group Pitchou meant to target with GRIST. While he stated that “housing is definitely
the main problem for migrants and refugees,” he explained that GRIST was initially supposed to
make people aware of the hardships refugees go through in Brazil.
For the former lawyer, the problems of poor Brazilians and of refugees converge in their
lack of access to adequate housing. Still, he saw refugees as being in a much more vulnerable
situation than Brazilian squatters. He complained that inside the movement “there’s nobody who
defends the rights of refugees.” When I asked him what he saw as the main differences between
the challenges faced by squatters who were Brazilians and those who were refugees, he focused
on bureaucratic hurdles and racism. He mentioned that refugees (technically, asylum-seekers) have
to wait for many years to obtain proper documentation, given the backlog of asylum applications
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Interview with Pitchou Luambo. São Paulo, October 2017. All other quotes from Pitchou in this chapter came from
this same interview.
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in the country. He explained that the provisional document they often hold, the asylum-seeker
protocol, does not allow them to obtain credit cards or drivers’ licenses, and they often have
difficulties obtaining diplomas. According to Pitchou, bureaucratically, it is also harder for nonBrazilians to obtain social housing. Further, he said that refugees are often discriminated against
in job interviews, especially black refugees.129 He concluded that “There’s no point in saying that
Brazilians are also refugees in Brazil.”
Pitchou thus challenged the MSTC’s rhetorical attempts to homogenize the circumstances
and identities of migrant and Brazilian squatters. He also raised two more issues in relation to
migrants’ participation in the MSTC. First, he stressed that international migrants cannot legally
participate in a political movement. This was indeed true at the time he was an MSTC member.
Then, the “Foreigner’s Statute” was still in place, and it prohibited the involvement of “foreigners”
in any “activity of a political nature” (article 107), which included participating in public
demonstrations and political meetings, for example.130 Nevertheless, the new legislation governing
international migration to Brazil enacted in 2017 does not prohibit international migrants from
engaging in political activities.
Second, as he explained, international migrants are not necessarily looking for a permanent
place to live in São Paulo. When I asked him what he meant by that, he gave me the hypothetical
example of an opportunity coming up for him in Canada (where he knew I was doing a Ph.D.). “I
would go!”, he exclaimed. He stressed that he would not stay in the squat if such an opportunity
arose. According to Pitchou, “refugees are looking for a place to live a safe life, in a better place;
they are not committed to staying somewhere.” This creates an incompatibility between what
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Pitchou sees the situation of Syrian refugees in Brazil as much more favourable than that of Haitians and Africans.
He explained that Syrian refugees have a local Arab community to support them, they have fast-tracked access to
documentation, and society shows solidarity towards them.
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The text of the law is available at: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/LEIS/L6815.htm
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international migrants and housing movements are looking for. As he elaborated, in order for
squatters to be included in a social housing program, the movement has to be able to provide
documentation proving that the squatter families had been living in the squat for a long time, that
they represent the movement’s demand for housing, and that they are not just people the movement
“invented.”131 For Pitchou, migrants’ lack of commitment to staying in squats for an indeterminate
number of years generated tensions with the movement. 132
Pitchou initially thought GRIST could allow refugees and international migrants to
represent themselves (instead of being represented by NGOs), and that it could support them in
their housing struggles. In his conception, GRIST was not supposed to integrate these newcomers
into the movement, but to advance refugees’ particular interests through the movement, and defend
their particular needs and interests within it.
To my mind, Pitchou’s frustration with international migrants’ participation in the MSTC
speaks to the main challenges undermining this coalition. The insistence on squatter’s shared
identity did not acknowledge the extra hurdles international migrants had to face when compared
with their Brazilian neighbours. But even more importantly, this coalition, as it was framed by the
MSTC, did not recognize the fact that international migrants and Brazilians living in São Paulo’s
squats do not necessarily have the same projects of existential mobility and horizons. By this, I do
not mean to imply that most disenfranchised international migrants, asylum-seekers, and refugees
living in squats in central São Paulo do not intend to stay in Brazil, but simply that they are not
necessarily committed to fighting for years for dignified housing in the city, and that their visions
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This point was also explained to me by Carmen Silva. While I do not know if there were past cases in which
housing movements ever “invented” members, that seemed to be a suspicion on the part of government agencies. As
such, housing movements tried to create records that proved they represented a concrete demand for housing.
132
When I asked Carmen Silva or MSTC collaborators about Pitchou they would vaguely refer to him as illustrating
the problem with migrant squatters in general, i.e., a lack of commitment to the housing struggle.
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of a better future were not necessarily limited to the realities of the city or country. 133 Brazilians
and international migrants living might share a common present as squatters, but they have come
from different backgrounds, and they often have different aspirations and imaginations of what
their futures could hold.
In order to make sense of these divergences, I now turn to a discussion of how they
manifested themselves in squatters’ everyday lives in the MSTC’s squats. This discussion is based
both on my observations while participating in GRIST and on interviews.

Reluctant comrades in struggle

GRIST’s activities always took place in the same MSTC squat, the one where the base meetings
also happened. When I joined, GRIST was constituted by four main “collaborators” two female
artists and two female psychologists. These were women I became quite close to, and whose
company I deeply cherished in our weekly gatherings. While we acted as a group, I certainly cannot
speak on their behalf. What I present here are my interpretations of our participation in the MSTC.
As I saw it, our main concern was to foster a positive relationship between the new members from
abroad and Brazilian squatters. In discussing our interventions, we often reflected on the challenge
of guaranteeing a harmonious coexistence among people from very different backgrounds in a
building run on collective duties. We were sympathetic to both the movement and the international
migrants, and we were constantly reflecting on our role—how and how much we should
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At the time of the writing of this dissertation, there were no reliable statistics on the number of international
migrants, asylum-seekers, and refugees who had left Brazil for other countries. Still, reports have noted that, especially
since 2016, a growing number of disenfranchised international migrants (especially from Haiti, and from African
countries) have been crossing Brazil’s northern border in the direction of North America (Edwards 2016; Rihouay
2018)—this will be further discussed in the next chapter.
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intervene—given that we were ultimately outsiders, since we only visited the squat and did not
live there.
An initial project we, as GRIST collaborators, undertook, was to try to mediate everyday
conflicts between international migrants and Brazilians. A project that was considered along those
lines, but that did not come to fruition during my fieldwork, was to create “video letters.” The idea
was that these were to be short comic videos showing everyday problems in the squat as well as
unusual solutions to these problems. For example, some neighbours had complaints about a bucket,
used for flushing a toilet in a shared bathroom (all bathrooms in the squat were shared) that always
went missing. This situation led to a video letter idea. It would feature a scene of a squatter who,
frustrated with the constantly missing bucket, hangs a poster on the bathroom wall with an image
of the “Saint of the Buckets.” The “saint” was supposed to protect the buckets and watch those
who took them from the bathroom. We thought that if these small quotidian nuisances were treated
with humour, there would be a better chance of people feeling motivated to solve them. The videos
were supposed to be screened only to the squatters, and to make people feel like they could talk
about these problems in public and in a light and non-judgemental way. Even though the videos
were not made while I was participating in GRIST, we did go up and down the squat’s stairs to
collect complaints from residents that could inspire the video letters. At the time, ten of the
building’s 14 floors were occupied and, as in most of the city’s squats, the elevators did not work.
After some weeks of knocking on squatters’ doors and listening to their complaints, we
gradually felt that the light-hearted video letters were not up to the task of bringing people together.
The chasm and accumulated resentment among neighbours were greater than we originally
anticipated. The Brazilian squatters who were most vocal about their grievances were the floor
mediators—each floor has a mediator, usually a volunteer squatter who is in charge of making sure
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her or his neighbours are contributing to the mutirões and behaving according to the rules. We
found that most of the women who served as floor mediators felt quite strongly that their migrant
neighbours were overall not contributing to the mutirões, or that they were not contributing to the
movement at all. The international migrants, on the other hand, mostly had complaints about the
demands imposed upon them for participation, about the rules they thought were infringing on
their private spaces, and about the way mediators and coordinators knocked on their doors calling
them (by yelling) to take part in mutirões and meetings.
Instead of making the video letters, we collected these grievances and, because of repeated
complaints from floor mediators about some international migrants’ lack of participation
(particularly in the mutirões for cleaning the common bathrooms), we organized two parallel
meetings: one meeting was with the squat’s mediators (all Brazilian women) and the with
international migrants who had been singled out as particularly “uncooperative” by the group of
mediators. After these meetings, we felt that we were unable to create dialogue and foster
understanding in relation to these everyday tensions. Because none of us actually lived in the squat,
we felt we were not in a position to try to interfere in the relationships among neighbours. Instead
of conflict mediation, we decided to focus on cultural events that, we thought, could better bring
everyone together.
But let us consider the main sources of conflict we identified among the neighbours. A few
international migrants openly questioned the necessity and legitimacy of mutirões. This was
Maria’s case, a woman from Angola who lived with her four children in the squat. We knocked
on her door one evening and her teenage daughter opened it, accompanied by her three small
siblings. We initially could not see if Maria was at home, as her space was divided with curtains
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into at l134east three different sub-rooms. After we chatted with her children for some minutes, she
came to see us, dragging her feet. She explained she was feeling very tired from work, and that
she did not agree that everyone had to contribute to keeping the common areas clean. She said,
exasperated, that “Each person should take care of their own space, maybe sweep in front of their
door, but we don’t have to clean the whole floor. That’s not how it works!” When visiting another
family from Angola, Jeremias complained assertively about international migrants being asked to
take turns guarding the building’s door. He thought that it was dangerous if the police came, and
that only Brazilians should be asked to do it.
Some specific rules of the squat were also resisted. For example, several families from the
DRC and Angola created divisions in their apartments with fabrics, like in Maria’s case. The
movement’s leadership was against this, as the fabrics were seen as a fire hazard. The migrants
did not agree with this intrusion in their private space; this was an ad hoc prohibition they saw as
arbitrary. Migrants also contested the interdiction—this one included the movement’s written rules
(the “statute”) and repeatedly mentioned in base meetings—against bringing people who were not
part of the movement to live in their spaces. The MSTC, as other housing movements, does not
accept that new people move in without first going through the base meetings. Some squatters
brought in new partners or relatives who had just arrived in São Paulo without communicating this
to the squat’s coordination, which led to complaints and frustration on the part of the movement’s
administration, and sometimes concerns that some migrants might be subletting or somehow even
selling their spaces. Finally, a consensus among international migrants seemed to be their distaste
for how mediators and coordinators knocked vigorously on their doors and, yelling, called them
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As explained in the previous chapter, squats organized by housing movements commonly have squatters taking
turns watching the building’s main entrance. This task was not associated with the presence of international migrants
(for example, out of concern that the police could target them), and international migrants living in MSTC squats were
expected to take turns as the doorperson just as much as their Brazilian neighbours.
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to join the mutirões and meetings. Many found the knocking too frequent and disrespectful.
Overall, international migrants seemed to feel that they were being treated poorly, and that they
should not be asked to participate in mutirões and meetings all the time.
Granted, leaders and coordinators of housing movements across São Paulo admit that getting
people to contribute to the common struggle and to become engaged activists for the right to
housing is a difficult task. Kohara’s (2013) work, for instance, based on a life-long collaboration
with central São Paulo’s housing movements and on interviews with leaders of six of these
movements, brings up this difficulty. Despite the efforts made in the formação (i.e. political
education) of members, leaders of housing movements expressed in his interviews a perception
that making people change their “underdog mentality” so they can become “full citizens” is
challenging. Kohara highlights that, for leaders of the housing movements, “There is a perception
that people’s wretchedness makes them fragile to the point that they lose hope or the will to change
the situation they find themselves in…” (2013, 178, my translation). An MSTC coordinator that I
interviewed during fieldwork put this challenge less in terms of people’s self-esteem and ability to
fight for their rights and more in terms of overcoming an individualistic mentality. As he put it,
“But the biggest problem really, the greatest difficulty, is to bring people towards a union, to a
common struggle. It’s what I was saying before, to forget about your own belly button and
remember all of us.”135
These challenges of getting people mobilized and of “bringing people towards a common
struggle” seemed to be multiplied when the people concerned were not used to the local reality,
and, even more importantly, were not necessarily tied to it. As I will show in the next section,
international migrants living in the MSTC’s squats did not seem to be completely motivated by
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Interview with MSTC coordinator. São Paulo, January 2018.
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the prospect of becoming homeowners in São Paulo, or compelled by the MSTC’s project of
making them into “full citizens,” into people who were cognizant of their rights and committed to
fighting for them not to be just dead rights. Carmen’s eventual reluctance to introduce international
migrants to the movement, depicted in the opening vignette, can be attributed to her evaluation
that many of these newcomers were not joining the movement to fight together a long-term battle
for rights, but just so they had a temporary place to stay. Constant complaints by Brazilian
neighbours about international migrants’ lack of contribution to mutirões, about their disrespect
for its rules (especially by bringing new people to live in the squat who had not attended base
meetings), and their perceived lack of participation in meetings discussing political and
administrative issues, all seemed to indicate to Carmen their lack of commitment to the joint
struggle. I now turn to how international migrants perceived the MSTC and its squats and how, in
turn, the leader and coordinators of the MSTC perceived these migrants’ circumstances.

Know thy neighbour

The experience of knocking on squatters’ doors and listening to their complaints about everyday
life allowed me to better understand the different perspectives held by squatters of Brazilian and
international origins. With time, I came to see the frictions between the two groups as informed by
their very different perceptions of the squat and the city. Simply put, international migrants had
very little incentive to commit to common chores and responsibilities, and more broadly to the
political agenda of the MSTC. They were skeptical of the possibility of obtaining durable housing
through the movement, and, most importantly, they were generally not so invested in this
possibility.
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In interviews with international migrants, I often got the impression that many did not have a
great deal of interest in what the housing movement was about. I did not hear from any of them a
full articulation of the movement’s goals in terms of fighting for rights and obtaining durable
housing. Whenever I asked about their understanding and opinions about the movement or
squatting in São Paulo, international migrants often put it in terms of, on the one hand, having to
clean spaces collectively and, second, in terms of being given help. For example, two sisters
sharing a space in an MSTC squat explained to me that the movement was about cleaning the
building and taking turns guarding the building’s door. My impression was that they, and many
other international migrants, saw the movement as being, first and foremost, about that kind of
participation. The squats are not necessarily regarded as part of a strategy of a political movement
fighting for people’s right to housing and trying to influence public policy. Instead, international
migrants seemed to see it much more as spaces that supported and organized the daily life of those
who needed a place to live. Jerémé, an asylum-seeker from the DRC put it this way:

It’s a form of help for people like us, right? I won’t talk about the Brazilians because they have
family, were born here, have many opportunities to make a living, to build their lives. But the
migrants who arrive here don’t know where to start and they are trying to survive with lots of
difficulty. For me, it’s very good [the movement] … It’s a great help for us because a lot of
people here don’t have a job. 136

In addition to articulating a view of the MSTC as source of help, Jerémé also emphasized the
idea that international migrants are in a more vulnerable position than their Brazilian neighbours,
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Interview with “Jérémé.” São Paulo, January 2018.
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a perspective in line with Pitchou’s and many other international migrants living in squats. Martin,
a migrant from Cameroon who had been living in another MSTC squat for two years by early
2018, said international migrants did understand what the movement was about, but that they
simply did not want to take part in its many duties. In our interview, he repeatedly expressed
gratitude towards the movement for the support it had given him, mostly by allowing him to pay
a cheap price for living in a central neighbourhood. Still, when I asked him about his thoughts on
the housing movement, he explained the following:

There’s no such thing as occupying someone else’s building [in Cameroon]. There really isn’t.
Well, for me, when I’m in the squat, a thing for me is that there are a lot of demands [cobrança].
A lot of requirements. There are people that only have the condition to pay the contribution,
but then you charge him the little time he has to work more, to try to make a bit more money,
for participation. OK, there’s the movement, but you are demanding of him more than just the
contribution. It becomes heavy. 137

Martin’s impressions were echoed by different international migrants I met and interviewed in the
MSTC’s squats. Many highlighted that in their countries of origin or previous residence, people
would not “live in the house of others.” Expressions of gratitude for the movement mixed with
indignation towards its many demands were also regularly voiced. While chatting with
international migrants in different squats, I heard a few times the assessment that the housing crisis
in São Paulo was a “problem for the Brazilians to solve.” Such a perspective contradicted the
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movement’s attempt to efface the distinction between citizens and non-citizens, and the
assumption that they should be struggling together towards a common goal in the city.
In addition, skepticism seemed to be a factor in migrants’ perceived lack of engagement in the
movement. Most did not find it likely that they would obtain social housing, and some openly
denied that that was a possibility. When I asked Beth, an eight-months pregnant woman from Haiti,
what she thought of the prospects of obtaining access to social housing through the movement, she
exclaimed: “We say that that’s a lie. They won’t give us [social housing]. Because we are not
Brazilians, this is for Brazilians. Because we say: you can’t vote, you can’t have your own home
either.”138
Added to this skepticism is the that fact that many international migrants were not necessarily
interested in settling in the city for good, much less in the peripheral neighbourhoods where most
housing projects are still built. As I see it, this is a central factor in international migrants’ approach
to the MSTC. Tito, a Haitian neighbour of Beth who had been living in an MSTC squat for longer,
was offered social housing in a project that was being built in Ferraz de Vasconcelos, a city in the
metropolitan region of São Paulo. He refused to enrol in the project and pay the subsidised line of
credit. He preferred to stay in the squat in the city centre, close to his job and cultural events—he
worked at a downtown restaurant and was part of a Haitian music band that usually played in the
central area.139
Evaniza Rodrigues, a key political and administrative figure in the umbrella housing movement
UMM (União dos Movimentos de Moradia, i.e. Union of the Housing Movements), recognizes
that for international migrants to fully commit to the housing struggle, they need to first have a
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clear sense that they intend to stay and build their lives in the city, what she refers to as a
“perspective of permanence”:

It [obtaining durable housing] is a process that lasts five, six, eight years. Of course, this is
already another moment in the life of the [international] migrant, right? We have many
migrants [in UMM], but it’s in another moment, when they are at least already living
somewhere, stopping somewhere, when they are more established. They might even be living
in a squat, they might be living in someone’s house, maybe, but they already have a perspective
of permanence also. Because it’s an important issue, especially with the refugees, we’ve had
many conversations with some organizations, some of them have no idea if they’re going to
stay here or not. It’s something like: “If the situation gets better, I want to return [to the country
of origin], but if things take a long time to improve, I’ll go somewhere else,” right?140

I agree with Evaniza that this perspective of permanence is key for people (not only
international migrants) to fully commit to the long-term struggle for durable housing in the city.
The international migrants that I met in different squats across downtown São Paulo seemed to
generally lack this perspective. As I further elaborate in the next chapter, some of these newcomers
had arrived in São Paulo hoping to obtain a better life in it, while others saw the city as a
steppingstone to a more prosperous destination, often in the global North. Regardless of their
original plans, these newcomers generally felt disillusioned with their circumstances in São Paulo
and tended to regard the squat as a temporary, conveniently located, and cheap housing option.
Depending on the individual and family circumstances at hand, the squat was perceived as a form
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of housing that facilitated these migrants’ survival in the city, that allowed them to save money for
remittances to relatives in their countries of origin, and, for the relatively better-off, it was a form
of housing that allowed them to set some money aside for their next international migration. These
were international migrants who were connected on a daily basis to networks of friends and
relatives in different countries, including more desirable destinations in North America and
Europe. Even when they lacked the resources to leave Brazil for one of these countries, these
places were part of their imagination of what a better life could look like. As Martin put it, “Going
to another place is a thing that almost all migrants have in their heads.” 141
Some international migrants’ mobility aspirations were visible in cultural events I helped
organize as part of GRIST. One of those events was a movie screening followed by an international
Skype conversation. We had been approached by a Brazilian woman working at The Grandhotel
Cosmopolis, an activist project where refugees, artists and travellers live together, in Augsburg,
Germany.142 She had watched the movie Era o Hotel Cambridge and felt that the work the MSTC
was doing in welcoming international migrants was in sync with the philosophy of The Grandhotel.
She proposed that the MSTC’s squatters and those working and staying at The Grandhotel watched
the movie simultaneously and later had a Skype conversation, asking each other questions about
their experiences of living together. 143 On the day of the event, the squat’s meeting room (where
the base meetings took place) was packed. Popcorn was made at the squat’s recently-inaugurated
communal kitchen and freely distributed to all movie-watchers. When the Skype conversation
began, the international migrants attending the event were particularly eager to participate in it,

Jonas with “Martin.” São Paulo, December 2017.
For more information on this project, see https://grandhotel-cosmopolis.org/de/
https://grandhotelcosmopolis.org/de/
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The Skype conversation with people at The Grandhotel Cosmopolis happened in Portuguese and English, and I
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even more than the Brazilian MSTC members. The only MSTC Brazilian member to step forward
and participate in the conversation, apart from Carmen, was a squat coordinator, who asked a
question about access to housing and urban politics in Germany. The international migrants, on
the other hand, had questions and comments related to migration to Germany. Armando, from
Angola, for example, asked what it was like to be a migrant in Germany, and whether racism was
a big problem there. A woman from the DRC, who dressed elegantly in colorful traditional clothes
for the occasion, came to the front of the room to state that she would very much love to go visit
those at The Grandhotel in Germany.
The MSTC’s coordinators and leadership did not seem to miss international migrants’
goals and aspirations entirely. As a coordinator observed,

I hear all the time from their mouths that their goal is to save money and try to go to the United
States. They have this dream of growing, they say that in the United States there are more
opportunities, that the worker is respected there. They do share that with us. “What is your goal
in Brazil?” It’s to help their families, they share with us. It’s to help the family in Africa, in
Angola, in other countries.144

For this coordinator, the fact that international migrants living in the MSTC’s squats have these
different, migration-related goals should not necessarily be seen as a problem. “The movement
doesn’t exclude anyone; the people exclude themselves from the movement. I know a lot of people
[referring to international migrants] who came to live in the squat and then left to try to obtain a
better life in another country. But during the time they spent here, they participated.” Carmen is
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also aware that international migrants might not want to stay in Brazil, and that their residence in
a squat and membership in the movement might be short-lived. “Some [international migrants]
don’t want to stay, some want to, they still have this dream of going to the United States, right?
They have this silliness of going to the United States. But some are more stable, when their families
are here they stay for longer.” Another coordinator also acknowledges many international
migrants’ intention to leave Brazil, and he said he had “no criticisms in relation to it.” “But,” he
added, “since the movement has opened its arms to welcome them, we will try to do with them
what we do with our Brazilian comrades: try to rescue their citizenship.”
For most of the duration of my fieldwork, the movement’s leadership and coordinators,
whilst aware of international migrants’ often divergent goals, were trying to incorporate them in
the movement and “rescue their citizenship,” as put by the coordinator, even if they were not
formally Brazilian citizens. The approach taken by the movement towards international migrants
was not markedly different from the one they took towards Brazilian squatters. Both groups were
encouraged to pick themselves up, work hard, and run after their rights. Both were expected to
follow the movement’s statute and participate in the movements’ mutirões, meetings, and even
political demonstrations—even though less pressure seemed to be put in relation to the latter. Both
were expected to be politically “born” through the movement, and behave like full citizens
deserving of rights, even those who were not technically citizens in the first place.
Somewhat paradoxically, the MSTC’s coordinators and Carmen, while being aware of
many international migrants’ aspirations to migrate elsewhere, also seemed to underestimate their
social condition. In the quote above, Carmen referred to international migrants’ ambitions to
migrate to the United States as a “silliness.” Coordinators and many Brazilian squatters tended to
assume that the Haitians and West Africans who joined them in the squats had directly come from
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extreme situations of war and acute poverty, and that, given their sufferable pasts, living in a squat
must not be so bad for them. In the words of a coordinator, “As these people went through a
difficult trajectory to get here, to live in a squat, I think it is source of comfort for them; it is a
tranquil and easy thing because of the experience they’ve had [...] As their suffering was so big,
for them this is not suffering.”145 This perspective, I believe, builds on deep-seated racialized
assumptions about African countries and Haiti as irremediably less civilized, poverty-stricken, and
conflict-ridden societies. But it is also in line with assumptions about an essentialized “refugee
experience” (Malkki 1996) marked by victimhood, helplessness, and desperation.
The international migrants living in the MSTC’s squats certainly did not once enjoy a life
of pure privilege and no suffering before coming to Brazil. But they often described their lives in
their countries of origin or previous residence as much more materially comfortable than their lives
in the MSTC’s squats. These migrants had generally attended postsecondary schools (either
universities or colleges) and used to own businesses or have relatively well-paying jobs. For
example, among the migrants living in squats, I met a lawyer, a former medical student, a former
engineering student, a woman with a degree in hospitality management, a founder of an NGO
focused on women’s rights, a radiologist, a brazier, and people who owned retailing businesses.
This should come as no surprise, because long-distance international migrations require
investments unthinkable to people in dire poverty. As Katja Hujo and Nicola Piper (2010, 24)
explain, “migrants are typically not from the poorest population strata, as a certain amount of
resources—human, social and financial—are necessary in order to migrate, especially to more
distant destinations.” Also, as Zolberg and colleagues (1989, 260) highlights, “The simple notion
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that poverty produces refugees is inconsistent with the fact that situations of extreme economic
deprivation usually have not generated population outflows claiming international refugee status.”
In sum, international migrants seemed to regard the MSTC as a sort of organization that
simultaneously helped them and demanded too much from them. Depending on their
circumstances, the MSTC’s squats helped them make ends meet in the city, send remittances back
home, and, in some cases, even save money for a next migration. Generally disillusioned with their
experiences in São Paulo, they were not overall enthusiastic about a long-term commitment to
struggling, alongside their Brazilian neighbours, for dignified housing in the city. They tended to
lack what Evaniza called a “perspective of permanence,” which is a necessary condition for
committing to the arduous struggle for durable housing in the city.
On the other hand, the MSTC’s leader, coordinators, and mediators, while cognizant of
international migrants’ specific goals to a certain extent, seemed to downplay their social condition
and mobility ambitions, and invest in an approach of rescuing their citizenship (even though these
were not, formally speaking, citizens). And here lies an interesting contradiction in the MSTC’s
approach: the movement’s stance towards international migrants simultaneously challenged and
reinforced the centrality of citizenship. It challenged citizenship’s centrality as a formal status,
since it articulated a view of squatters (Brazilians or not) as all similarly displaced from the group
of rights-bearing individuals, and it insisted on their need to struggle alongside each for their rights.
But it also reinforced the centrality of citizenship as the political identity and horizon for struggle
par excellence, by assuming international migrants should also have their citizenship rescued and
eventually behave like “full citizens.” In a way, the MSTC perceived citizenship as “the
superstructure of legitimate expectations” (Marshall 1992, 34) even when it came to non-citizens.
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Same roof, different horizons

So, how can we make sense of this complex and fragile coalition between international migrants
and Brazilians in the MSTC’s squats? We can find limitations, contradictions, irony, and political
promise in considering this coalition. The MSTC’s attempt to forge an alliance with
disenfranchised international migrants in a joint struggle for dignified housing is politically
promising. This is because this attempted alliance does not have as its point of departure the divide
between citizens and non-citizens. It thus opens up space for ways of imagining political life
beyond the constraints of the modern categories of migrants, citizens, and national borders, thereby
shifting the “horizons of the possible,” as Anne McNevin (2019, 2) has put it.
The recent literature on migrant squatting in Europe has emphasized this generative
potential within coalitions between local activist squatters and non-citizens. Scholars have tended
to highlight the potential these coalitions have of incubating or prefiguring more just worlds. But
while I agree with this literature’s stress on the potential of these coalitions, I believe it is important
to also make room for possibly contradictory or ambivalent forms of social agency, and the
potential frictions derived from the different backgrounds and aspirations found among different
groups of people under the same roof. I certainly do not mean to imply that these coalitions are all
outright failures or that they are inevitably bound to fail at some point. My point is that if we
overlook the messiness of these coalitions and promote a straightforward view of them as
necessarily harmonious and revolutionary, we might not be doing justice to the different
perspectives and aspirations that inhabit them.
In relation to the international migrants that constitute these coalitions in particular, we
might end up putting on their shoulders the undue but heavy burden of leading class contestation
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and rescuing locals from the injustices they face. Such heroic portrayals of disenfranchised
migrants can be just as obscuring and dehumanizing as those that position them as helpless and
speechless victims (Malkki 1996) or as villains threatening host states’ national security, identity,
or economy (Mainwaring 2016). Are international migrants living in squats out of necessity
inevitably interested in contesting private property (in line with the agenda of left-leaning local
activists)? For those among them who might be living in squats while trying to migrate to a more
desirable destination (such as the case among many in Italian and Greek cities), can we say they
are necessarily urban citizens, fighting for their right to a city they might wish to leave as soon as
possible?
In analysing the coalition between disenfranchised citizens and non-citizens in the MSTC’s
squats, I came to see a simple irony within these sorts of coalitions. The unity between citizens
and non-citizens, which is the promising and potentially generative aspect of these coalitions,
might be transmuted into disunity, if practice and analysis rely too much on it. The MSTC’s
insistence on squatters’ shared fate as “refugees of their rights” challenges an “us” versus “them”
mentality and places international migrants not as illegitimate competitors for scarce resources,
but as equal comrades in a joint urban battle. For all the merits of this progressive and inclusive
approach, it ends up effacing both the particular obstacles faced by the international migrants and
their particular aspirations in the city. International migrants’ reluctance to fully comply with the
movement’s rules and to fully participate in the movement’s activities might be understood as
derived from their different goals in the city. While living in the city’s squats alongside
disenfranchised Brazilians, migrants were not necessarily interested in committing their time and
efforts to a long-term battle for dignified housing in the city.
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Further, even though the citizen/non-citizen divide was not the starting point of the
coalition the MSTC sought to forge, the movement’s vision of transformation was informed by
the horizon of citizenship, of inserting all squatters (citizens and non-citizens) in the city’s
community of value as “full citizens”—recall Carmen’s exhortations to the international migrants
to get involved in the movement, to run after their rights (which would otherwise be dead rights)
and be politically born, like she was when she began participating in a housing movement. But
this transformation was not necessarily in line with the aspirations of the international migrants
living in the MSTC’s squats. Generally disillusioned with their experiences in the city, and often
lacking a clear “perspective of permanence” (as put by Evaniza Rodrigues), the prospect of
becoming “full citizens” did not seem to resonate with them or capture their imagination. Their
horizons seemed to be less informed by the prospect of being incorporated into the realm of full
citizenship in Brazil. Their horizons seemed to go beyond the territory of São Paulo or Brazil, as
these migrants had already travelled a long way to reach the city, and as they were constantly in
touch with transnational networks of migrants like themselves living in more prosperous
destinations, as will be further elaborated in the next chapter.
By evading the local discourse of citizenship around deservingness, these international
migrants reveal the limitations of citizenship as a political horizon, especially in highly unequal
cities like São Paulo. Their reluctance to engage in a long-term struggle and waiting for belonging,
rights, and political recognition in São Paulo unsettles the assumption that citizenship is
necessarily “the superstructure of legitimate expectations” (Marshall 1982, 34) for those partially
or completely excluded from it. Their reluctance lays bare the “false promise of citizenship”
(McNevin 2020) or how citizenship entails a “fantasy” (Anderson and Hughes 2015, 2), as these
migrants show no confidence that, at least in the Paulista and Brazilian context, a citizenship
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agenda can bring about their full inclusion. Hence, if cities, and especially their margins, are key
places for struggles over citizenship, they can also be places where the limits of the horizon of
(full) citizenship are made visible. Eviction room dwellers might pursue their recognition as “full
citizens,” thereby expanding the boundaries of the city’s community of value, but they might also
unveil the limitations of such a pursuit and bypass the exclusionary dynamics of the community
of value altogether.
One way of making sense of these divergences is to think about the different projects of
existential mobility, in addition to the different horizons, that might be at stake in this coalition.
As explained in Chapter One, existential mobility, as defined by Ghassan Hage (2005, 2009) refers
to people’s sense that they are going somewhere, that their lives are progressing, and doing so at a
good enough pace. Importantly, one can move existentially without moving physically at all. In
schematic terms, we can say that the project of existential mobility promoted by the MSTC is
informed by the goal of obtaining durable and dignified housing for its members in São Paulo. In
order to succeed in this project of existential mobility, the movements’ members are encouraged
to have a particular spatial and temporal approach to the squats they live in. They are encouraged
to perceive the squat as a determining place that can allow them to regain their dignity and become
full citizens. Squatters are to be zealous towards this place, as it can define their chances of
obtaining durable housing in the city in the future. This project involves squatters working together
towards improving the conditions of the squats, organizing themselves politically, and seeking to
influence urban policymaking. But while this project involves a lot of action and agency, it also
involves squatters waiting for the moment when their claims will be finally met. In a way, the
project of existential mobility promoted by housing movements like the MSTC entails a more
abstract sense of waiting as well. It entails waiting for the progressive unfolding of citizenship à
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la Marshall, expecting citizenship’s “urge forward along the path” that leads to “a fuller measure
of equality” (18). As citizenship informs the movement’s horizon for political imagination, the
MSTC envisions a future in which its members will be duly recognized as “full citizens.” In this
perspective, the squat serves as a launching pad for squatters’ incorporation in the city’s
community of value.
In perhaps too schematic terms, this can be contrasted to the projects of existential mobility
and the horizons of the international migrants living in central São Paulo’s squats. A more
elaborate description and analysis of these will be developed in the next chapter, but some elements
of these projects and horizons can already be discerned based on this chapter. Many international
migrants encountered squats as a provisional space,146 that was conveniently located and
affordable. Depending on their resources, this space allowed them to make ends meet in the city,
to set some money aside for remittances and, in some cases, for a further migration, often to the
global North. Instead of seeing the squat as a place that could allow them to secure dignified
housing in the city and to be incorporated in the city’s community of value, these international
migrants tended to perceive the squats according to their subsistence needs and mobility goals
(both in terms of sending remittances to relatives and, sometimes, of saving money for a next trip).
Even for those who could not contemplate leaving Brazil in the near future, they were generally
unenthusiastic and skeptical about the prospect of struggling for years in a row to obtain some sort
of housing support from the Brazilian government—this particular project of existential mobility
did not seem to capture their aspirations. As I will discuss in the next chapter, for the most
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Here I am resorting to a common distinction between place and space that has been debated by geographers for
many decades. In simple terms, “place” can be understood as standing for meaningful locations, those that “people
are attached to in one way or another” (Cresswell 2004, 7), whereas “space” is a more abstract and undifferentiated
location (Agnew 2011). As I use these terms I do not intend to contribute to conceptual discussions on this distinction.
I simply use these terms because they help me express what I find to be important distinctions in the way squats can
be perceived by its inhabitants, especially when considering the contrasting horizons of MSTC and the international
migrants living in its squats.
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vulnerable migrants who had to live in the squat for their immediate survival, the sense of being
stuck seemed more prevalent than a sense of attachment to the city and building. 147 For those in
relatively more privileged circumstances, the squat might have been more of a space for pausing,
while they sought to gather resources to move on (either to better housing in the city or to a
different country altogether).

As Ghassan Hage (2005) points out, migrants’ sense of “stuckedness” often comes when their physical mobility
(their migration to another place) does not translate into the existential mobility they were searching for by migrating.
As he put it, “Often the trauma of migration sets in when one realizes that here too one has ended up being stuck, but
in an unfamiliar rather than a familiar surrounding” (474).
147
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Chapter Five: Beyond the horizon of the city (and of citizenship?)

Opening vignette: Destination Quebec

“Dieu est grand [God is great]!” read an unexpected Facebook Messenger text on my phone in
June of 2018, a couple of months after I had concluded my fieldwork in São Paulo. It was Philippe,
a Congolese migrant who was one of my main interlocutors in São Paulo, and who used to live in
a squat that was organized by a shadowy group (not by a housing movement). He was texting to
let me know that he, his wife, and their three children (one of whom was Brazilian) had made it
safely to Montréal, after a three-months-long arduous trip through Central America and the US. I
met them in their government-subsidized apartment in a Montréal suburb a month after receiving
the celebratory text. Their place had “three bedrooms, living room, kitchen, bathroom, etc.,” as
Philippe proudly informed me in his invitation, a clear contrast with their space in the São Paulo
squat.
When I first met Philippe in São Paulo, in December of 2017, he had immediately informed
me of his plans to migrate to Canada as soon as possible. 148 By then, he had already lived in Brazil
for longer than he had originally planned. He arrived in São Paulo from Luanda, Angola’s capital
city, in early 2016 with his wife (who was then three months pregnant) and two small children.
They came, he clarified, “searching for a better life,” but Brazil was a transition country, not the
place where they expected to live this desired better life. The economic crisis in Angola pushed
them to leave Luanda, but returning to the DRC, their country of origin, was not an option. Through
friends, they learned that visas to Brazil were relatively easy to obtain, and they hoped they would
be able to make and save enough money in São Paulo in order to be able to finally travel to Quebec.
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Interview with “Philippe.” São Paulo, December 2017.
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He originally tried to obtain a visa to migrate to Canada legally, but, after thoroughly researching
the idea with friends who shared this same goal, he decided that his family’s best bet was to make
the journey irregularly.
Quebec had been Philippe’s dream destination for exactly 20 years. According to him, in
1997, when he was a medicine student in Kinshasa, the Quebec government offered scholarships
to Congolese students for an exchange period in the francophone province. Philippe had applied
to the scholarship, but the ousting of then-president Mobutu Sese Seko interrupted the selection
process. For Philippe, the administration of Laurent-Dérisé Kabila, the leader of the rebel forces
that removed Mobutu from his office and the country, favoured students aligned with their politics,
frustrating Philippe’s plans. “That’s where my idea comes from. If God allows it, I’ll arrive there,
maybe next year. Because I came here working, saving, little by little, to see if I manage to get
there.”
Philippe’s time in São Paulo imposed a test on his faith and resolve to get to Quebec. The
arrival in itself had its hurdles. An Angolan friend was supposed to pick him and his family up
when they landed at São Paulo’s Guarulhos International Airport, but she was nowhere to be found.
Luckily, another woman from Angola, married to a friend of Philippe’s, found them looking
disoriented by the arrival gate and offered some guidance. Through her recommendation, they
stayed in a cheap hostel around the city centre, in the Brás neighbourhood. After three nights there,
however, when their savings were nearly gone, the Angolan friend who was supposed to meet
them at the airport finally reached out and called Philippe. She gave him the address of a municipal
government social assistance centre, where they found a vacancy for Phillipe’s pregnant wife and
two kids in a shelter, but not for him. He ended up spending a sleepless night on the dusty ground
of a square, with “no sheets or blankets.” Laughing, he remembers that he received a few “visitors”
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that night: some fat brown rats and the dogs of a homeless group staying on the other side of the
square. To his relief, however, the next day a Congolese woman who had heard of his situation
called him and told him she knew of a place by the city’s centre where they could live.
“Movement… something to do with housing…struggle…?” Philippe was not sure exactly
the name of the group organizing the squat he ended up living in for a little over two years. He
also did not know who the leader was, or “the number one,” as he put it. In contrast with the
MSTC’s squats, in this building, squatters were not asked to “participate” much. Philippe paid 200
Brazilian reais per month, plus a 10 reais fee for the cleaning of common areas, totalling about 60
Canadian dollars. Meetings were only called when an emergency erupted (for example, when they
received an eviction notice). The majority of his neighbours were also international migrants,
mostly from the DRC and Angola, but there were also some Brazilians and smaller groups from
other nationalities. He mentioned that once he was pressured by the “organization” to help squat
another building. At the dead of night, the migrants meandered the streets of downtown São Paulo,
the Brazilian squatters in the lead. Right after they arrived at the targeted building and the
Brazilians busted its door open, the police arrived. “I tell you, an African is always afraid of the
police and does everything to avoid trouble, especially the Angolan, the Congolese!” But Philippe
was relieved by the policemen’s “very fair” approach, as they only asked for everyone’s documents
for a background check and let all “foreigners” go. He thinks the police understood that “the
foreigners were naïve and didn’t know what was going on.”
Philippe had no complaints about conviviality in the squat. A Brazilian woman who stayed
by the building’s reception had married an African man. Also, the international migrants
sometimes got permission to throw wedding parties and play African music, and the Brazilian
neighbours were invited as well. But, overall, he said, “it’s natural, the Brazilians stay with the

205

Brazilians, the Africans with the Africans.” He thought international migrants like himself “didn’t
deserve to stay” at the squat. “Because the conditions we had in our countries were not like the
ones we’re living here now.” As we met at a public square near the squat he lived in, he explained,
“As a human being it’s not very dignified, right? As such, because in Angola…”—at this point
Philippe was interrupted by a homeless man begging for some change. “It’s tough right now,” he
said gently to the man, who just shook his head as he walked away. Unperturbed, Philippe went
on to explain that in Angola he had his own business selling construction and cleaning materials
to companies, but that in Brazil he worked as cleaner at a hospital. In Angola, they rented a house,
“where we had AC, a big living room, a 43-inch TV, we had bedrooms for the kids, a kitchen,” a
description that matched the Montréal apartment where I visited Philippe’s family in 2018.
Pointing to his phone while his wife cooked and his three kids played on a big touch-screen
TV in the living room of his Montréal apartment, Philippe mentioned that many of his former
neighbours at the São Paulo squat had been texting him for advice on how to get to Canada. His
family’s journey through Central America was more dangerous than they expected. With Angolan
documents, they were able to fly to Panama without a visa, avoiding the deadly jungle of the Darién
gap, between Colombia and Panama. After that point, they destroyed their Angolan and Brazilian
documents. Philippe thought that Costa Rica was a country that “really loves migrants,” as they
were given shelter and food on their way. The passage through Nicaragua proved traumatizing,
though, as they lost their youngest, Brazilian daughter, in a jungle over a never-ending half hour.
In the US, a Congolese friend who lived in Dallas gave them shelter for a few nights, allowing
them to recharge before their last and most anticipated border crossing. Having reached Quebec
“at last,” Philippe was optimistic. He believed his asylum claim would be approved by the
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Canadian government because he had gathered “heavy documents” proving he could not be
returned to the DRC. As I left the apartment, he assured me: “We came here to stay!”

Introduction

After having investigated the discourse, strategies, and horizons of housing movements organizing
squats in central São Paulo, and the fragile coalition between the MSTC and recently-arrived
international migrants, this chapter focuses on the international migrants’ side of the story,
analysing their particular horizons. On the one hand, the circumstances of these international
migrants can be seen as a recent manifestation of a characteristic urban phenomenon: the housing
and spatial segregation of disenfranchised newcomers to cities. As discussed in Chapter One and
illustrated in Chapter Two, those pushed to the urban margins (regardless of citizenship status)
tend to also be pushed to the margins of the city’s community of value, seen more as burdening
and threatening individuals than as rights-bearing and valued members of society. I have called
“eviction rooms” (a term borrowed from Carolina Maria de Jesus) these territories and forms of
housing produced by cities’ patterns of attraction and segregation of disenfranchised people,
spaces at once at the margins of the “city proper” and at the margins of citizenship (understood as
a virtuous identity). The international migrants who have recently joined disenfranchised
Brazilians (many of whom of domestic migrant origins) in central São Paulo’s squats are thus new
members to the city’s eviction rooms. These international migrants might face greater bureaucratic
obstacles and prejudices than their Brazilian neighbours, but their marginalization in the city is not
fundamentally distinct from that faced by the latter, or the marginalization faced by their
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predecessors throughout the city’s history. They end up joining the city’s legions of sem teto,
making up a relatively invisible subgroup among a stigmatized population.
On the other hand, despite this shared marginalization, these international newcomers do
not necessarily perceive their circumstances or have aspirations that are in sync with the agenda
of the housing movements they join. As we saw, the agenda of housing movements such as the
MSTC can be seen as, in essence, seeking to insert the sem teto into the city’s community of value,
demanding that they be recognized as full citizens, who are deserving of rights (especially the right
to housing). Citizenship informs their horizon of political imagination; the elusive ideal of “full
citizenship” structures their notion of what the sem teto should strive for. However, I argue that
the horizon of citizenship, at least in how it is articulated in São Paulo, does not capture the
imagination and aspirations of many of the international migrants living in central São Paulo’s
squats. Recently arrived in the city and generally disillusioned with the reality they find in it
(unemployment or low-paying jobs, the city’s high rents, and racism), they are not easily motivated
to commit to years of struggle alongside Brazilians for more inclusive urban policies and durable
housing in the city. Among these newcomers, some still have hopes of securing better living
standards in the city in the near future, while others actively seek to leave São Paulo and Brazil for
a more prosperous destination. But in either case, their conceptions of what their futures could
entail are not necessarily delimited by the boundaries of São Paulo or Brazil. In constant contact
with relatives, friends, and other connections in different countries, these international migrants
have horizons extending far beyond the local geography. Their horizons are broader than those of
many of their Brazilian neighbours and of housing movements such as the MSTC. Given that, they
have not been generally inclined to put their efforts into trying to belong to São Paulo’s community
of value and to fight for their “full citizenship” in the city.
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In this chapter, I focus on those international migrants that, as Philippe, have approached
São Paulo’s downtown squats as a launching pad for their mobility plans. Some of them arrived in
the city already regarding it as a steppingstone to a country in the global North, while others
oriented themselves towards these mobility plans after feeling disillusioned with their standards of
living in the city. While I do not mean to convey that all international migrants living in São
Paulo’s squats have concrete plans to migrate to the global North, I believe it is fair to say that the
possibility of moving to a country perceived as more prosperous is part of the horizons of many,
especially those who are connected to wide-ranging migration networks. Such broad horizons
impact their willingness to commit to a local and long-term struggle for durable housing in the
city.
Instead of insisting on their right to housing or to other social rights in São Paulo,
international migrants such as Philippe showed a sense of a right to international mobility—hence,
they articulated a more cosmopolitan outlook, in line with Loren B. Landau and Iriann
Freemantle’s (2010) conception of a “tactical” kind of cosmopolitanism. I analyse how some of
these international migrants might frame the legitimacy of their mobility plans in religious terms
and in terms of a never-ending colonial extraction of their countries’ resources. In articulating a
discourse that legitimizes their mobility across borders regardless of authorization by states, they
critique the prerogative of state sovereignty which sustains national citizenship regimes.
Nevertheless, they simultaneously aspire to secure rights and welfare in more prosperous
countries, thereby not clearly expressing an alternative vision of political association beyond
citizenship.
In order to explore these points, I first turn to a discussion of the presence of international
migrants in squats that are not organized by housing movements, but that are run by shadowy
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groups that simply charge “rent” from those living in such buildings—for lack of a better term, I
call these spaces “for-profit squats.” These types of squats have attracted many more recentlyarrived international migrants than those organized by housing movements. I explain how these
squats function and suggest how international migrants’ greater presence in these buildings (rather
than in those run by housing movements) makes sense considering their aspirations. After that, I
will discuss the migration networks developed by Congolese and Angolan migrants who constitute
the main national groups in these for-profit squats, and how their migration networks might inform
their approach to the city and to citizenship. The rest of the chapter analyses the perspective of
Congolese and Angolan migrants on their experiences in Brazil and on their desired futures.

“For-profit squats”: vulnerability and freedom

As we saw in the last two chapters, life in a squat organized by a housing movement is
characterized by some heavy demands. One does not simply move into a place that is affordable
in this case; one becomes a member of a political movement, and one is expected to act as such.
Active participation and rule-compliance are required alongside the monthly financial
contribution, and all residents are incessantly encouraged to fight collectively for a durable and
dignified housing solution in the city. But many recently-arrived international migrants in São
Paulo lack clear prospects of staying in the city or even in Brazil; they generally have little or no
sense of belonging to either, and they often find their circumstances in São Paulo below their
ambitions and desires. A squat organized by a housing movement might be an affordable and welllocated dwelling, but the movement’s insistence on fighting together for something one is not
necessarily seeking can cause tensions. Nevertheless, as mentioned, this is not the only kind of
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squat found in São Paulo’s central districts. Many squats are organized by shadowy groups that
charge cheap “rent” for each occupied unit and do not require much else from residents. Not
surprisingly, disenfranchised international migrants who have arrived in the city in recent years
(and who are not necessarily committed to staying and fighting for rights in the city) are more
commonly found in these types of squats. Some of these buildings are even almost exclusively
inhabited by non-Brazilians.
These for-profit squats seem to have proliferated in the city in recent years (Earle
2017,11).149 My interviews with international migrants living in such squats relied on visits to two
particular buildings situated in the neighbourhoods of Consolação and Santana. 150 Political
engagement in these types of squats is limited: residents find no systematic preaching in them
about citizenship or the right to housing, and those organizing the squat do not take seats in
participatory councils or seek to influence urban policies in other ways. The “leader” or “leaders”
of these squats are unknown to the residents, but the entrances of these buildings often have an
“administration.” Cleaning of common areas and the handling of garbage are usually done by a
hired worker, and meetings are only held when an emergency comes up (for example, if they
receive an eviction order, or if the power is out). Still, squatters might be asked to protest or camp
in front of government buildings (such as the city hall) to contest eviction, and they are often
requested to participate in the squatting of new buildings, as happened to Philippe.
Residents of for-profit squats are arguably exposed to further risks than those of squats
organized by “serious” housing movements. As the money paid, and not participation, is the basic
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Interview with Luiz Kohara. São Paulo, February 2018.
While Consolação is at the very heart of São Paulo’s centre, Santana is a part of an “expanded” centre; it is
technically in São Paulo’s North Zone, bordering the central neighbourhood of Bom Retiro. It is a well-equipped
residential and commercial neighbourhood, and the intensely-used Portuguesa-Tietê bus and subway station is situated
in it.
150

211

requirement for living in these places, those who are not able to meet their financial obligations 151
are often subject to violent harassment and to ultimately being evicted from the building. Benedito
Barbosa, a lawyer representing many of the city’s housing movements, emphasises that the groups
organizing these squats, instead of seeking to “requalify” the spaces and turn them into safe, even
if temporary, dwellings, make the buildings even more precarious spaces to live in. As he puts it,
these “sleazebag” (picareta) groups “increase the precarity because they divide the spaces even
further, to sublet to more people, you know? And later, when there’s an eviction, sometimes these
people disappear and the migrants are left behind, all by themselves, at the mercy of the police.” 152
Additionally, and connected to this point, the physical structures of these buildings are often more
precarious and in much more deteriorated conditions than in the MSTC’s squats, for example.
Housing movements generally work closely with architects and engineers sympathetic to their
cause, and promote renovations designed to make buildings safer. Safety measures, such as the
installation of fire hydrants, are common in these squats. A tragic example of the material risks
faced by residents of for-profit squats emerged in the early hours of 1 May 2018, when a 24-storey
squatted tower caught on fire and collapsed in central São Paulo. 153 This squat was organized by a
shadowy group and 25 percent of the dwellers were international migrants, mostly from Angola.
Risks of sudden evictions are also greater in such squats, even though many of the groups
organizing them also go to court against property owners (to elongate their permeance and profits,
not to press for the building to be converted into social housing).

Following housing movement’s lingo, those administering these squats often refer to the monthly payment charged
as a “contribution,” not as a rent. They sometimes also use the term “maintenance.” The prices charged vary; my sense
is that they usually go from 200 to 500 Brazilian reais per month (between 60 and 140 Canadian dollars).
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Interview with Benedito Barbosa. São Paulo, February 2018.
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This episode was mentioned in Chapter Two’s introduction.
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Hence, there are important differences between these squats and those organized by
housing movements. Still, those organizing for-profit squats generally seek to project the idea that
they are also engaged in a political struggle for the urban poor’s access to dignified housing. In
this regard, they literally create a façade, pretending to be one of the city’s housing movements:
on the front walls of these buildings one often sees painted acronyms made up with some of the
key terms found in the names of actual hosing movements (some combination of “housing,”
“rights,” “movement,” “struggle,” and “roofless”). The strategic forging of a sham housing
movement identity allows the groups behind these squats to extend their stay in the buildings. The
sham identity might be useful if the authorities in power are open to the demands of housing
movements and prone to negotiating with them. Both the Santana and the Consolação squats had
a generic housing movement name graffitied on their front wall. The reception of the Consolação
building also had a sign with the title “We are an Association of Residents NGO of Private Nature
and Non-Public,” which listed the regulations of the squat. These were generally similar to those
found in the MSTC’s statute (no drugs, no violence, etc.), but a telling exception was that it
included the “prohibition” to “take information about the building to another movement, under the
risk of exclusion.”
Some for-profit squats have been charged with being associated with Brazil’s most
powerful criminal organization, PCC (Primeiro Comando da Capital, i.e. First Command of the
Capital), which is mainly known for its drug trafficking activities. This was the case of the Cine
Marrocos, a building that symbolizes the rise and fall of central São Paulo’s status in the city. Built
in 1940, the movie theatre used to be the biggest and most luxurious of its kind in Latin America,
with a capacity for 1870 movie-goers. It was shut down in 1972, during the process of
“abandonment” of the downtown area. Taken by squatters repeated times in the decades following
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its closure, in 2015, the building had large red MSTS (Roofless Movement of São Paulo) signs
hanging by its sumptuous entrance. According to São Paulo’s police, the building was the
headquarters of PCC, a place where members of the group met monthly. During the squat’s
eviction in 2016, five long guns and 200 knives were found in the building’s rooftop water
reservoir (G1 2016). “Marrocos was dan-ger-ous,” summarized Rosine, a Congolese woman who
had lived in this squat for three months (which, for her, “felt more like three years”). 154 Rosine
told me that those organizing the squat were disrespectful, swore all the time, and would frequently
beat up residents. A rumour ran among the residents that the building had a hidden cemetery for
PCC’s enemies. Even though there are no reports of this cemetery ever being found, this rumour
illustrates the environment of fear squatters lived in at “Marrocos.”155
Despite the greater precarity and even deadly risks found in for-profit squats, international
migrants mostly live in these kinds of squats. The housing movements of central São Paulo do not
seem to generally discriminate against international migrants seeking housing. Some international
migrants living in for-profit squats that I interviewed had heard of the MSTC’s squats, but they
thought that it was better to stay where they were because they had more freedom, i.e. less demands
on their time and energy. The fact that one can immediately move into for-profit squats seems to
contribute to these buildings being more sought after by international migrants. For those recentlyarrived from far away and in urgent need of an affordable place to live, these buildings are more

Interview with “Rosine.” São Paulo, March 2018.
One of the greatest concerns of those leading housing movements is that their work should not be confused with
the purportedly criminal activities of for-profit squats. Still, many media outlets and politicians tend to see all squatting
as equally criminal and refuse to separate the wheat from the chaff, i.e. to distinguish those who are “exploiting” the
poor (and might be associated with criminal gangs) from those who are “assisting” them or waging a legitimate
political fight. Carmen’s insistence on the MSTC being “within the state,” while criminal organizations are often
described as parallel states, makes sense in this context. This is a point also raised by scholar Lucy Earle (2017, 232),
when she states that “The potential for criminalization and association with underworld gangs means that organized
housing movements have to work harder than ever to convince the authorities that they are not troublemakers or
vandals.”
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accessible than those run by a housing movement—they do not need to wait weeks attending base
meetings in order to be allowed to bring in their suitcases and other belongings. For those who are
trying to save money for remittances and/or a further international migration, these squats might
also be more advantageous, as there are no demands on squatters’ participation in collective chores
or attending meetings.
Most of the international migrants that I interviewed, who were living in for-profit squats
in downtown São Paulo, were either from Angola or from the DRC. I did not conduct a survey
profiling the international migrants living in these types of squats, but, according to different
international migrants and NGO workers that I interviewed in the city, these seem to be the two
main nationalities found in these squats. While international migrants tend to be a minority in
squats run by housing movements, in many for-profit squats they constitute the majority. For
example, in December of 2017 a for-profit squat commonly referred to as “Ipiranga” (the name of
the neighbourhood where it was located) was evicted, and, according to Náthalie Guimarães, a
Brazilian lawyer who assisted the evicted migrants, 17 of the 18 families living there were of
international migrants from the DRC and Angola. 156 Both the squat in the Cosolação and Santana
neighbourhoods, according to interviewed residents, had a majority of Congolese and Angolan
migrants, but also some Brazilians and families from other nationalities.157 In the next section I
focus on the migration networks built by Angolan and Congolese migrants, highlighting the key
role that these networks play in informing these international migrants’ trajectories, their approach
to squats, and their horizons of future possibilities.
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Interview with Náthalie Guimarães. São Paulo, January 2018.
The Santana squat had a more heterogeneous configuration than the one in Consolação. Among the other
nationalities also found in it, there were mainly Bolivians and Haitians, but also Peruvians, a few Chinese migrants,
Nigerians, migrants from other African countries (mostly from West Africa), and even Filipinas who had come to São
Paulo to serve as care workers in the homes of the city’s wealthiest.
157
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The expanded horizons brought by migration networks

When visiting squats in downtown São Paulo (both those organized by housing movements and
the for-profit ones), I was often confused about whether some international migrants I had not
interviewed were from Angola or the DRC. Among themselves, they often spoke a language I
came to recognize as Lingala (the many French words that dot it made recognition easier). Lingala
is the lingua franca of the DRC and Congo-Brazzaville,158 but it is far from being a representative
language in Angola.159 When I asked the Angolan migrants why they spoke Lingala, they often
referred to forced migrations caused by war as being responsible for the spreading of the language
in Angola. An Angolan man whose family had mixed Angolan and Congolese origins explained
the difficulty in separating the two nationalities thus:

But it’s a bit this problem of distinguishing two people, because the Angolan, you meet an
Angolan [in Brazil], when you start talking to the Angolan, maybe he’s a Congolese and
you don’t notice the difference. Why? Our countries after so many wars are mixtures of
people, that crossed each other and speak Lingala, [and] have the same culture. Because
you meet a family and a part of it lives here, another part lives on the other side [of the
border]. You find in the same family, there’s a person who is Congolese, there’s a person
who is Angolan. There’s no way of telling them apart. And then the way they introduce
Lingala is “spoken as a first and additional language primarily in DRC, the Republic of Congo (Congo-Brazzaville),
and in parts of four neighboring central African states: northwestern Angola (including the cities of Luanda and
Cabinda), eastern Gabon, southern Central African Republic, and southwestern Sudan” (Bokamba 2009, 51).
159
I could not find estimates of the absolute number or the percentage of Lingala speakers in Angola. Portuguese is
Angola’s official language, but the country has 20 national languages. The most-spoken national language is Umbundo
(26%), followed by Kimbundo (20%). Lingala is not commonly listed among Angola’s national languages.
Information available at: http://www.fao.org/tc/cplpunccd/paginas-nacionais/angola/en/
158
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themselves, maybe they’ll say they’re Congolese, but they might have both nationalities. 160

Previous research on Angolan migrants and refugees in Brazil had already highlighted this
particular ethnic profile. Since the 1980s, Angolan asylum-seekers arriving in Brazil seem to have
come mostly from the Bakongo ethnic group, which speaks both Kikongo and Lingala, and is
found in Angola, the DRC and Congo Brazzaville (Petrus and Francalino 2008, 3). Armed conflicts
in Angola and the DRC have pushed this and other ethnic groups of the region back and forth
across regional borders. Angola went through a bloody war of independence against Portugal
between 1961 and 1975. Peace, however, was not obtained with national liberation, and a 27-yearlong civil war ensued right after. The long-drawn-out conflict produced, in addition to innumerable
deaths, the destruction of much of the country’s basic infrastructure and the displacement of an
estimated four million people. Many of these refugees went to, among other neighbouring
countries, the DRC (named Zaire until 1997).
While corruption and political turmoil have continued to plague Angola, between the late
2000s and 2014, the country’s economy grew exponentially with the rise in international oil prices.
During this period, many Angolans returned to their country (including those who had lived in the
DRC and built families there). Many regional migrants and hundreds of thousands of refugees also
went to Angola in this period. As Joana, an Angolan woman living in the Santana squat, put it,
during this period of economic growth, nobody in Angola “dreamed of coming to Brazil;” instead,
“many Africans were dreaming of going to Angola, leaving Congo, leaving Nigeria.” 161 Indeed,
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Interview with “Jacques,” an Angolan man living in for-profit squat. São Paulo, March 2018.
Interview with “Joana.” São Paulo, January 2018.
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with the DRC plunged in an intractable conflict for the past three decades, hundreds of thousands
of Congolese, some of whom of mixed Angolan origins, have crossed into Angola. 162
The DRC is currently described by the UNHCR (n.d.b) as “one of the most complex and
challenging humanitarian situations worldwide, with multiple conflicts affecting several parts of
its vast territory.” Fighting, raging since 1996, has been incited by the country’s great mineral
wealth; it has large deposits of coltan, cassiterite, wolframite, and gold, which are used to produce
massively consumed technological products such as phones and laptops, as well as jewellery. Most
of the Congolese migrants I met during fieldwork were from Kinshasa, which is not considered a
frontline area for inter-ethnic and political violence in the country—North and South Kivu and
Ituri are currently considered the most critical areas (UNHCR 2019a).
All of the Congolese migrants I met in São Paulo had lived in Angola (most often in the
capital city, Luanda) before migrating to Brazil. Most of the Angolans I met were from Luanda.
Both the Congolese and the Angolans who had been living in Luanda had lost jobs, investments,
or their own businesses with the crashing of the Angolan economy since 2014, when oil prices
began falling sharply. Given the country’s dependency on the commodity—45 percent of its GDP
came from the oil and gas sector (Sieff 2016)— a severe social crisis ensued in Angola, with a
drastic deterioration of public services, a spike in prices of basic food items, and thousands of
deaths due to preventable diseases (such as malaria and yellow fever). 163 While in the previous
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In 2017 the DRC was the seventh main source country of refugees in the world. Most Congolese refugees are
hosted by neighbouring countries. Uganda is the main destination, with an estimated total of 226,200 Congolese
refugees, followed by Rwanda (82,800), Burundi (61,900), Tanzania (56,900), Angola (38,500), Zambia (34,900),
South Sudan (15,000), and the Republic of Congo (12,300) (UNHRC 2017). These numbers, however, do not account
for the many Congolese refugees who are undocumented or who forged local documents in order to survive in these
neighbouring countries. This undercounting was made clear recently, with the Angolan government’s crackdown on
Congolese refugees living in the country, which led to the forcible return of around 200 thousand people in October
of 2018 (Information available at: https://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/2018/10/5bc59dcb4/mass-congolesereturns-angola-lead-humanitarian-crisis.html. Accessed 1 March 2019).
163
For more on this, see https://www.reuters.com/article/us-angola-health-malaria-idUSKCN0XN0EY. Accessed 7
March 2020.
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years there was an expectation that Angola could become a “New Dubai,” when the economic
crisis began, “everyone began leaving Angola,” explains Joana. “That’s why you see many
Angolans leaving Angola, coming to Brazil. The Congolese too.”
Thus, the Congolese and Angolan migrants living in São Paulo’s downtown squats tend to
be part of very particular and connected subgroups from both countries. The Angolans were mainly
Lingala-speaking (again, far from being a nationally representative group) from Luanda and the
Congolese had previously lived in Angola, mainly Luanda. 164 The latter also often had Angolan
documents, which were either legitimate (due to parental origins) or forged during their stay in the
country. We can see this as signalling the existence of migration networks constituted by Angolans
(many of whom Lingala-speaking) and by Congolese migrants who had been living in Angola
before moving to Brazil. 165 Migration networks “are sets of interpersonal ties that connect
migrants, former migrants, and non-migrants in origin and destination areas through ties of
kinship, friendship, and shared community origin. They increase the likelihood of international
movement because they lower the costs and risks of movement and increase the expected net
returns to migration. Network connections constitute a form of social capital that people can draw
upon…” (Massey et al. 1993)
Another important aspect of these networks and of migrants’ worldview more broadly is
the central role that their families (often extended families) often play in their mobility and
aspirations. Research on the African diaspora has consistently stressed how these migrants are
traditionally under strong social pressure to contribute to the wellbeing of relatives who stayed in
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A survey carried out by Rosana Baeninger and Roberta G. Peres (2017, 106) showed that Angola was the main
country of passage or previous residence for West African migrants before arriving to São Paulo.
165
In Rio de Janeiro, recently-arrived migrants from both countries have formed an Ango-Congolese association that
highlights the cultural-linguistic ties of this community, and which facilitates and supports the arrival of AngoCongolese migrants to Brazil (Petrus and Francalino 2008).
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the country of origin (Tiemoko 2004; Fleischer 2007). Strong kin ties and a sense of community
among extended family members render individual mobility into a family project. For example,
Kankonde Bukasa Peter’s (2010) research with migrants from the DRC, Somalia, and
Mozambique living in South Africa argues that these migrants remit not so much for material
reasons but for affective reasons: remittances allow them to foster familial belonging and to
improve social status in the community of origin, where they are perceived as successful and
contributing family members. The African migrants that I interviewed during fieldwork often
referred to the need to support relatives in their countries of origin, and how this responsibility also
influenced their decision to live in a squat. The relatively low “rent” charged in these buildings
allowed them or boosted their ability to set some money aside for remittances. For instance,
Jacques from Angola, explained to me that by living in the squat he was able to remit about 100
Brazilian reais every month to his aging mother. But his family obligations went beyond that, as
he clarified: “Perhaps we Africans live differently from you [Brazilians]. When a Brazilian works
his salary is only for him, maybe also for his wife, for his kids. But not for us. If my brother falls
sick, he will ask me for help. If he goes to a hospital, and the doctor tells him he has to pay an X
amount, he will ask me to pay for it. This doesn’t happen to you.”166
If transnational family ties give migrants a strong sense of purpose and responsibility, the
broader networks they build with other people on the move provide them valuable information for
the success of their mobility. These migration networks constituted by Angolan and Congolese
migrants provide information for those who seek to migrate to São Paulo. Through them,
prospective migrants learn about the possibility of and path to obtaining a tourist visa to Brazil.
They also learn about their options for regularization once they arrive in Brazil. As illustrated in
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Interview with “Jacques” São Paulo, March 2018.

220

Philippe’s story, in addition to providing information for the migration of these AngolanCongolese individuals to São Paulo, these networks also support their navigation of the city.
Through their networks, these migrants learn which NGOs or municipal government offices can
provide assistance and provisional accommodation. They also learn about squats as a sub-optimal
form of accommodation that nonetheless allows them to survive and perhaps gather resources in
the city. Finally, those living in these squats who are trying to migrate to prosperous destination in
the global North also rely on these networks for guidance. By visiting neighbours and exchanging
information through social media (most commonly WhatsApp and Facebook Messenger), these
international migrants obtain advice on what routes to take, what documents to apply for, and they
are able to follow those who have already began their journey or arrived in a desired destination.167
When talking to Phillipe (from the opening vignette) while he was still living in São Paulo,
he often pointed to his phone and showed me some messages from friends updating him with
information on how to obtain a visa to a European or North American country, or with tips on the
perilous journey through Central America. (Notice that later, when I met him in Montréal, he was
on the other side of this exchange.) As he explained it, the squat he lived in had a high “turnover,”
with international migrants moving in, saving resources within some months to a few years,
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As discussed in the Introduction, these networks of support and shared knowledges, which often operate off the
radar of the state, are interpreted by authors associated with the Autonomy of Migration approach as constituting the
“mobile commons” (Papadopoulos and Tsianos 2013), a political ontology that transcends state citizenship. While I
agree with this literature’s perspective that we can find social worlds both precarious and vibrant in the networks
developed by irregularized migrants, I do not clearly see in the networks that pervade central São Paulo’s squats the
creation of an alternative to or complete refusal of the order of the state and citizenship. The international migrants
living in São Paulo’s squats both sought the state’s recognition (as they applied for asylum or permanent residency in
Brazil, for example) and support (in accessing public hospitals, schools, and applying for social benefits), while also
creating paths that did not necessarily respect the state’s authority (by squatting private property, and also when they
seek to cross international borders without authorization). Also, even if we consider their experiences beyond Brazil
and their undocumented crossing of international borders, I agree with McNevin (2013) that it is difficult to discern
in the mobile commons the contours of an alternative form of political community and association. I am also wary of
romanticizing these precarious networks and implying that those who constitute them might be invested in radical
projects of undermining the institution of citizenship per se (and not just a key component of it, i.e. the control over
national borders).
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planning their next steps, and moving out for the next stage of their journeys. I cannot say whether
this is representative of the migration aspirations or trajectories of most Angolan and Congolese
migrants who arrived in São Paulo in recent years—many have settled in the city for years in a
row, forming a community in peripheral neighbourhoods, especially in the east zone of the city.
But perhaps downtown squats, especially the for-profit ones, attract mostly those who do not
intend to stay in the city in the long-run and who are trying to gather resources for a next trip, in
addition to those who are in immediate need of shelter.
While there are no reliable statistics on these journeys, recent news reports have been
showing the formation of an unexpected transnational route connecting West Africa, Brazil, and
North America. In June of 2019, pressed by the American administration, Mexican officials urged
Brazilian authorities to take measures to curb irregular cross-border flows towards central America
(Veja 2019). Brazil is seen as the main country of arrival of international migrants from beyond
South America who take the Central American route towards the United States. In February of
2019, 17 Congolese migrants who were trying to reach the US drowned in an overcrowded boat
crossing from Colombia to Panama; they were part of a group of 150 Congolese migrants who
used to live in São Paulo’s periphery. A fuller portrayal of these journeys was produced by the
network France 24 in April of 2018 (Rihouay 2018). The video report tried to track the five-month
“odyssey” of a Congolese family from São Paulo to Canada through Central America. In the video,
this route, characterized by the show’s host as “inconceivable,” begins in the Congolese family’s
home in São Paulo.168 Even though the report does not mention it, I am confident the followed
family was living in a squat; the ample room divided with fabrics and the dark corridor built with
thin pink plywood give it away. The role of social media in allowing for international migrants in
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The report stops following the Congolese family when they reach Tijuana in Mexico. It then follows a Nigerian
young man crossing from Plattsburg, New York, to Canada.
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São Paulo to obtain information about the route is also visible in the video. Before the Congolese
family leaves their São Paulo home, the father is shown listening to a message from a man
informing him of how he crossed the border between Brazil and Peru.
In sum, the Congolese and Angolan squatters of downtown São Paulo can be seen as part
of migration networks that have supported their long-distance mobility, their subsistence in the
city, and, in some cases, their paths out of it. They are also deeply connected to extended family
members towards whom they have a strong sense of responsibility. This is relevant because it
gives us a sense of the horizons of future possibility of these international migrants. Like many
international migrants of other origins found in São Paulo’s downtown squats (especially those
from beyond South America), they have access to information and guidance from fellow
international migrants located in different countries, including in countries perceived as more
prosperous. Hence, the migration networks they constitute and feed not only help them arrive and
survive in São Paulo, but also inform their horizons of what sort of futures are available to them.
This is in keeping with previous research on migration networks, which has shown how these
networks’ effects go from offering support, advice, and information related to the migration and
settlement processes, to shaping people’s views on their mobility, discouraging or encouraging
subsequent movements (Bakewell et al. 2016). In the case of the Angolan and Congolese squatters
in downtown São Paulo, their migration networks present to them alternative paths beyond the city
(and towards the global North). These alternative paths might not be pursued by many, either
because they choose to stay in São Paulo, or because they lack the resources to leave the city. But
these alternative paths inform their notions of what they could possibly achieve (their horizons),
and I believe they influence their reluctance to commit to a struggle for rights and dignity in a city
that often frustrates their desire for existential mobility. Their “struggle” is not so much tied to
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housing in São Paulo, but imbued with notions of solidarity, belonging, and commitment through
strong family ties. In the next sections, we turn to these migrants’ perspectives on São Paulo and
their aspired futures.

São Paulo as steppingstone, São Paulo as disillusionment

Some migrants, such as Philippe, have migrated to São Paulo regarding it as a steppingstone to a
country of the global North (Canada). The city might be seen as a first stop, a non-ideal temporary
place that can nonetheless enable international migrants to move to their desired, final destination.
Despite the fact that the Brazilian embassy in Luanda has hardened the issuing of visas since 2017,
during my fieldwork, Brazil still seemed to be perceived by many international migrants as a
country of accessible visas compared to desired destinations in the global North. São Paulo, or
Brazil more broadly, may work as a steppingstone through two main ways that are not mutually
exclusive: it can be a country that allows international migrants to save some money for migrating
to the global North, and/or it can be a country where they may obtain permanent residency, which,
some hope, would strengthen their bids for a tourist visa in a European or North American country.
The former was Philippe’s case, as he hoped to be able to make and save more money in
Brazil than he was managing to do in Angola since the beginning of the economic crisis. The
money he set aside in his two years living in a squat allowed him to pay for his and his family’s
long and expensive trip through Central America guided by human smugglers. The latter option
was more fully explained to me by Jorge, an Angolan man who worked at a social assistance
municipal office in 2017. 169 According to him, many African migrants pursue permanent residency

169

Interview with “Jorge.” São Paulo, October 2017.
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in Brazil as a way to support their visa applications to mostly European countries. Seated behind
a small desk in a bare office, Jorge, who spoke Portuguese, French, Lingala, and “other African
languages,” explained to me that the main countries of origin of those who sought the office’s
assistance were Angola and the DRC, so his language abilities were much in demand. Even before
I could ask him why he thought people from those countries had been arriving in São Paulo in
recent years, he commented that most Africans saw their stay in Brazil as a step towards migrating
to Europe. “They think it is easier to come to Brazil, work here and get documentation, then try to
reach Europe from Brazil,” he explained. Since asylum applications take years to be processed,
these migrants have a better chance of obtaining permanent residency in Brazil by either marrying
a Brazilian or having a baby in the country, and the latter was a more common option. According
to Jorge, the belief among many African migrants is that European border officers would be laxer
towards Africans with permanent residency in Brazil, assuming they would return to Brazil instead
of overstaying their tourist visas.
However, some African migrants framed their aspirations to migrate to a country in the
global North as a product of their disillusionment with their living standards in São Paulo, and not
as part of an original plan. Joana, for example, is an Angolan woman who I met in 2018 and who
had lived in a for-profit squat since her arrival in São Paulo in 2016. She landed in Brazil pregnant
and accompanied by her young daughter. Her first address in the city was the Santana squat, and
she initially stayed in the space of Lorence, a friend from Angola, before finding one for her family
in the same building. She landed a part-time job selling subway tickets, which paid her a minimum
wage. Her husband managed to obtain a tourist visa in Luanda on his second attempt, having joined
her in the city a few months after her arrival. I interviewed Joana and Laurence in Joana’s stuffy
but well-lit space in a for-profit squat. We sat by a small square table, surrounded by a big TV, an
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old couch, and some hard-side suitcases piled up on a corner. Our conversation was constantly
interrupted by her one-year-old Brazilian daughter’s attempts to get her mom’s attention, and
Joana also had to check every now and then on the rice she was cooking in the tiny kitchen by the
entrance to the room. When I asked her whether she had come to Brazil with the intention of
staying, she answered:

So, for us, for me, I came here searching for a better life, but with the life conditions that
I’m finding here, one can’t live here. Because I can’t stay forever here in the squat building.
No. Because maybe they [the owners] will ask for the building back and will take me out
of here. If I try to rent a house outside of here, and with the salary I make, 800 reais and
so, I can’t, it’s not possible… We came to Brazil searching for a better life, right? But we
are not finding it, so we have to leave! 170

When I asked her where she wanted to leave to, she referred to knowing many people who were
living in France. She conceded that the main obstacle for getting there was the visa, which was
much harder to obtain than the Brazilian one. Later, when I was leaving, she insisted on walking
with me to the entrance of the squat and, along our way down the dark and graffitied stairs, she
mentioned that her husband had been looking into ways to migrate to Canada. He had already
applied for a US visa but received a rejection.
Some migrants I met, like Joana, were vocal in expressing their criticisms of their living
conditions in São Paulo, and they attributed to these conditions their intentions to migrate to North
America or Europe. Their criticisms were centred on the difficulty of making enough money in
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Interview with “Joana.” São Paulo, January 2018.
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the city in order to have a life that met their ambitions and desires, as well as their imperative to
send remittances to relatives back home. “Because with a good wage we could easily live here in
Brazil,” Joana concluded. While some migrants denied the existence of racism in Brazil or did not
find it relevant for their frustrating experiences in São Paulo, Joana thought it was, after the low
wages, the main problem in Brazil, and also a reason for wanting to leave the country. She was
surprised to find racism in São Paulo; she said she “knew that Brazil is a country that was, that has
many of the black race, and a country where many Africans entered in the times of Brazil’s
history,” referring to the country’s over 300 years of enslaving trafficked Africans. She first
became aware of racist behaviours when she noticed that white Brazilians would swap seats in the
subway when she sat beside them. Laurence had already warned her that would happen, but she
thought it was a joke. Later, when applying for a job at a company, she said the receptionist was
refusing to accept the CVs of all the African migrants, which made the group collectively complain
to her about the unjust discrimination. But Joana thinks racism is not just a problem faced by
African migrants, but by black Brazilians as well. “I also noted this in Brazil, that when it’s a black
Brazilian, all of them work with cleaning, but when it’s a white one, they work at the reception.
Why? I noticed that. This can’t happen!”, she complained.
Joana’s neighbour Loid, who was Congolese, echoed her criticisms. Even though he did
not mention racism, Loid was also very vocal about his disillusionment with the reality he found
in São Paulo, and he attributed to his precarious living and working conditions in the city his
intention to migrate to Europe. He arrived alone in Brazil from Luanda in February 2016 and
stayed in a shelter run by the NGO Missão Paz. His wife joined him in the city three weeks later,
and, because there was no vacancy for her in the same shelter, they moved into the squat following
the recommendation of a Congolese friend. Their space originally had only two mattresses on the
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floor, donated by Missão Paz. Loid found a job as a “helper of diverse services,” in an urban
maintenance company doing outsourced work for the municipal government. According to him,
his job post “doesn’t exist in the world, only in our company, only in Brazil.” 171 Pointing to an Xray of his spine, he explained it is a “machine’s job” which had recently caused him a back injury.
He wakes up at four in the morning and spends his workdays “carrying 200, 300 bags of rubble,
throwing it on trucks,” landscaping squares, and “cleaning poop from the streets,” among other
tasks that come up. Whenever he complained to his boss or co-workers that the work is too
physically demanding, degrading, or that he is tired, they would tell him the phrase “Here it’s
Brazil!” (Aqui é Brasil!). He thinks this wretched expression encapsulates the exploitation and
marginalization he found in Brazil. He suggested that “Here it’s Brazil!” should be the title of my
dissertation.

When you arrive in Brazil, you don’t have the thought of leaving, you don’t. You want to
stay, but when you understand Brazil, when you understand this sentence “Here it’s
Brazil,” you have to leave. We are leaving Africa to come here to live, our view of Brazil
in Africa is that here people live well, that everything is very good. Did you understand?

As Loid summarizes it, “Brazil is now famous, it is receiving migrants, but migrants are suffering.”
When his wife got pregnant, they decided to ask their relatives back in Africa to sell a property
they owned so they could afford his wife and their baby’s trip to Portugal. They managed to obtain
a tourist visa and, when we met in early 2018, Loid explained that his wife and baby were staying
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Interview with “Loid.” São Paulo, February 2018.
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in a shelter for asylum-seekers in Portugal, where they were very well fed, and that the government
would soon find them a proper home to rent. He was still trying to save money to join them.
Loid contrasts the hardships he has found in Brazil with the comfort and dignity his wife
and baby were offered in Europe. His analysis is centred on Brazil’s socioeconomic inequality:
“Here in Brazil, politics doesn’t want to give a chance to the poorest. The people who are in the
lower classes have no chance to climb up. If you are poor, you remain poor. If you are rich, you
become richer.” In contrast, he thinks that once a migrant is “within the Schengen space,” there is
respect for human rights (he says droit de l’homme, in French). In Brazil, he explains, “it looks
like there are human rights, but it only looks like there are. Here everything only looks like.” For
him, even social services such as public health are nothing but appearances in Brazil. As he put it,
these services are de maiuia, an expression from Angolan Portuguese meaning fake or a mock-up.
Finally, the story of Rosine, the previously-mentioned Congolese migrant who lived in the
Marrocos squat (controlled by PCC), shows that these feelings of disillusionment and this
orientation towards other places can stay with international migrants even after they have spent
many years living in Brazil. Rosine had already been living in the country for ten years when we
met, but she lived in Rio before moving moving to São Paulo. In contrast to her expectations
informed by the glamorous images she had seen in Brazilian novelas (soap operas) broadcast in
Luanda, where she had lived for three years before arriving in Rio, Rosine ended up living far
away from the postcard settings, amid frequent shootouts in Rio’s favelas, then in a squat run by
the PCC in central São Paulo, and later in a peripheral neighbourhood of the city. Her last address
was markedly safer and more comfortable than the previous ones; however, with one teenage
daughter and five small children born in Brazil, she worried about their “bad company” in the
neighbourhood. Not having the financial means to do so in the immediate future, she nevertheless
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harboured hopes of one day migrating to a more promising place and starting over yet another
time.
Again, I do not mean to convey that all international migrants living in squats in central
São Paulo had concrete plans to leave Brazil for the global North. Most of those that I interviewed,
however, expressed that aspiration or remote future possibility, either because that was their
original plan or because they felt frustrated with their lives in the city. This is not to say that these
international migrants might not end up settling in São Paulo, but it is important to recognize that
for most, if not all of them, their aspirations and imaginations of future possibilities were not
delimited by São Paulo’s perimeter.

A religious and anti-colonial cosmopolitan outlook

In Chapter Three, I analysed the discourse developed by housing movements (particularly the
MSTC’s) to justify their claims to dignified housing and the act of squatting. This discourse
defends squatting as a legitimate act due to the state’s unwillingness and inability to promote the
urban poor’s right to housing, and it frames vacant private property (that does not perform a social
function) as the actual crime. The international migrants living in São Paulo’s squats who aspire
to migrate to a country of the global North sometimes also articulate a particular discourse
justifying and granting legitimacy to their plans, and framing international borders hindering
people’s mobility as the actual problem. Instead of insisting on their right to housing or to other
social rights in São Paulo, these international migrants often showed a sense of a right to
international mobility—as such, they articulated a more cosmopolitan outlook. It is not my aim to
review the literature on cosmopolitanism here—which spans the thoughts of the stoics, of
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Enlightenment (most notably, Kant) and postmodern philosophers (such as Michel Foucault and
Jacques Derrida)—but to simply analyse the particular cosmopolitan leanings expressed by the
international migrants considered in this research. Cosmopolitanism has been associated with the
views of globe-trotting elites (Calhoun 2003; Kofman 2005) and with colonial-like projects that
espouse particularly Western values as if they were universal (Mignolo 2012; Balibar 2012).
However, different authors have increasingly analysed manifestations of cosmopolitanism that,
less conceptual and more practical, have been enacted “from below.” 172 This scholarship has
generally considered the “transnational experiences that are particular rather than universal and
that are unprivileged—indeed, often coerced” (Robbins 1998, 1). This line of investigation has
found fertile ground among scholars interested in the actions of disenfranchised international
migrants with limited or no legal status who nonetheless claim rights and assert the legitimacy of
their mobility and presence, as in the work of Peter Nyers (2003), Luis Cabrera (2010), and
Thomas Nail (2015), for instance.
Among these many works, Loren Landau and Iriann Freemantle’s (2010) notion of
“tactical cosmopolitanism” is particularly helpful in illuminating the approach taken by many of
the international migrants considered in this dissertation. Landau and Freementle argue that
African international migrants living in Johannesburg have responded to a context marked by
xenophobic violence and restrictive immigration policies by devising a “thin” cosmopolitan
outlook that positions them as not bound by local obligations, but as transient people somewhat
superior to those obligations. In the face of violence and humiliation, but sometimes also due to
original plans of mobility beyond South Africa, these international migrants display a “strong
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For examples of this literature, see Mignolo (2010), Vertovec (2009), Olwig (2010), and Baban and Rygiel (2014,
2017).
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orientation to yet unknown and untravelled places outside both the host and the home country”
(381), and this orientation is fed by the far-reaching migration networks they integrate. Their
cosmopolitan discourse, without constituting “a coherent or self-conscious collective philosophy”
(380) and without adopting cosmopolitanism’s “universalised concerns for others” (381) drew on
a mixture of pan-African, human rights, and religious rhetoric, as well as on the language of the
global elites.
In a similar vein, I see the cosmopolitan outlook displayed by some Congolese and Angolan
migrants living in São Paulo’s downtown squats as being informed by their disillusionment with
São Paulo and by their aspirations to live in a better place (these aspirations being informed by
their transnational connections). This outlook allows them not to be bound by São Paulo’s
intractable housing struggles, and it frames their aspired global itineraries as necessary and
justified. Some migrants I met in the city elaborated particular lines of reasoning legitimizing their
transnational mobility plans beyond a search for a better life. They explained the legitimacy of
their plans in theological terms, in terms of never-ending colonial extractions of their national
resources, or by combining these two lines of reasoning.
Let us first consider the theological line of reasoning. The majority of the international
migrants that I met who lived in São Paulo’s squats frequented Pentecostal churches of varied
denominations. I encountered different men from Angola and the DRC living in squats who
presented themselves as pastors, because they had led congregations in their countries of origin or
of previous residence. Not all of them formally led worship services in churches in São Paulo, but
they habitually offered their spiritual guidance to fellow international migrants in need of support.
This was Philippe’s case. In Angola he was a pastor at Assembleia dos Santos, but in São Paulo he
went to Paz e Vida. He explained that there was no point in serving as an actual pastor in São Paulo
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because “there’s no stability yet, and the plan is not to stay for a long time.” Still, he uploaded
some of his sermons to YouTube, and occasionally, at the invitation of a pastor friend, he
participated in services at a church. Philippe, as most of the international migrants I interviewed,
often referred to God’s will, protection, and reasoning when explaining his own story and goals.
“Because God is so good,” “God willing,” “God will protect [someone]” are expressions featured
in many of my transcripts. The divine also informed some of these international migrants’ views
of why their mobility plans were legitimate. 173
“God has created the world for all humanity equally, with no borders,” Philippe explained
to me; “This is something I really believe in.” He mentioned this belief at different times we met
in São Paulo, and he also brought it up when I visited him and his family in Montréal. According
to Philippe, the long and windy journey they took, which involved both regular and irregular border
crossings, and which finally led them to Canada, might have violated some legal restrictions
imposed by states, but it is perfectly legitimate in the eyes of God. National borders are arbitrary
and unjust human creations, after all. Paul Freston (2008) identified a very similar religious
discourse in his research with Brazilian Pentecostals living, often without legal status, in the United
States. What Freston calls the “theology of the undocumented” stands for this pastoral treatment
(which is not exclusive to Brazilian immigrants) that emphasises, among other things, the idea that
borders are not God’s, but man-made creations. Freston sees this treatment as attempting to solve
a conundrum within Pentecostal churches frequented by undocumented migrants, since these
denominations tend to be legalistic and morally condemning of infractions.
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Rygiel (2014) identified similar theological expressions of cosmopolitanism among dwellers of Sidiro, a small
Greek village near the border with Turkey. In this case, the villagers have organized themselves to make sure the lives
of migrants who have drowned trying to reach Greece are honored with a proper burial in their village. Referring to
religious beliefs—such as the notion of providing these migrants “a place in this world, if only to pass to the other
world” (68)—these villagers criticized the arbitrariness of borders and highlighted the inherent value of every human
life.
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In addition to this theological discourse justifying people’s right to international mobility,
some international migrants I interviewed also referred to a sort of postcolonial critique of the
exploitation of their country’s resources in order to legitimize their migration plans. This came up,
for example, in a conversation with both Philippe and Loid, the Congolese man whose wife and
baby had migrated to Portugal. “Africa’s problem is that you, white ones, are killing us. I’m sorry
I’m talking like this, but you, white ones, are killing us,” asserted Loid. He and Philippe explained
to me that the DRC, as other African countries, was extremely rich in minerals and other natural
resources, and that many developed countries, but also Brazil, were extracting those resources and
leaving nothing behind for the African people “to enjoy.” In order to more effectively extract these
resources, “the white ones” incite “rebellions, wars, an eternal mess, killing people,” as Loid put
it. Given this scenario, “people have to leave,” and the countries that most benefit from this
colonial extraction, and therefore offer more comfort to their inhabitants, are the most desired
destinations. Philippe agreed with Loid’s analysis, but only raised an issue: “And if everyone
leaves then it doesn’t work either. How is the country going to be?”
The perversity of this logic of colonial extractions (facilitated by the breeding of conflicts)
that leads to the displacement of people in the global South has been remarked by critics of the
governance of (forced) migration for decades, as well as by those displaced by this logic
themselves. By the final years of the Cold War, Nobel observed that:

The overwhelming majority of the refugees originate in the Third World. The direct causes
of their flight are conflicts kept alive mostly by super-power politics and by weapons
forged and manufactured at bargain prices in the rich countries, who export death and
destruction, and import the natural and partly processed products of the poor countries. At
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the same time, they refuse to a great extent to receive the refugees who try to escape the
suffering and the sorrow generated by super-power politics. (Nobel 1988, 29, quoted in
Malkki 1995, 504)

Authors analysing the social mobilizations and claims made by disenfranchised migrants
have shown how these migrants often articulate this sort of anti-colonial critique. McNevin (2006),
for example, highlighted that the Sans-Papiers of France, who were mostly from African countries
formerly colonised by France, referred to this historical relationship in order to challenge their
criminalization in the country. The words of Ababacar Diop, a delegate of the Sans-Papiers, echo
Loid’s and Philippe’s line of reasoning: “Our background is in ancient colonies and our riches
have been plundered by France as well as by other European countries. It is legitimate that we flee
our drained countries to come here to look for our subsistence” (quoted in McNevin 2011, 108).
The main difference here is that Loid and Philippe put the emphasis not so much on the colonial
past but on a similarly (even though not officially) colonial present, marked by extraction of
resources and expulsion of populations.
In sum, for many of the Congolese and Angolan international migrants living in São
Paulo’s squats, a discourse granting legitimacy to their international mobility plans was more
appealing than a discourse legitimizing their rights in the city. Either due to their original plans or
to their disappointing experiences in São Paulo, they displayed a tactical sort of cosmopolitanism
that freed them from local obligations and that positioned them as entitled to a right to international
mobility, be it because of the arbitrary character of national borders in the eyes of God or because
of colonial injustices.

235

Minding the gap between what is and what might come

As we saw in the previous chapter, international migrants living in the MSTC’s squats generally
showed reluctance to committing to the movement’s agenda, and they evaded both obligations to
contribute to a local struggle for housing and participation in the citizenship discourse of
deservingness. By evading this discourse, they bypass the boundaries within citizenship, those that
delimit the community of value and distinguish between the full or good citizens and their others.
Also, as this chapter showed, some of the international migrants living in central São Paulo squats
articulated a discourse that questioned the legitimacy of the boundaries around national citizenship
regimes, or the exclusionary dimension of citizenship as a “regime of government” that is “used
globally to regulate mobility” (Rygiel 2010, 11).
At the same time, I cannot assert that these international migrants unambiguously refuse
the legitimacy or desirability of citizenship, or that they clearly pursue or trace the contours of an
alternative political community beyond it. Why am I unable to make this assertion? This chapter’s
opening vignette ends with Philippe reassuring me that he and his family had come to Canada “to
stay.” When chatting with him both in São Paulo and in Montréal, he enthusiastically advised me
to apply for permanent residency in Canada as soon as possible, and later for citizenship, because
Canada could offer me a much better life than Brazil. Other international migrants that I met in
squats in São Paulo referred to countries in the global North as places where their rights would be
respected, where they could obtain the stable and prosperous life they had been striving for—
places where they would finally obtain existential mobility, we could say.
We can thus identify an ambivalence in these international migrants’ take on citizenship:
they criticize the legitimacy of international borders that hinder their mobility, but what they are
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searching for (access to rights and a dignified life) depends on these same borders. As argued by
McNevin (2013), the notion of ambivalence can be particularly illuminating for interpreting the
claims made by irregular migrants. These claims might not aim at a complete dismantling of the
international state system, and they can even be reliant on citizenship or human rights frameworks,
but this, she argues, does not eliminate their transformative potential. Rather, McNevin stresses
that “It is entirely possible for ambivalence towards the strategies open to migrant struggle to
operate less as a handicap or a prelude to becoming political than as a productive resource that
plays a part in being political” (197, emphasis in the original). I see the claims constituting the
tactical cosmopolitanism of some migrant squatters in São Paulo as being marked by such
ambivalence. The ambivalence they express is marked by a rejection of the borders guarding
national citizenship regimes and by a desire to enjoy rights and protection guarded by these same
borders. Their aspirations and critiques are not fully captured by the frame of citizenship, but
neither do they envision a radical overturn of citizenship and its replacement by a clearly-outlined
alternative political community. As such, their aspirations and critiques are located in the gap
between the “no longer” and the “not yet,” as put by Isin and Nyers (2014, 9): their political
subjectivity is no longer limited by citizenship, but it has not yet developed a vocabulary of a
political topography beyond the limits of citizenship.
Finally, and just to complicate matters some more, it might also be that citizenship (even
in a society perceived as prosperous) does not exactly delimit these international migrants’
horizons, even when they pursue citizenship status in countries of the global North. Instead, it
might be that the pursuit of citizenship is merely a strategic asset that allows for the maintenance
of less-easily fixed or bordered horizons. Given the complex sense of belonging that international
migrants often have (combining allegiances to their countries of origin and relatives who stayed,
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their connections to migration networks spanning different places, in addition to attachments to
their host societies), it might be that, as Fernandez and Olson (2011) have argued, these
international migrants are more interested in “living, loving, and working” where it pleases them
than in fully belonging to a single society. Their “home” might be in multiple locations, and, as
such, their horizons might not be easily pinned down.
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Conclusion

Thesis overview

This dissertation has sought to answer two main questions: (1) How can we conceive the
intersecting struggles of citizens and non-citizens living together at the urban margins? (2) What
sort of visions of transformation do they articulate? In posing the second question, the dissertation
explores particularly how those visions of transformation engage with the horizon of citizenship.
In answering these questions, the dissertation argues the following. First, that housing and
residential segregation are fundamental for matters of political subjectivity and belonging in cities.
Additionally, that an analysis of the aspirations and claims made by both citizens and international
migrants living at the urban margins shows us that the horizon of citizenship can, in some cases,
kindle progressive change while reinforcing inegalitarian assumptions, and, in other cases, fail to
completely capture urban dwellers’ political imaginations.
This dissertation is, in essence, about the problem of political subjectivity and belonging
at the urban margins. It explores how people living in precarious neighbourhoods and forms of
housing are often constructed as and/or presumed to be undervalued members of the city. The
dissertation has situated this problem within a particular context—one formed by the relationships
among cities, migration, segregation, and citizenship. Not least, this context is characterized by a
particular sorting dynamic found in cities: its tendency to attract and segregate the disenfranchised,
pushing them to both the physical margins of the city and the symbolic margins of citizenship. In
this sense, this research draws a parallel between where someone is compelled to live, and the
degree of inclusion they can expect to enjoy. The dissertation thus proposes a way to see how the
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dynamics of the “community of value” (Anderson 2013) play out in cities (rather than in the
nation). Looking at how the community of value operates in the context of a city, we see it can
“other” both citizens and non-citizens inhabiting stigmatized forms of housing, constructing them
as undeserving of the enjoyment of rights and political participation.
Ensuing from this is the problem of whether those marginalized demand to be counted as
full citizens, and the possible consequences of such a demand. The dissertation shows that not all
those who find themselves similarly at the margins of cities and of citizenship will seek to belong
to the city’s community of value. It points out that when the disenfranchised seek to position
themselves as virtuous city dwellers deserving of rights, they can climb the city’s social hierarchies
and access rights and political recognition, but that this can unintentionally end up reproducing the
notion that some city dwellers are more deserving than others; that is, they reinforce the boundaries
of the community of value. Further, the dissertation shows that international migrants, by virtue of
having different horizons, can bypass the discourse of deservingness altogether; that is, it is the
particular horizons of the marginalized, not the marginalization per se, that determines whether
one is caught up in the conundrum of deservingness. The dissertation also stresses that
international migrants can, in addition to evading local discourses of citizenship, critique the
international borders guarding national citizenship regimes.
In the following sections, I highlight some of the main contributions made by the
dissertation. I then elaborate on the limitations of this work, its implications, and avenues for
further research.

The politics of citizenship in segregated cities
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This dissertation has highlighted the importance of housing and residential segregation for the
politics of citizenship in cities. It builds on works that foreground the city as a key site for the
constitution of the meaning of citizenship, and on works that consider how housing and residential
segregation shape the politics of citizenship in cities, to explore how people’s housing impacts
their political subjectivity and belonging in cities. I have borrowed the “eviction room” metaphor
conceived by Carolina Maria de Jesus (2017 [1960]) to explore how those evicted (often literally)
to living spaces at the margins of the “city proper” are often simultaneously evicted (this time,
symbolically) to the margins of the city’s community of value, constructed as burdensome or
threatening groups undeserving of rights, protections, and political participation. I have thus
discussed how the politics of citizenship in highly segregated cities is often permeated by moral
judgements of deservingness and value that are associated with where people live. Combining
insights from both Bridget Anderson’s (20013) and Engin Isin’s (2002) work, I have explored how
those inhabiting the urban margins are often constituted as the immanent others of the city’s good
or full citizens.
These insights have been developed with the realities of São Paulo and Brazil in mind. As
such, they might resonate less in other urban contexts, especially those less marked by stark
inequalities and characterized by a more egalitarian culture of citizenship. Still, in contexts where
the rights and entitlement to political participation of the urban poor are not self-evident and where
they are treated as an urban “problem,” these insights can help us analyse the promises and
limitations of grassroots citizenship agendas. As shown in Chapter Two, for many marginalized
dwellers of Brazilian cities today, the universal and anonymous identity of the citizen can still
offer very limited protection. A generalized climate of fear of violent crime stigmatizes the urban
poor and associates their communities and generally darker bodies with the world of criminality.
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In such a context, many of these urban dwellers, when making claims to rights and protection, feel
compelled to prove they are not criminals or social burdens but contributing and valuable members
of society who deserve to have their rights respected. The dissertation shows that when
marginalized urban dwellers engage with the citizenship discourse of deservingness underpinning
the city’s community of value, they are taking a defensive and strategic stance that recognizes their
stigmatization and seeks to overturn it. This stance can bear important and progressive fruits: it
can allow those at the urban margins to access rights and protection and to influence formal
politics; and it can transform their self-perceptions (which can lead to new claims and social
transformations that we cannot foresee). But the dissertation also underscores that by taking this
stance, these urban dwellers risk reinforcing the boundaries of the community of value, i.e., the
assumption that not all urban dwellers are equally deserving of rights.

Struggles across the citizenship divide

The insights of this research help us think about the struggles of marginalized citizens and noncitizens in cities together, without assuming that formal citizenship status warrants separate
analyses. This is in keeping with recent calls for migration research to de-exceptionalize the
migration experience and see it within a broader social context (Dahinden 2016), and to explore
how the exclusions faced by non-citizens connect to those faced by citizens (Anderson 2019). By
focusing on shared urban struggles, I do not mean to say that citizenship and immigration status
have absolutely no impact on the lives of those living at the urban margins. For example, citizens
are generally not subject to immigration controls and the risk of deportation, 174 and they often have
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Even though citizens have also been increasingly made irregular, as Peter Nyers (2019) shows.
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access to forms of social protection and political participation (including the right to vote and to
be elected) that are often partially or entirely denied to non-citizens. But in host cities marked by
stark socioeconomic inequalities and where a great proportion of the urban poor is treated as the
outsiders within, as second- or third-class citizens, the predicaments of disenfranchised citizens
might coincide with many of the predicaments of disenfranchised non-citizens.
In exploring a coalition formed between similarly marginalized citizens and non-citizens,
the dissertation highlights the generative175 potential in such encounters. These coalitions can be
seen as generative because they are premised on a logic that does not separate the interests of the
citizens from those of the non-citizens—i.e. because they disrupt the way we have to come
conceive political struggle along nationality lines—and because they bring to the surface the
failure of citizenship to provide universal inclusion. At the same time, the dissertation also
highlights that the unity between citizens and non-citizens can also be the main factor undermining
them, if too much reliance is placed on a presumption of shared goals and political perspectives.
While this dissertation shows that citizens and non-citizens can face similar predicaments in their
struggles for dignified living conditions in the city and in how they are perceived in it, it highlights
that this does not necessarily mean they will have similar projects of existential mobility or
political horizons. Hence, coalitions forged between disenfranchised citizens and non-citizens, as
well as analyses of these coalitions, need to also make room for the possibly divergent perspectives
and objectives at stake.

The horizons of migrant struggles

McNevin (2020) sees “politically generative” as referring to “productive ideas, practices, and discourses that
challenge the givenness of subjects (citizens) and institutions (citizenship, the state) or that question whether those
subjects and institutions must take the established forms they currently take.”
175
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Critical migration and citizenship studies have thoroughly explored the political subjectivity and
agency of disenfranchised international migrants (refugees, asylum-seekers, the illegalized, etc.)
and countered mainstream discourses that frame them as either helpless victims or villains. But to
theorize the political agency and subjectivity of non-citizens is a challenging task, because the
modern political discourse based on state sovereignty posits that political life takes place within
the spatial and temporal limits of national communities, and that we are political subjects as
citizens of particular states (Walker 1993). In other words, the political agency and subjectivity of
non-citizens is conceptually unsettling because we assume political life takes place within the
parameters of international space and progressive time (McNevin 2019), and that full citizenship
in a given country is the ultimate horizon for political struggle. In this light, different authors have
shown how disenfranchised international migrants, in their discourses and actions, can critique the
legitimacy of international borders unauthorizing and obstructing their mobility and be political
despite lack of recognition by a state. This dissertation contributes to these studies by showing
how these migrants’ actions and perspectives can pose a critique not only to the external
boundaries guarding national citizenship regimes but also to the internal boundaries of citizenship,
which distinguish the full or good citizens from their immanent others.
In analysing the discourses and strategies of international migrants living in squats in
central São Paulo, this research agrees with analyses that point out that while the struggles of
disenfranchised migrants might not fully articulate clear notions of belonging or political
subjectivity beyond citizenship, their struggles are not so easily captured by the premises of
citizenship either. I have shown that some of the international migrants living in São Paulo’s squats
develop a discourse (based on religious beliefs and colonial critiques) that positions international
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borders and border controls as arbitrary and unjust, thereby defying core premises of national
citizenship regimes. At the same time, this discourse was inspired by a desire to access rights and
certain living standards which ultimately depended on the existence of national citizenship
regimes. Also, the dissertation illuminates how international migrants, because of their horizons
informed by transnational connections and family obligations, can evade local citizenship
discourses of deservingness. By bypassing such discourses, they reveal the limitations in pursuing
the horizon of full citizenship, especially in highly unequal cities.

Implications, limitations, and further research

This research proposes a particular approach to analysing the shared struggles of disenfranchised
citizens and non-citizens inhabiting marginal urban spaces, by paying attention to how where
people live impacts their positioning in the hierarchy of a city’s community of value. This approach
can be taken up and adapted by research focused on other urban contexts of the global South and
North. For example, in São Paulo, the presence of poor and racialized international migrants is not
particularly politicized, just as the issue of international immigration does not feature prominently
in national political debates. As disenfranchised migrants, refugees, and asylum-seekers inhabit
favelas, precarious peripheral neighbourhoods, cortiços, and squats, they tend to blend in and
become part of the urban poor; as such, they are vulnerable to the same strand of neglect, racism,
and criminalization that their Brazilian neighbours encounter. It would thus be interesting to
compare how the dynamics of the community of value play out in highly unequal cities where
international migrants are a more visible and politicized presence, and where they are targeted by
particular discourses of deservingness and value. For example, in Buenos Aires and in
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Johannesburg, disenfranchised international migrants tend to be scapegoated for social problems
(unemployment and crime, for example) and framed by particular xenophobic discourses, while
these migrants often inhabit precarious neighbourhoods and forms of housing alongside
marginalized citizens, who are also victim of prejudiced discourses. How do the overlapping
discourses around the “undesirable” migrant and the “undeserving” urban poor play out in the
citizenship politics of those cities?
In highlighting the intimate connection between where people live in cities and their ability
to be seen as rights bearers and political subjects, this dissertation can help us think about agendas
for more just urban futures. If our future entails an even more urban world, 176 and if our cities are
increasingly divided, we need to pay attention to how growing urban inequality translates into
social hierarchies of value and political disenfranchisement. The trends towards the
financialization of housing and growing residential segregation threaten cities’ historical role as
places of diversity and democratic experimentation, where, as Sassen (2017, 120) stresses, the
“powerless” have been able to make diverse claims, “including demands for better garbage
collection, housing issues, and police brutality.” I have argued that an important way through
which segregation impacts marginalized urban dwellers’ ability to make claims is through its
entanglement with processes of othering, which position these urban dwellers as not-quite full and
valued members of the public deserving of rights. Hence, if we are interested in pressing for more
just urban futures, we need to challenge not only exclusionary urban governance agendas but also
the assumptions around value and deservingness that permeate highly unequal cities.
Likewise, the dissertation’s analysis of the strategies and discourses of grassroots housing
movements also has implications for how we approach agendas for more just cities. I have stressed
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Estimates indicate that 68 percent of humanity will be living in urban areas by 2050 (UNDESA 2018).
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that, in order to obtain their urgent subsistence needs, those at the urban margins are often pressed
to engage with the existing discourses around deservingness and value that permeate the
citizenship politics of highly unequal cities. While recognizing the limitations of this approach, I
do not discount the transformative potential of these claims simply because they are not aimed at
a complete overhaul of the status quo. I highlight that such claims and agendas can lead to
important concrete changes (such as the production of better quality and well-located housing
projects) and self-perception changes (in supporting marginalized people’s sense of themselves as
valuable political subjects), whose ultimate implications cannot be anticipated. In this sense, while,
in an ideal and not necessarily realistic scenario, grassroots urban agendas should directly aim at
disrupting assumptions around deservingness, it is also possible that actual citizenship agendas
that claim for an expansion of the city’s community of value could lead to a change in the very
premises around deservingness that sustain the boundaries of this community. Much like claims
for “rights in the city” (the right to housing, to sanitation, to safety, etc.) can be seen as galvanizers
or a step in the direction of a radical agenda for “the right to the city” (an alternative and just urban
society) (Harvey 2008; Marcuse 2010), claims for the full citizenship of certain urban dwellers
might pave the way for agendas that press for the full inclusion of all urban dwellers.
In relation to the question of coalitions forged between citizens and non-citizens in squats,
this dissertation brings insights for both their actual organizing and their analysis. There is much
to be celebrated in these coalitions, especially in a context of increasing financialization of housing
and populist nationalisms that vilify both domestic and international “others.” These coalitions
demonstrate the possibility of conceiving those on the other side of the citizenship divide as
“comrades in struggle” rather than illegitimate competitors for scarce resources in cities where
adequate housing, secure jobs, and other social rights are a privilege of the few. Considering these
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promising aspects of such coalitions, the dissertation also stresses that those organizing these
coalitions (activists) and those studying them (scholars), as well as those who both organize and
study them (activist scholars), should be careful not to presume that all squatters will have the
same goals and political perspectives. In some contexts, international migrants might be concerned
with obtaining legal recognition from the state and accessing formal housing, while activist locals
might reject both the authority of the state and the existence of private property. In other contexts,
migrants might be in search of a temporary and affordable place to stay and lack strong attachments
to the city at stake, while locals might be engaged in a long-term battle for homeownership and
political belonging in the city. In any case, if these coalitions ignore the possible divergences at
stake and privilege one particular perspective on what is to be claimed (usually the perspective of
the activist locals), these coalitions run the risk of being fragile and ephemeral, and of also
imposing on international migrants the responsibility for carrying out struggles that many citizens
have given up on. Further, if analysis presumes migrants to be aligned with the visions of local
“avant-garde” struggles, it runs the risk of swinging the pendulum of misrepresentation from the
extreme of abject helplessness (Malkki 1996) to the extreme of heroic revolutionary agency.
Further, this research brings some insights that are relevant for policy discussions. First, in
exploring the centrality of housing for urban dwellers’ living conditions and belonging in cities,
this dissertation brings to the fore the importance of urban policies that promote safe, affordable,
and dignified housing for all. The activism of the MSTC and other housing movements in São
Paulo is particularly illuminating in this regard. Their activism highlights the insufficiency of
housing policies based on the construction of precarious housing projects on the outskirts of cities,
where the urban poor have limited (if any) access to basic social services and the general
opportunities brought by city life. Also, their activism shows that, in order to secure adequate
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housing for all, housing policies need not necessarily invest in the construction of new dwellings.
In cities that have abandoned properties not fulfilling any “social function” (often due to real estate
speculation), legal and policy instruments can allow for the expropriation of such properties, which
can then be renovated and turned into social housing. In Brazil, the City Statute, passed in 2001
thanks to the activism of housing movements, is a model legislation allowing for such
expropriations. Hence, the policy lessons taught by housing movements such as the MSTC can
help challenge a current global policy agenda promoting the financialization of housing, and push
for urban policies that are in line with the Sustainable Development Goal 11 to ensure universal
access to adequate and affordable housing by 2030.
Also, the circumstances of the international migrants living in central São Paulo’s squats
attest to the insufficiency of relatively open immigration policies in contexts where rights and
protection are barely accessible to those disenfranchised. Different people interviewed for this
research criticized the fact that international migrants were given permission to arrive and stay in
Brazil but, once in the country, were generally left to fend for themselves. The Congolese Loid,
for example, voiced the criticism that while Brazil accepted the arrival of international migrants,
these newcomers were forced to come to terms with the wretched phrase “This is Brazil” (which
implied that they should not expect to have dignified standards of living in the country). 177
Similarly, Carmen Silva was critical of how Brazil had been “making international treaties” that
welcomed international migrants but “without any planning”—which explained why so many of
them were resorting to the squats she organizes. 178 Finally, Camila Asano, program coordinator at
the human rights NGO Conectas, recognized that “it is positive for Brazil to have open borders,”
and that “there are different paths for regularization,” but that beyond this, “the issue of support
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for accessing rights is still very precarious”—even though, as she stressed, the São Paulo municipal
government had made attempts to remedy this situation by developing a municipal law and policies
specifically geared to the rights and assistance of disenfranchised international migrants. 179
By bringing up these criticisms I do not mean to imply that the Brazilian government
should adopt more restrictive immigration policies until it is able to adequately guarantee the
access to rights and protection to all international migrants and asylum-seekers. Rather, I mean to
say that immigration policies should be accompanied by initiatives that guarantee that migrants
can access rights and protections upon arrival. Also, when we consider policies that aim to protect
and assist international migrants, we should consider the broader context in which migrants are
inserted once they arrive in the country, and the sort of policies that can remedy their particular
struggles as well as those shared with disenfranchised citizens. For example, in relation to housing,
it is important to develop policies that are accessible to both citizens and non-citizens, and that are
adaptive to the different needs and life plans at stake. The São Paulo municipal immigration policy
aims to “grant the immigrant population access to housing programs” (Law N 16.478 2016), but
the existing housing programs are based on the homeownership model, and many migrants might
not be able to or interested in committing to a subsidized line of credit over several years. In this
case, both citizens and non-citizens could benefit from more diverse housing policies, that also
include substantive rent support programs and rental social housing.
It is important to also highlight the scope and limitations of this research. It focuses on a
very particular encounter between a sophisticated Brazilian social movement and recently-arrived
international migrants who generally felt disillusioned with their experiences in São Paulo. This
cannot be taken as a case that is representative of encounters between marginalized citizens and
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non-citizens in São Paulo in general, much less of encounters between disenfranchised citizens
and non-citizens in other cities across the world. For example, in São Paulo, there are many
encounters that take place between citizens who are not organized within social movements and
non-citizens who are more settled in the city and who have a greater sense of belonging in it.
Because of the two very particular groups that were the focus of this dissertation, the question of
citizenship and its community of value gained conceptual prominence in it (especially because of
the MSTC’s political discourse). However, this question might not be as salient in other locations
globally. Brazil also offers a unique context in this regard, because it combines, on the one hand,
extreme levels of social inequality and limited effective citizenship for most of the population,
and, on the other, a progressive Constitution and strong social movements that, since the late
1970s, have relied on the language of citizenship to articulate the most varied claims on the state.
Within the scope of this research, there were also particular issues that I did not have the
opportunity to fully explore. One of these was the gender aspect of the politics of housing
movements such as the MSTC, which is brought up in Chapter Three. During fieldwork and as I
undertook interviews, I became more aware of the importance of gender for the dynamics of
everyday life in the MSTC’s squats, not least because most of the coordinators and mediators of
the movement were women, in addition to the movement’s leader being a woman as well. In the
future, a closer attention to this aspect will help me extend the research of this dissertation and
provide a complementary lens into analysing the relationship between the movement’s leadership
and the international migrants. Also, during fieldwork, it became clear to me that Angolan women
who lived in squats with small children and who were struggling to reunite with their husbands in
Brazil because their visas were being repeatedly denied by the Brazilian diplomacy (an issue that
is mentioned in Chapter Four) were a particularly vulnerable group. While, in this dissertation, I
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did not explore how their particular gendered experiences in the city impacted their horizons and
aspirations, further research exploring this dimension will bring further nuance to the analysis.
Finally, I would be also be interested in deepening my investigations on the politics of
squatting in São Paulo, by comparing the discourse and strategies of the MSTC to those of the
MTST (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Teto, i.e. Movement of the Roofless Workers), and
paying particular attention to the role that the issues of gender and race feature in their agendas.
The MSTC has been at the forefront of squatting abandoned buildings in the city’s central districts,
and it cooperates with government agencies in order to influence urban policymaking, while the
MTST has gained notoriety for squatting large tracts of vacant land at the edges of the city, and it
distances itself from “polite” negotiations with the state. While these movements have contrasting
approaches to the state, they have both been criminalized with the rise of far-right state and federal
administrations since 2018 (led by President Jair Bolsonaro) and increasingly framed as
“terrorists.” Future research might investigate how this adversarial political context has impacted
these two movements’ (very different) strategies and relationships with the state. Also, as the farright in Brazil has invested in both racist and misogynistic discourses, I would be particularly
interested in exploring how these movements, which have been mostly organized by women and
by darker-skinned city dwellers, have articulated responses to these discourses.

Conclusion

This dissertation has analysed the marginalization and claims-making of Brazilians and
international migrants living together in squats in central São Paulo. This research has
implications, however, that extend beyond the walls of these precarious and vibrant dwellings.
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First, it helps us understand better the meaning and value of citizenship in cities: urban dwellers’
effective hold on citizenship is deeply shaped by where they live. Citizenship here is understood
as not simply formal status, but as a meaningful political identity; it refers to urban dwellers’
belonging and their ability to claim rights in the city. This research shows that if we fail to pay
attention to how residential segregation itself impacts people’s ability to be seen as deserving,
valuable members of society (that is, as “good” or “full” citizens), we are overlooking a
particularly pernicious way segregation contributes to the fracturing of cities’ social fabrics.
Second, this dissertation illustrates the nuances and implications of the often ambivalent, yet
transformative aspirations and claims of those at the urban margins. In doing so, it underscores the
importance of not assuming that shared marginalization entails shared goals, of not conflating a
researcher’s hopes with the hopes of the disenfranchised, and of not disregarding the urban poor’s
agendas if such agendas are not aimed at completely overhauling the (local or international) status
quo.
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Appendices
Appendix A: List of interviews (alphabetical)
1.
2.
3.
4.

Angolan couple (man and woman) living in a for-profit squat. São Paulo, February 2018.
Angolan man living in an MSTC squat. São Paulo, January 2018.
Angolan woman living in a for-profit squat. São Paulo, February 2018.
Benedito Barbosa, lawyer representing different housing movements in São Paulo. São
Paulo, February 2018.
5. “Beth,” Haitian woman living in an MSTC squat. São Paulo, December 2017.
6. Brazilian housing and pro-Palestine activist. São Paulo, November 2017.
7. Brazilian woman collaborating with the MSTC. São Paulo, November 2017.
8. Camila Asano, program coordinator at the human rights NGO Conectas. São Paulo,
February 2018.
9. Carla Aguiar, social worker at the NGO CAMI (Centro de Apoio ao Migrante, i.e. Support
Centre for Migrants). São Paulo, February 2018.
10. Carmen Silva, leader of the MSTC. São Paulo, December 2017 and March 2018.
11. Christo Kamanda, journalist and advocate for African migrants’ rights in São Paulo. São
Paulo, February 2018.
12. Congolese couple living in a for-profit squat. São Paulo, January 2018.
13. Congolese woman living in an MSTC squat. São Paulo, January 2018.
14. Congolese woman who had lived in, and been evicted from, a for-profit squat. São Paulo,
March 2018.
15. Egyptian woman living in a squat in central São Paulo. São Paulo, February 2018.
16. “Emmanuel,” Congolese asylum-seeker living in an MSTC squat. São Paulo, January
2018.
17. Evaniza Rodrigues, part of the leadership of UMM (União dos Movimentos de Moradia,
i.e. Union of the Housing Movements). São Paulo, March 2018.
18. Female MSTC coordinator. São Paulo, February 2018.
19. Female Palestinian refugee living in a squat in central São Paulo. São Paulo, January 2018.
20. Female Syrian refugee living in a squat in central São Paulo. São Paulo, February 2018.
21. Francisco Comarú, researcher of housing movements in São Paulo and Associate Professor
at Universidade Federal do ABC. São Paulo, March 2018.
22. Haitian man living in an MSTC squat. São Paulo, January 2018.
23. Ivanete Araújo, leader of MMLJ (Movimento por Moradi ana Luta por Justiça, i.e. Housing
Movement in the Struggle for Justice), and her assistant. São Paulo, March 2018.
24. “Jacques,” Angolan man living in a for-profit squat. São Paulo, March 2018.
25. “Jérémé,” Congolese asylum-seeker living in an MSTC squat. São Paulo, January 2018.
26. “Joana,” Angolan woman living in a for-profit squat. São Paulo, January 2018.
27. “Jorge”, Angolan social worker at CRAI (Centro de Referência e Atendimento para
Imigrantes, i.e Service Centre for Immigrants). São Paulo, October 2017.
28. Letícia Carvalho, legal advocate at the NGO Mssão Paz. São Paulo, February 2018.
29. “Loid,” Congolese asylum-seeker living in a for-profit squat. São Paulo, February 2018.
30. “Lorence,” Angolan man living in a for-profit squat. São Paulo, January 2018.
31. Luiz Gonzaga da Silva (“Gegê”), leader of the MMC (Movimento de Moradia do Centro,
i.e. Housing Movement of the Downtown). São Paulo, January 2018.
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32. Luiz Kohara, architect and long-term collaborator of São Paulo’s housing movements. São
Paulo, February 2018.
33. Male activist of the housing movement Terra Livre (“Free Earth”). São Paulo, January
2018.
34. Male MSTC coordinator. São Paulo, January 2018.
35. Marcia Araujo, social worker at the NGO Missão Paz. São Paulo, November 2017.
36. “Martin,” migrant from Cameroon living in an MSTC squat. São Paulo, December 2017.
37. Monica Quenca, social worker at the NGO Missão Paz. São Paulo, October 2017.
38. Náthalie Guimarães, Brazilian lawyer who assisted international migrants evicted from a
for-profit squat. São Paulo, January 2018.
39. Male Palestinian refugee living in a squat in central São Paulo. São Paulo, December 2017.
40. Male Togolese asylum-seeker living in a for-profit squat. São Paulo, February 2018.
41. Paolo Parise, priest and coordinator of the NGO Missão Paz. São Paulo, October 2017.
42. Paula Carlos de Souza, nun and researcher of cortiços in central São Paulo. São Paulo,
November 2017.
43. Paulo Illes, coordinator of the NGO CDHIC (Centro de Cidadania e Direitos Humanos do
Migrante, i.e. Centre for Migrants’ Human Rights and Citizenship). São Paulo, January
2018.
44. “Philippe,” Congolese asylum-seeker living in a for-profit squat. São Paulo, December
2017.
45. Pitchou Luambo, Congolese refugee and activist, founding member of GRIST at MSTC.
São Paulo, October 2017.
46. “Rosine,” Congolese refugee who had lived in a for-profit squat. São Paulo, March 2018.
47. Sávia Cordeiro, coordinator of CRAI (Centro de Referência e Atendimento para
Imigrantes, i.e Service Centre for Immigrants). São Paulo, March 2018.
48. “Tito,” Haitian migrant living in an MSTC squat. São Paulo, November 2017.
49. Two advisors of the Centre for Coordination of Policies for Migrants of São Paulo. São
Paulo, February 2018.
50. Two Angolan sisters sharing a room in an MSTC squat. São Paulo, January 2018.
51. Two Brazilian women, members of the housing movement ULC Unificação das Lutas dos
Cortiços, i.e. “Unification of the Cortiço Struggles”). São Paulo, March 2018.
52. Two migrant women from the Philippines who shared a room in a for-profit squat. São
Paulo, March 2018.
53. Venezuelan asylum-seeker who had stayed at the shelter run by the NGO Missão Paz. São
Paulo, October 2017.
54. William da Rosa, lawyer working with the NGO Cáritas, which supports asylum-seekers
in São Paulo. São Paulo, February 2018.
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Appendix B: Map of the city of São Paulo and its districts

West Zone

North Zone

East Zone

South Zone

Source: adapted by the author from the website Encontra SP. Accessed 15 August 2020.
https://www.encontrasaopaulo.com.br/mapa-de-sao-paulo.php
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